12th annual Pacific University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
April 18-19, 2008

Abstracts of papers 2008

Aimar, Simona "Names and Definite Descriptions" (Marsh 101, 9:45-10:30)

Kripke’s charge to Russell’s, Frege’s and Searle’s descriptivism has lead the philosophical debate to face the so-called Paradox of Naming. The behavior of names in, say, identity statements seems to suggest that some sort of descriptivist account of names is needed. On the other hand, however, it seems that names are rigid designators, whose referent cannot be determined descriptively. The paper defends a version of Weak Descriptivism firstly put forward by Kent Bach. An account of the linkage between Weak Descriptivism and the determination of the referent of a name is given on the way.

 

Alexander, Adam “Jacques Lacan’s Theory of Aggressiveness” (Marsh 213, 4:45-5:30)

This paper addresses the Lacanian understanding of aggressiveness, its relevance, validity, and position relative to the larger field of philosophy. Central arguments include the existence of a symbolic order that is constituent of the self, the existence of the unconscious as the influence of this symbolic order and the desire of others, human subjectivity as necessitating a fundamental misrecognition of the relation of the self to other people, and aggressiveness as existing necessarily due to the universal pursuit of a transparent and reducible self that caAimar” (Marsh 101, 9:45-10:30:30)

Al-Shawaf, Laith “Harman’s The Inference to the Best Explanation” (Marsh 213, 12:15-1:00)

This paper examines the manner of reasoning in the field of philosophy of science known as Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE).  Specifically, Gilbert Harman’s 1965 paper on the subject is dissected, and his arguments concerning enumerative induction and IBE are evaluated.  It is argued that enumerative induction seems systematically dependent on IBE, and that while there exist objections to Harman’s arguments, many of these can be refuted.  Harman’s case, though at times problematic, survives the attacks against it, and is fortified by additional points and arguments.

Andrews, Scarlet “Do You Believe in Ghosts?”  (Marsh 201, 11:30-12:15)

This paper is an investigation into the different forms of ghosts and a call for toleration of different outlooks and beliefs about ghosts. It begins by introducing themes from the book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, and explains the significance of the relationship of Phaedrus and the narrator of the book as an introduction to the theme of ghosts of our past. Then, it will explore the careers of some real-life ghost hunters, and offer some insight into their ideas about ghosts. The similarities of the narrator’s ghosts and the ghosts that modern ghost-hunters search for will be highlighted, and the topic of ghosts in the minds of building greater consciousness of self and society. Finally, I will present the idea that maybe we all have ghosts in our lives, and this does not make us crazy, just human. Differences in beliefs should not lead us to believe others are not intelligent. Instead, we should tolerate all types of beliefs and understand that we all have some things in common.

Azevedo, Justin “Presence, Embodiment, and Differance” (Marsh 213, 4:00-4:45)

In his essay on differance, Derrida tells us that the possibility of consciousness prior to the plays of differance is "the ether of metaphysics." Such a position presupposes the possibility of consciousness outside the plays of differance, which according to Derrida is impossible. Derrida's position radically opposes our common sense experience, which tends to view the presence of our subjectivity as intuitive and primordial, while signification is often understood only as an after effect of this initial presence. This is the basic presupposition of most phenomenology. The famous French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty for instance frequently talks about the primordial character of embodied experience as suggesting a kind of unmediated immediacy, which is not completely tied to language and conceptualization. Given these two schools of thought, structuralism on the one hand and phenomenology on the other, can we find a way of approaching the question that will split the difference? One that will allow us to both account for the mediated usage of language and the seemingly unmediated qualities of embodied experience? This is precisely my intention in this paper, I will argue that Derrida is correct in identifying consciousness as mediated by differance, but that he is wrong to solely identify the plays of differance with signification. Borrowing upon Merleau-Ponty's arguments about the nature of embodiment I hope to show that embodied experience does suggest a form of immediacy distinct from signification. Unlike Merleau-Ponty however I will argue that if we look critically at the relational character between subjectivity and objectivity we find the traces of a different form of differance, one that is not explicitly tied to signification but one that is at work nonetheless. I purpose we call this form of differance, embodied differance. I will begin by outlining what Derrida means by differance and how it relates to his overall argument about the nature of presence. From there I will try to argue that certain experiences such as pain undermine Derrida's assertion that consciousness is tied solely to signification. I will then outline the nature of spatiality and temporality as presented by Merleau-Ponty, and then end by analyzing the nature of this relation and comparing it Derrida's understanding of differance.

Ballard, Brian “Peirce’s Pragmatism from the Outside” (Marsh LL5, 10:30-11:15)

This paper is about C. S. Peirce’s pragmatic account of belief. Peirce claims that a belief is just the habits and behaviors it produces. I argue that this claim is false, and that, instead, a belief’s definitive feature is its propositional content. Furthermore, I argue that Peirce’s claim is self-referentially incoherent, that his claim being true gives us a good reason to reject it. This is because it is at least possible for someone who is a pragmatist to lead a “behavioral” life very similar to someone who believes the denial of pragmatism. But if a belief just is the behaviors it produces, then pragmatism implies that there is at least one possible world in which pragmatism is very similar to its own negation. And this is a very strange consequence. Generally, if any proposition p entails that there is a possible world in which p is indistinguishable from not-p, then we have good reason to reject p. Thus, we should reject Peirce’s pragmatic account of belief, and accept a more traditional propositional account.

Ball-Blakely, Michael “The Impossibility of Epistemic Inductions” (Marsh 206, 9:45-10:00)

When considering the justified true belief theory of knowledge, epistemologists primarily consider the truth or the justificatory status of the belief or claim. This is done both in attempts to refute the JTB, as well as in attempts to strengthen its position. However, legitimate and important as these attempted goals may be, more consideration needs to be given to the status of the belief in question. My project will attempt to press further into this area of epistemology, and it is concerned primarily with a theory of belief. In many analyses of knowledge, particularly the Gettier style cases a belief is considered in such a way that it is abstracted from the thought processes from which it came into being. When a person forms a belief, particularly through deductive inferences, it is made in a structure similar to that of a chain. This is not a causal chain, per se, but rather one where a belief is linked together with others in a way that the beliefs cannot always be separated while still preserving the intention of their originator. When epistemologists take one particular link out of the chain, such as in the Gettierized deductions below, to be studied to determine whether it constitutes knowledge, the true belief of the agent in question is often left behind. My proposal is that we take a step back in order to look more closely into whether or not the claims being studied in epistemology are actually ones that correspond to their author’s thoughts.  And while such a thing may present practical difficulties, such concerns are not reason to discredit a potentially true theory of knowledge.

Barry, Jason “Tackling Beardsley’s Aesthetic Theory of Art” (Marsh 101, 4:00-4:45)

The definition of “art” and “artworks” has historically been a very difficult task, yet it is of fundamental importance that we establish an effective definition, to be used for the correct demarcation of artworks. Monroe C. Beardsley provides an aesthetic definition of art. My essay provides an account of Beardsley’s definition, and I argue numerous reasons why we should reject it. I submit that Beardsley’s definitional theory is logically circular; assumes intentions we cannot adequately infer; is too broad in that it warrants the inclusion of artifacts which should not be considered art, while ruling out other works that should; and that his definition gives insufficient criteria for the evaluation of artworks. This essay is written in the analytic style. I do not argue for an alternative definition, but instead seek to establish compelling and logical reasons for the dismissal of this particular - seemingly attractive - definition of art.

Baumiller, Ronald “Del Sentimiento Trágico de la Vida and die Ewige Wiederkehr: an Essay Concerning the Immortality of the Soul” (Marsh 213, 8:00-8:45)

Beginning most notably with Plato, an inquiry concerning the immortality of the soul has persisted for centuries.  This investigation has even found itself in one of the most recent and prominent movements in philosophy, existentialism.  Kierkegaard, a theistic philosopher, is popularly accepted as the founder of existentialism along with his historical contrary Nietzsche, an atheistic philosopher.  What is crucial to the above investigation is also a distinguishing factor for the previously mentioned fundamental thinkers of existentialism—does God exist?  Due to Kierkegaard’s unique but ambiguous style, I will utilize Miguel de Unamuno, an explicit Kierkegaardian, to endorse the theistic approach concerning the immortality of the soul.  In this essay, I will rehearse the philosophies of Miguel de Unamuno and Friedrich Nietzsche regarding the immortality of the soul.  Then, I will contrast the two contraries to see if any light maybe shed on the subject by these two diverse existentialists.

Bieker, Jill “The Construction of Subjectivity According to Merleau-Ponty” (Marsh 207, 11:30-12:15)

This paper is an explicative account of subjectivity as is presented in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, which attempts to reveal how traditional dichotomies are addressed in the Phenomenology.  The emergent image ultimately recognizes both components of these dichotomies and reveals them in communication with one another, while avoiding the pitfalls of monism and dualism.

Blanchard, Joshua “Two Views of Domination: Horkheimer and Adorno against Marx” (Marsh 101, 2:15-3:00)

Questions about domination – political, ideological, economic, etc. – have enjoyed a rich and varied history in philosophy. One interesting study that arises is the method and form of domination. In other words, by what means do persons and institutions effect domination over others? How is this domination manifested? Is it encoded or explicit? I discuss two plausible answers to these questions. For Karl Marx, structures of domination are disguised under ideological illusions and pretenses. Ideology in this context serves to manipulate its objects into (largely ignorant) submission. In contrast, for Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, domination structures are not maintained through intellectually coercive means; rather, such structures are blatant. While ideology certainly still plays a sustaining role, domination is public and even understood. Despite its less covert existence on this view, domination is yet willingly accepted by the cultured masses. This means that there appear, in place of mere ideology, the operations of what they label “the culture industry.” In our modern situation, I claim that Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis is more accurate. That the culture industry supports unmasked domination is not only evident in developing institutions, but carries more explanatory force as a thesis.

Bowen, Jessica “Raunch Culture and Sexual Terrorism: Women’s Sexuality as Power” (Marsh 101, 8:00-8:45)

Throughout this paper I discuss how raunch culture reinforces men’s control over women’s sexuality through sexual terrorism.  The first section of this paper will explain the main ideas of raunch culture. Even though raunch culture promotes explicit displays of sexuality, and as such is framed as the new and improved feminist movement, these women still participate in patriarchal constructions of women’s sexuality. The second part of this paper will deal with Carole J. Sheffield’s concept of sexual terrorism, specifically the fear that is created and maintained through men’s sexual control over women. The third section of this paper will explain that when women participate in raunch culture, they unknowingly objectify themselves in order to become empowered, and this merely reinforces men’s power over women. Male power and control is connected to sexual violence and is reinforced by the standards of raunch culture. The final part of this paper will examine the idea that although raunch culture is framed as the new feminism and its advocates present seemingly strong arguments to support it, as long as these women participate in women’s sexuality as defined by men, they are not becoming empowered.  Women who participate in raunch culture have a distorted perception that exhibiting one’s sexuality is power; however, this distorted perception of power serves to reinforce the prominence of sexual terrorism and men’s control over women’s sexuality.

Braich, Matt “Strawson and Allison on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism” (Marsh 201, 4:45-5:30)

Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism is no stranger to controversy. A primary source of the controversy is the question of whether Kant regards the distinction between things in themselves and appearances as metaphysical or epistemological. Advocates of the metaphysical interpretation (specifically, P.F. Strawson) insist that things in themselves and appearances are distinct entities occupying different ontological realms: the phenomenal realm and the noumenal realm. By contrast, advocates of the epistemological interpretation (specifically, Henry Allison) insist that things in themselves and appearances are numerically identical entities considered from different perspectives: the empirical perspective and the transcendental perspective. While both interpretations offer plausible accounts of transcendental idealism, neither is completely compatible with the text. The question, then, is: what elements of Kant’s philosophy must we sacrifice in order to adopt either interpretation? In this paper, I answer this question and argue that, though each view fails to cohere fully with the text, the problem may not lie in the details of the interpretations. There is another possibility: transcendental idealism may not itself be a single, self-consistent doctrine.

Breitenfeldt, Jeffrey “Hume’s Ethical Duty to Animals: Widening the Sphere of Morality beyond Rights” (Marsh 206, 11:30-12:15)

In the animal rights debate, non-human animals are generally argued to have inherent “rights.” This argument has led to a complex debate surrounding the ability of animals to be rights-bearers through becoming a part of a common moral community. While there are strong arguments in favor of a rights-based defense of animals, our understanding of rights with regards to people is generally dependent upon the condition of a rational acceptance of the responsibility such rights entail. This paper argues that David Hume through his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals establishes another potential for including animals into the sphere of moral concern that does not depend upon an agreement regarding the status of animals as right-bearers. I will argue that by recognizing a moral obligation to animals based on Humean moral theory and its formation of a sympathetic relationship between ethical agent and ethical subject we can avoid the need to establish animals as capable rights-bearers with “inherent” rights which we have a human-like duty to respect. Based on Hume’s claim that morality is dependent upon sentiment rather than reason, it is possible to adjust our understanding of the obligation to avoid causing unnecessary pain to animals beyond determining their inherent rights. Because determining the ability of animals to be human-like rights-bears is difficult given the absence of a rational acceptance of the responsibility such rights entail, an argument for obligation without a dependence on rights could prove more effective in persuading reluctant persons to develop an ethical consideration of animals.

Briere, Victor “Non-cognitivism and Error Theory: A Self-Defeating Commitment” (Marsh 207, 9:45-10:30)

This paper explores the views of A.J. Ayer’s brand of Non-Cognitivism and its consequences. As it turns out, Ayer’s argument for the meaninglessness of statements containing ethical symbols must appeal to views such as A.L. Mackie’s Error Theory. Once it is shown that Ayer must commit himself to Error theory, it is shown that Error Theory and Non-Cognitivism are incompatible, thus making Ayer’s views incoherent.

Chapman, Isaac “A Freirian Critique of Educational Policy in the US” (Marsh 214, 11:30-12:15)

The purpose of this paper is to use the theories espoused by Paolo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed to understand the educational institutions in the United States.  The thesis central to this analysis is that education in the United States grows increasingly rigid as it emphasizes the values and attitudes of those who make educational policy rather than acting as a means for posing and solving the economic and social disparities that exist in this country.  Using Freire’s concept of “the oppressed,” this paper draws distinct parallels to the students and the oppressed, and the way in which the current model of education limits their potential; not only the potential of the individual, but also the collective potential of the society at large.

Cordio, Mariano de Dompablo “Is Artificial Intelligence Possible?” (Marsh 106, 8:00-8:45)

This paper treats the philosophy of John R. Searle in his article "Minds, Brains, and Programs". It shows, using Searle's Chinese room argument (CR), that what Searle calls strong artificial intelligence (AI), the thesis that minds are to brains as computer software is to computer hardware, is not only false, but also that it must be false. The CR does this by arguing in effect that Chinese cannot translate to John's English understanding and likewise neither can a computer understand any question put to it because any question addressed to the computer is like the Chinese to John. On the other hand, ask John in English, which he understands as well as any native speaker, 'Do you understand Chinese?' and he will answer 'No'. What is the difference between John and a computer? While John does not understand Chinese and does understand English, computers understand nothing. And because any programming language to computers is like Chinese to John, human-like behavior of a computer charged with running a robot, for example, proves nothing in the way of human understanding on the part of the computer. Because the CR does such a good job of proving the falsity of strong AI, a fundamentally different approach to the creation of AI is necessary. But, this is problematic for strong AI, namely, because it leaves strong AI definitively behind.

Dailey, Nathan “Free Actions of the Will in the Critique of Practical Reason” (Marsh 201, 5:30-6:15)

An appeal, in the Critique of Practical Reason, to an apperceptible fact of reason and the specially constituted will that it implies represents the essential move of an argument for the real possibility of humans as uncaused first causes of their own actions or causal chains (actions not necessitated by prior empirical conditions). But the particular metaphysical constitution of the will and how it fits within the broader Kantian discussion of necessitated phenomenal causality is ambiguous. I provide an interpretation that seeks to resolve this ambiguity and in the process conclude the proof for the real possibility of human freedom.

Downes, Phillip “Refuting Moral Luck” (Marsh LL5, 2:15-3:00)

Thomas Nagel argues against Kantian ethics by saying that we cannot hold moral agents accountable for their actions because the agent’s actions are a result of events that are out of the agent’s control, moral luck. With this Nagel pushes Kantian ethics onto an extensionless point with nothing to found our intentions. In this paper, I argue against Nagel’s moral luck with a two piece argument. I disprove Nagel’s paper by arguing that his concept requires us to blur the lines between Kant’s transcendental freedom standpoint and the practical freedom standpoint, which is cannot be blurred. Also, even assuming that Nagel’s moral luck argument is correct, Kant is not on an extensionless point because the Kantian ethics’ goodwill is an extension from the extensionless point.

Dunleavy, Casie “What the World Needs Is a Moral Marx” (Marsh 101, 3:00-3:45)

A lot of great things were said by German philosopher Karl Marx, as he revealed great flaws in Capitalism--that it limits the individual from expressing their own creativity, and yet there seemed to be one thing missing from his philosophy: moral guidelines. Since his focus was on economics and social class struggles, he rejected morality in general—believing that morality was something that the people holding all of the power in a society used to control the masses. My statement is that moral guidelines are not a control-tactic of the elite or ones with power, but rather, moral guidelines are an expression of human creativity, and reflect our rational nature.

Fletcher, Logan “From Finite Tension to Determinate Extension: Meaning Finitism and the Cryptographer’s Constraint” (Marsh LL5, 4:00-4:45)

One of the more radical theses to come out of the sociology of scientific knowledge movement is the meaning finitism defended by Barry Barnes and David Bloor. The central finitist claim runs roughly like this:  Since the meaning of a concept derives ultimately from a finite set of past applications, the future application of a concept is indeterminate.  The premise is taken to entail the conclusion because of the formal underdetermination of future use by past use.  The corollary that no concept has a fixed extension has far-reaching consequences for scientific knowledge, including the result that there can be no deeper facts about the truth or rationality of scientific beliefs, beyond the facts about what is held to be true or rational by a particular community.  In this paper, I will attempt to show that we can accept the finitist premise—that a concept’s meaning follows from a finite set of past applications—while allowing that in certain cases past applications can indeed determine future application.  Sometimes finitely realized concepts really can possess fixed extensions.

Foland, Oliver “A Critique of Foundational Beliefs” (Marsh 206, 10:30-11:15)

In this essay I present, with the most plausible understanding I can attribute, the theory of foundationalism in respect to the justification of beliefs. In doing so I examine different versions of the theory, including classical, moderate, internalist and externalist forms, focusing particularly Timothy McGrew's essay, "A Defense of Classical Foundationalism"; as well as those beliefs alleged to be foundational. After explicating the theory, I argue that no beliefs that qualify as foundational exist, as the justification of any belief depends on the justification of others that are either: directly related as supporting reasons; or those that are presupposed by the belief in question.

Frein, Aaron “How to Kill a Zombie with Words: A Response to Chalmers-style Mind-Body Dualism” (Marsh 106, 8:45-9:30)

The re-introduction of dualism, even in the significantly modified form seen in David Chalmers’ philosophy, leads us to a very worrying conclusion: zombies are possible. Instead of attempting to challenge the naturalistic dualist’s underlying modal commitments and the conceivability-possibility thesis, I argue that our belief that zombies are possible is due to a faulty intuition of the conceptual separation of the mind and the body. By appealing to the common received definition of consciousness, I attempt to show that our mental and physical concepts are best understood as the intrinsic and extrinsic (respectively) properties of a broadly ‘physical’ existence. When considered in these terms, it becomes clearer that physical and mental properties are not separate or even supervenient, but rather the internal and external expressions of a single existence. The result of this is a non-reductive form of mind-body identity theory. I then go on to consider the impact that this understanding of the relation of the mind to the body has on the philosophy of mind, concluding that we are not just able to block dualism, but also to avoid the problems inherent to reductionist physicalism. In short, I attempt to kill zombies with words.

Gandy, Meaghan “Military Matters” (Marsh 201, 8:00-8:45)

Military friendly fire infractions while in combat are mainly tried by military tribunals. However some trials can be tried in a civilian court. This is wrong, because civilian courts are not a jury of the offender’s peers. Civilians do not know what it is like to be under fire and stress. Also, civilians cannot relate to the role of being in the military. They do not understand what it means to be willing to give up your life for your country. For example, instances of friendly fire, while they are terrible, are hard to understand if you have never been in a stressful combat situation. A jury of civilians would have a hard time understanding why a soldier would shoot his fellow fighter by accident. In contrast, a jury of military peers would be able to empathize with the soldier. For instance, one of my past experiences, in which the pilot was not told some of his brakes had been capped and we had an emergency landing in the middle of the night, would also not be understood by a civilian jury; then the pilot could have been convicted of neglect. Military life is very different from civilian life, and unless you have ties to it, it is hard to understand what goes on in the military. Consequently, I will argue, that based on civilians lack of knowledge about military life, they should not be involved in trials dealing with military infractions in combat; instead, military cases should be dealt with by military tribunals.

Garland, Melissa “The Price of Escaping the Vat” (Marsh 201, 3:00-3:45)

Hilary Putnam, in his paper “The Meaning of Meaning,” describes externalism, “[o]ne of a number of views that hold that what is thought or said (content) depends in part on the factors external to the mind of the thinker or speaker” (as defined by the Oxford Companion to Philosophy).  However, a counterintuitive implication arises when considering externalism in light of self-knowledge or first person authority.  If the contents of mental states are determined by objects outside the mind, and it is not possible to know with special authority those objects outside of minds, how can anyone know what they think?  Since Putnam published his essay, prominent philosophers have offered solutions to this problem. Donald Davidson offers an alternative position about self-knowledge that rejects externalism completely and suggests that philosophers abandon the dogma of considering a belief as containing an ‘object before the mind,’ instead opting for a more fluid conception.  Is this a sound solution?  Akeel Bilgrami objects, saying that rejecting the dogma leaves us with the same problem Putnam had originally – the problem of how we can know anything outside our minds.  His objection is ultimately unconvincing, and the following question is addressed:  What is the cost of abandoning externalism?  The cost is confidence in knowing anything about real people in the real world – confidence that life is more than a brain floating in a vat. In “Brains in a vat,” Putnam demonstrates that the implication of his Twin Earth example, however counterintuitive, gets humanity out of the vat.  While Davidson’s alternative account certainly is plausible, then, it may not be worth the price.

Gingerich, Brian Robert “A Dire Contagion: War, Plague, and the Illiad” (Marsh 201, 8:45-9:30)

Contrary to many popular interpretations, Homer’s Iliad is far from a glorification of war. When inspected through the existential lens of Camus’s plague, Homeric war is seen rather to be a disease endemic to human nature, yet afflicted by Fate. In the similarities between Troy and Oran, between Hector and Dr. Rieux, war is perceived to be an unavoidable expression of the perpetual striving to attain Being, whether in the form of Helen or the “perishable joys” of life. War, in fact, is a dire contagion infecting all mankind, an inevitability of his continuous Becoming. War, to Homer, is an unsought but unavoidable, ennobling yet disgracing, consequence of human existence, incidentally negating immanent attempts at perpetual peace.

Glover, Kelly “Leibniz’s Mid-Life Substance-Abuse Problem: A Defense of Monadological Analysis in His Middle Years” (Marsh 212, 2:15-3:00)

This paper presents a new argument in support of the traditional view of Leibniz's metaphysical development, namely that in his middle years, he endorsed a monadological theory and characterized only monads as ultimately real substances.  Recently, many scholars have suggested, instead, that he endorsed a corporeal substance and took corporeal substances to be the ultimately real substances. These scholars typically focus on Leibniz's ontological commitments in the sciences. It is because these analyses have not entirely settled the debate, that I suggest an alternative route. This paper introduces a new consideration: a parallel between the underlying motivations of Leibniz’s metaphysical project and foundational concerns typically associated with Agrippan skepticism. If Leibniz was consistently applying Agrippan principles to his metaphysics in his middle period, a powerful case can be made for the claim that he would have been compelled to reject the corporeal substance theory and endorse a monadological analysis.

Goebel, James “Death and Discourse: An Inquiry into Meaning and Disruption” (Marsh 212, 10:30-11:15)

In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre vehemently argues that we must assume the world with the proud consciousness of being its authors, as it is only in and through our projects that the world has Meaning. I explore Martin Heidegger’s The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics to develop a brief analysis of language that locates Meaning in the speaking human subject. I argue that while language does provide a pre-reflective foundation of Meaning onto the world, there are events that have the potential to severely disrupt that Meaning and, therefore, the potential to challenge Sartre’s existential-phenomenological framework.

Gonzalez, Julian Roel “Kant’s Courage and Its Relevance in Today’s Reality” (Marsh 201, 4:00-4:45)

The paper analyzes issue of courage in Kant’s “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” and relevance to present. It also discusses how Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is a paradigm of Kant’s courage. I will consider Kant’s opinion of Dr. King’s civil disobedience, and a possible reason for why the United States of America ought to use Kant’s courage.

Goo, Ashley “Anarchy, State, and Utopia or a Life ‘After Virtue’: MacIntyre’s Stand against Nozick’s Position and Lack of Moral ‘Desert’” (Marsh LL21, 5:30-6:15)

The goal of this paper was to show the incomplete nature of Robert Nozick’s argument regarding his position given in his work Anarchy, State and Utopia. Alasdair MacIntyre discusses in his work After Virtue how Nozick’s position misses the bigger picture of moral desert when it comes to his narrow theory of justice in his work After Virtue. The position that is being discussed in this paper is showing that while Nozick believes that he has a grasp on justice, the reality is that while limiting his conception of moral desert, it in turn narrows his views to focus on the individuals in a society rather than the community. This paper lays a clear argument discussing how detrimental the lack of moral desert in Nozick’s argument is to his larger conception of political theory by breaking it away from its very foundation. Alasdair MacIntyre manages to offers a clear description of what our political system really needs to focus on.

Guerin, Robert “Tragedy and the Desire to Be God” (Marsh 206, 2:15-3:00)

In this essay I will examine the correlation between suffering and self-consciousness. Both Soren Kierkegaard and Miguel de Unamuno believe that human beings are internally ill. For we desire immortality, and yet the world seems indifferent to our desire or, at least, seems to demonstrate that immortality is impossible. Being confronted, then, with an evanescent life, what are we to do? I first examine, according to Kierkegaard, what the self is. For I think it necessary to understand the object of the illness before understanding the illness itself. I intend to summarize, then, the various forms of despair. During this summary, I argue by analogy using psychoanalysis. For similarities can be drawn between despair, mourning, and melancholia; hence, I think the notions of despair can be understood psychoanalytically. I then turn to Kierkegaard’s conception of the tragic hero as a segue into Unamuno’s tragic sense of life.  When discussing the tragic sense of life, I want to focus on the idea of consciousness. Similar to Kierkegaard, Unamuno argues that the purpose of life is to become aware of the internal suffering that is life.  For this is the starting-point for the cure of such an illness. I conclude, finally, that both philosophical treatises argue for the same thing; that is, to be God.

Hambro, Matthew “A Critique of Petionary Prayer” (Marsh 101, 12:15-1:00)

An issue of concern for those committed to a Judeo-Christian view of God, is the problem of petitionary prayer. Prayer's necessity in light of God's existence is questionable, as is its ability to exact change in an implacable deity.  In this paper I will consider a view of God as a friend developed by Eleonore Stump and argue that this view is inadequate to demonstrate the efficacy and usefulness of petitionary prayer given both free will and an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God. On Stump's view, arbitrary denials of prayers must be made by God, which is inconsistent with his perfectly good and rational nature. Her system does not safeguard free will, since God may intervene in certain situations and force prayer upon people. She also does not adequately defend the consistency of the problems that she maintains occur between humans and God, which causes her to succumb to the problem that she identifies in Aquinas, that is: having a need for petitionary prayer. These problems I will explain in full detail after explaining both the problem as well as Stump's solution to it more carefully.

Hartfield, Andrew “On Justice as Power” (Marsh 207, 4:00-4:45)

This paper addresses the question “is power justice?” and if not, what then is justice.  I begin by examining what the implications of the equation “justice is power” has upon the nature of injustice and try to logically deduce what can follow. Based upon the results of this examination I then create a new definition of what I think justice is and attempt to see if this new definition meshes with real world experience.

Heyman, Ivan “Seneca’s Cynical Side: Withdrawal and ‘The Social Embeddedness of Virtue’” (Marsh 206, 8:00-8:45)

In her paper "My Station and Its Duties: Ideals and the Social Embeddedness of Virtue," Julia Annas has argued that the Stoics recognized two aspects of ethical life: the social and the ideal. She argues that they expressed these two aspects by the idea that there are two commonwealths (the local polity and the universal community of reason), as evidenced in a passage from Seneca's De Otio. Her main thesis is that, while the Stoics distinguished between these two different aspects of ethical life—aspects which can easily be imagined to conflict with one another (e.g. the social role of slave master conflicts with a certain ideal of human dignity)—they managed to hold them together in a way superior to and fundamentally different from the way in which modern ethical theories have sought to do so. However, by looking at Seneca's De Otio in detail and by attending to the Cynic origins of Stoic cosmopolitanism, I will suggest that Annas's reading of Stoicism is lopsided and overly generous.

Invictus, Augustus Sol “Reviving Galton’s Monster: An Ethical Reassessment of Eugenics” (Marsh 207, 4:45-5:30)

Self-improvement has recently been relegated to following the latest health food fads and reading the life-altering material promoted on Oprah Winfrey’s reading list. But this need not be the case. There is a way to true self-improvement, a solution that will make our children stronger, healthier, and more intelligent. It is a way that was abandoned after it was abused egregiously during the 1930s and 40s; and a solution to much that comprises the bleak human condition. That way is eugenics, and, whether we like it or not, it is coming back in a way more powerful than could ever have been imagined in the first half of the 20th century. It is the responsibility of philosophers to see it engaged rightly this time around.

Jaakson, Maja “Theory and Practice in John Dewey’s ‘Escape from Peril’” (Marsh LL5, 9:45-10:30)

In Chapter I of The Quest for Certainty, “Escape from Peril”, John Dewey argues that both traditional and contemporary philosophical notions about “certainty and the fixed, about the nature of the real world, about the nature of mind and its organs of knowing”(Dewey 19) find their origins in the theory-practice dichotomy. Dewey traces the cause of the elevation of theory over practice back to ancient history. He suggests that humans’ need for protection and their fear of the unknown sparked within them desire for security. Thus began humanity’s quest for absolute certainty. Stability was not found through overt action, as a chaotic element was inherently associated with such activity: even the best laid plans may go awry. Consequently, our ancestors turned to theoretical thought in search of everlasting knowledge. As will be shown, the ancient Greeks continued along the same path as primitive humans in forming their epistemological and metaphysical conceptions. In turn, modern thinkers inherited acceptance of the mutual exclusivity of theory and practice on which Greek philosophy was founded. Dewey holds contemporary philosophers unjustifiably subscribe to this theory-practice dichotomy. In this essay, I will elucidate Dewey’s challenge to the belief that we may only achieve stable knowledge by using the reflective method to grasp truths that are what they are, antecedent to any and all inquiry. I will also explain the reasons for which he impugns the claim that the philosophical method is necessarily purely reflective.

Jhun, Jennifer “Perception Does Not Have Intentional Content” (Marsh 212, 4:00-4:45)

In philosophy of perception it is commonly assumed that perceptual episodes have intentional content. In this paper I provide a provide a logical formulation of what I believe is the main thesis of I call minimal intentionalism, presupposed by most proponents of intentionalism but rarely argued for: that all perceptual episodes have intrinsic, determinate intentional content, usually cashed out in terms of accuracy conditions or conditions of satisfaction. I also provide a formalisation of its strong counterpart, anti-intentionalism. By way of a thought experiment inspired by Anil Gupta and Charles Travis, this paper challenges the minimal intentionalist thesis by demonstrating that anti-intentionalism better accommodates the fact that we bear upon our experiences background knowledge and beliefs.

Johnson, Meredith “Defining Emotions” (Marsh 214, 4:00-4:45)

The purpose of this essay was to define the experience and manifestation of human emotions. The answer to the question of what is an emotion has implications for the way we value our emotional experiences. This essay evaluates the arguments of William James and Martha Nussbaum. James argues that emotions are nothing more than bodily sensations, while Nussbaum asserts that emotions are rational and intelligent judgments. The essay concludes that while both arguments hold elements of truth, Nussbaum’s is stronger in that it accounts for emotions as being important judgments that should not be ignored in ethical thought.

Karlberg, Drew “The Myth of the Amoralist: A Challenge for Motivational Externalism” (Marsh LL21, 4:00-4:45)

Motivational judgment internalism, as it will be understood in this paper, states that there is a conceptually necessary relationship between sincere moral judgments and motivation. Motivational judgment internalism (henceforth motivational internalism) holds that if an agent sincerely judges that it is right for her to act in a certain way, then she is to a degree motivated to act in that certain way. There is a conceptual relationship which entails a necessary relationship between moral judgment and moral motivation. On this view, it is within the very concept of a moral judgment that entails the motivation to act. However, this conceptually necessary relationship between judgment and motivation has been challenged by some. They argue that it is possible for there to be a rational and strong willed person who makes competent moral judgments on how to act, and yet still remains completely unmotivated to act. This person is referred to as the amoralist. In response, the amoralist objection has been challenged in a number of ways. In this paper, I will discuss in more detail the view of motivational internalism and the amoralist objection. After that, I will present various responses to the amoralist objection. I shall argue that these responses are inadequate within the current framework of the debate. I will then propose a new framework for the debate that provides new resources to argue against the amoralist objection. The new framework emphasizes the relationship between one’s degree of confidence in a moral judgment and one’s degree of motivation. This new understanding poses a challenge and shifts the burden of proof to those who deny the conceptual relationship between moral judgment and motivation.

Kenney, Stephen “On Annas and the Problem of External Goods” (Marsh 207, 8:00-8:45)

The manner in which external goods contribute to happiness is an essential problem in the interpretation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. According to Aristotle, a person is happy if she lives an actively virtuous life and has a sufficient amount of external goods. External goods are things like friends, money, health, and so on. It is clear from Aristotle’s account of happiness that he thinks external goods are necessary for happiness, but it is not clear how they are necessary. How exactly do external goods play a role in making us happy? The ‘internal use view,’ defended by John Cooper and Eric Brown, claims that external goods only contribute to happiness in virtue of being instrumental for the performance of virtuous activity. Without a sufficient amount of external goods, we would be unable to perform many virtuous activities. For example, a person who does not have any money cannot be generous. The ‘external use view,’ defended by Martha Nussbaum and Terrence Irwin, also claims that external goods contribute to happiness by being instrumental for the performance of virtuous activity. However, it further claims that external goods contribute to happiness in virtue of being intrinsically valuable. On this interpretation, external goods benefit us in and of themselves. For example, good health contributes to a person’s happiness in its own right. In The Morality of Happiness, Julia Annas argues that Aristotle’s account of happiness is an ‘unstable’ position regardless of whether one adopts the internal or external use view. This essay will attempt to determine if her objections are successful. I will first overview her objections to the internal use view. She claims that internal use view does not correctly explain both how the loss of external goods decreases one’s happiness and how we make comparisons between the losses of different external goods. I will not argue against either objection. I will then present and evaluate her objections to the external use view. In brief, they are that the view does not tell us the minimum amount of external goods required for happiness, leads to a dilemma, and contradicts Aristotle’s belief that a virtuous person cannot become unhappy. I will argue that none of her objections to the external use view are successful. Finally, I will make a few passing remarks in order to explain why I am not yet prepared to fully endorse the external use view.

Khan, Jon “To Pause Modernity” (Marsh 207, 5:30-6:15)

Jan Drydyk, argues that “properly understood human rights are justifiable from within all cultures.” As admirable as this statement is, it may soon become irrelevant, regardless of its true value, as globalizing labour trends threaten to destroy the very societal framework by which many countries co-exist and survive. Thus, political philosophers, more than ever, must take the issue of global human rights seriously. As a philosopher, it seems germane to question - before developing any thesis regarding what it means have ‘rights’ as a human being - the global indubitable foundational basis of human rights? Conor Gearty argues that if human rights theorists fail “to deliver such a response then its medium to long term future [regardless of globalization or any current trend for that matter] cannot be assured.” Renowned psychologist Abraham K. Maslow proposes an answer to the foundational basis for global human rights when he argues that human beings intrinsically maintain a biological need-based foundation. Nevertheless, philosophers and human rights advocates too often pontificate grandiose and ambiguous ideas of universal liberty, dignity, or equality, and yet rarely seem to halt modern notions or discussions to address the fact that millions die simply from a lack of biological necessity every year. Globally, there is a crisis regarding human rights, but before progressing modern toward modern ideals, modernity must first pause and feed the hungry. This paper will take such a pause and construct an examination of human rights from the biological (needs based) perspective, and consequently will reveal that the universal, global, and indubitable basis of all human rights is the premise that all must adequately eat and drink clean water.

Kullas, Jennifer “Theories of Human Emotions: William James vs. Martha C. Nussbaum” (Marsh 214, 5:30-6:15)

What are emotions? Do they have an essentially “felt” quality? Are they essentially cognitive? This essay will evaluate the arguments made by two prominent philosophers who offer very different accounts of human emotion. An American pragmatist writing in the late 1800’s, William James believed that the central element of all human emotions is their “felt” quality. On the other hand, contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum believes that emotions are “personal judgments of value” that need not be felt at all. This essay will lay out each philosopher’s account of the emotions and discuss why, of the two accounts, the theory proposed by Nussbaum is superior in both its pragmatic and contextual elements. Her understanding allows for correct emotions to play a prominent role in our lives as a form of knowledge worthy of rational credibility.  In evaluating emotions as a type of knowledge she is radically changing the stereotype that frequently accompanies the concepts of emotions as “non-reasoning”, a very stoic view, and gives them a legitimate and rational claim to become ethical judgments.

Lampros, Alex “A Discussion of the Ethical Foundation of Happiness with Regard to the Metaphysical Locality between Aristotle and Schopenhauer” (Marsh 214, 9:45-10:30)

Hearkening to the whisper of the title, this paper is dedicated to exploring the opposing views of happiness between these two thinkers. To this end, I show that, for both thinkers, their ethical claims are deeply rooted in their metaphysics. In contrasting the expressive totalities of the will and the unmoved mover, I argue that the location of the will, as outside space and time, leads to an inability to account for temporality. I then show how this misstep ripples through Schopenhauer’s ethical claims on happiness, thus rendering his claims metaphysically inferior to those of Aristotle.

Levitan, Joseph “Issues Concerning the Evolutionary Psychologist’s View of Modularity” (Marsh 106, 2:15-3:00)

One of the major tenants of Evolutionary Psychology is the theory that the brain has a modular structure. In other words, different parts of the brain are like dedicated “mini-computers” that evolved adaptationally to solve specific problems. Jerry Fodor raises some issues with the Evolutionary Psychologist’s view that points to three questions. How is it possible for the modular structure of the brain to integrate into one whole person who can reason? How did this capability evolve? And how would this integration actually function in the brain, especially when considering the brain’s plasticity? These questions are developed and analyzed in this paper.

Lusky, Amanda “Streams of Language: The Addition of William James to Wittgenstein’s Rejection of Private Language” (Marsh LL5 8:00-8:45)

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations mention of Mr. Ballard, from William James’ Principles of Psychology, provides additional support in the argument against a private language. James’ analysis of Ballard’s thoughts, as a profoundly deaf child, focuses on the presence of an on-going steam of thought. However, Wittgenstein dialectically criticizes James for mistaking speech with the role of language. This paper examines the addition of Ballard into Wittgenstein’s private language argument. If the refutation of a private language emphasizes language as public phenomena, then this relates to the extent individuals are able to interact within society. Ballard’s physical isolation from verbally engaging within the locally spoken language does not hinder his active involvement inside given language-games. Furthermore, Wittgenstein conceives that Ballard’s personal thought-process is indicative of his acquisition of language, without speech. Although Ballard cannot participate with spoken language, his meaningful engagement within surrounding language-games ensures his comprehension of language.

Lyon, Rachel “Freedom of Destiny and Endless Potentialities” (Marsh 214, 8:00-8:45)

It seems that either one has total control and responsibility for life through freedom of will, or one's life is wholly predetermined, allowing no room for deviation. For centuries, the relationship between freedom of will and determinism has been largely debated. Yet while many merge such ideas together or simply choose a side, it is important for the debate to change focus. Real concentration should, instead, be between the relationship surrounding freedom of will and destiny. Attention in this new direction is vital and more practical to apply in our everyday lives. It effects the decisions we make as well as the way particular circumstances are viewed. However, since determinism and free will have been paired together for so long, breaking this mindset first is crucial. Only then can full consideration be given to this new opposition. It is impossible for one to accept both freedom of will and destiny, the two are not reconcilable. While the typical view of destiny continues to hold a popularly pleasant mindset in our culture, it strips the individual of responsibility and meaning. A life plagued by the absence of free will is empty; it is up to the individual, through his existence, to create a destiny for himself.

McCall, Andrew “A Defense of Representationalism” (Marsh 201, 10:30-11:15)

There are two major theories in philosophy concerning human perception: Direct Realism and Representationalism. The first holds that human beings perceive the physical world directly, while Representationalism suggests that we are capable of perceiving only sense data. In his work Perception and the Physical World, D.M. Armstrong makes several attacks against Representationalism, some of which were answered in Frank Jackson’s Perception: A Representative Theory. This paper explores several of those accusations, such as the assertion that the perception of sense-data would not be reason enough to believe in a physical world, and finds them to be either weak or inappropriate in a discussion of perception. It also raises several objections to Armstrong’s Direct Realism in support of a Representationalist theory of Perception.

McClain, Aaron “Is Truth Required for Knowledge” (Marsh 213, 11:30-12:15)

Is truth required for knowledge? Of course it is, or at least that’s what almost all epistemologists would have you believe. Philosophers from Plato to Gettier have all based their theories of knowledge on this one assumption. However, as I will show in this paper the idea that truth, defined as correspondence to reality, is required for knowledge is exactly that, an assumption. And if we look into the case further we will see that my prescription, that says knowledge equals justified belief, not only fits better with our common sense beliefs but also has pragmatic benefits as well. In this paper I will offer four differing yet related cases that will support my thesis.

McComb, Geordie “A Defense of Qualitative Hedonism as Interpretation and Account Well-being” (Marsh 207, 8:45-9:30)

In this paper I examine John Stuart Mill’s chapter II account of well-being in Utilitarianism.  Mill’s account is interpreted by Wendy Donner as a qualitative hedonistic theory whereas David Brink interprets it as a “deliberative conception of happiness.”  Brink argues that well-being for Mill is not grounded in mental states, as Donner claims, but in states of the world.  Furthermore, Robert Nozick and James Griffin argue that mental states do not ground well-being and, consequently, that qualitative hedonism is untenable.  In defence of Donner’s qualitative hedonism, I will argue that her account meets both Brink’s objections to it as an interpretation of Mill as well as Nozick and Griffin’s objections to it as an account of well-being.

McEvilly, Michael “’Like That in a Fairy Tale or Story’: Indirection in Kierkegaard’s Late Authorship” (Marsh 213, 8:45-9:30)

This paper argues against oversimplifications in reading Kierkegaard—such as the simple categorization of works as indirect (or aesthetic; vis-à-vis the pseudonyms) or direct (or religious; signed works) communication—by evidencing indirection in the “direct” communication of The Moment and Late Writings. I will examine briefly Kierkegaard’s general authorial method, the two types of communication – direct and indirect – that play a part in the formation of ethical-religious communication, and the idea of illusion and how it applies to Kierkegaard’s corrective task during the final two years of his life.

McVey, Clark Aaron “On Fate and Luck” (Marsh 214, 8:45-9:30)

This paper examines the ancient Greek conceptions on the concepts of “fate” and “luck” from the writings of Aristotle, Epicurus, Lucian, and others, and details whether or not the two terms are mutually exclusive within the culture and philosophy of the time.  Lucian's analysis of the “Iliad”, and whether or not the gods are capable of escaping the grasp of the Fates is covered.  The paper also looks at how the question of the existence of fate and luck continues to be an issue of discussion since the ancient Greek times.  The focus is primarily put upon the philosophies of Aristotle, Epicurus, and the stoics, and how they dealt, or failed to do so, when it came to how to deal with the issues of fate and luck, and how such concepts should affect one's everyday life.  Comparisons are also made to Machiavelli's belief that “fortune favors the strong”, and Calvin's belief in Christian predestination.

Mecham, Christian “Cast Off Body and Mind: The Teachings of Buddhism as Applied to a Phenomenological Model” (Marsh 106, 4:00-4:45)

The philosophical school of phenomenology and the religion/philosophy of Buddhism share striking similarities that have been noted by many scholars of both.  Standing as a highlight between the two, the works of the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the Japanese Zen Master Dogen (founder of the Soto Zen school) both take a drastic turn against their respective schools of thought (Merleau-Ponty against western philosophical tradition and Dogen against Buddhism metaphysical beliefs, respectively) and argue for the necessity of the material body for epistemological experience of the world.  Working at different times, in different parts of the world, under different philosophies, both men came to startlingly similar conclusions in their arguments for the necessity of the body.  This paper shall attempt to highlight those similarities and reconcile the few differences between them.

Mirzakhan, Karolin “The Role of Forgiveness in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit” (Marsh 101, 11:30-12:15)

The dialectical movements in the Phenomenology work themselves out in such a way that internal contradictions in one form of consciousness lead necessarily into the next sublated form of consciousness. Forgiveness is an act undercuts the apparent opposition between two individuals by shedding light on a common aspect held by both. This act of forgiving plays an important role in the dialectical moves found in “Morality” and “Religion” within the overall project of complete mutual recognition. This essay will explore the origin of forgiveness, why the act of forgiving is necessary at the level of two individual self-consciousnesses, and the role that this human capacity plays in “Morality.” Also addressed will be how forgiveness works at the level of the universal community in “Revealed Religion,” and the limits of this form of forgiveness in the progress of the Phenomenology towards complete mutual recognition.

Mooring, Chani “Wittgenstein’s Argument against Private Language: A Defense of Meaning as Found in Forms of Life” (Marsh LL5, 8:45-9:30)

I aim to show how Wittgenstein’s argument against the idea that one could have his own private language, i.e., a language where the individual words are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking and not by anyone else (Philosophical Investigations, 243), and how the impossibility of a private language as such, bolsters the view that the meaning of words is dependent on the use of the words, i.e., the meaning of words depends on how a community of speakers in a language use words, which relies on forms of life, or our cultural backgrounds.

Nesse, Glen “A Defense of Discrete Space-Time” (Marsh 206, 5:30-6:15)

The world is chalk-full of trickery. The vast size of our planet tricked people into thinking that it was flat instead of spherical. Just as the rotation of the earth tricked people into thinking that it was the sun that was revolving around us.  Relatively recently, we have discovered that light bends, “solid” objects like tables and walls are chiefly comprised of empty space, matter and energy are fundamentally the same thing, and that the moon constantly falls toward the earth. Mark Twain quote sums up the idea rather nicely, “Truth is stranger than fiction….” I would expect a complete and true metaphysics (if there is such a thing) to pay little heed to such things as common sense and intuition. In this paper, we’ll be comparing the liberal view of receptacles with two distinct senses of a competing thesis: the three dimensionalist view regarding material objects, and the three dimensionalist view regarding spatial regions. Additionally, we will look at one example of a number of problems and paradoxes that arise (in part) because of the liberal view of receptacles. The focus of the paper will be on defending a discrete view of space-time, as well as an analogous defense of a discrete ‘relationalist view’.

Ok, Rebecca Jade “Desires, Dispositions, and Smith’s Defense of the Humean Theory of Motivation” (Marsh 212, 11:30-12:15)

It will be the aim of this paper to show that Michael Smith does not present a successful and incontestable argument for the Humean theory of motivation in his paper The Humean Theory of Motivation. I shall first briefly present Smith’s argument for the Humean theory. I will then present his characterization of the distinction between beliefs and desires and point out an ambiguity in this characterization. I will then examine this characterization in the context of an objection from Margaret Little, the strength of which depends upon the interpretation of Smith’s characterization. In order to escape the problems associated with this ambiguity, I will suggest the characterization of beliefs and desires be reformulated in Smith’s own counterfactual terms. This reformulation will make obvious that the main thesis of the Humean theory not only does follow incontestably, but that it does not follow at all.

Olson, Kent “Always” (Marsh 106, 11:30-12:15)

Wittgenstein and Davidson argue that language use is prior to concept formation. Furthermore, Martin points out that concepts are ill-defined. If we accept that the word comes before the concept, it follows that a fundamentally fuzzy word leads to a fuzzy concept. “Always,” a term often used to indicate connection or a constant conjunction, is a fundamentally fuzzy term. Common ordinary uses of the term show that it is vague in respect to eternity, futurity, and repetition. This vagueness informs a philosophical suspicion that claims to omniscience are made whenever we say something is always the case (make an inductive claim). If we get over the fact that no rational agent claims to divine the future, we realize the problem is simply an incorrect picture in our minds and in our language. The rational result is to accept that all we have to go on is past experience; the outcome of accepting that the past is all we have to guide us is nomic reliabilism. Generally speaking, we as rational agents accept the rules, laws and connections that have proven themselves to be reliable.

Petersen, Travis “Influences of Phenomenology and Logical Positivism on the Natural Sciences” (Marsh 206, 3:00-3:45)

In the beginning of the twentieth century there was much debate about whether natural science could establish what was true about reality.  The two main schools of thought that initially dealt with this problem were Logical Positivism and Phenomenology.  This paper will examine the strength of Phenomenology’s emphasis on subjectivity versus the argument that claims made objectively about the world retain their values as truths.  It will be shown that Logical Positivism claims that truths about the world can be attained only through experience, and that the experience can be considered as objective and corresponds directly to reality.  Husserl argues this claim by showing that human subjectivity is an essential component of experience that eliminates the possibility of human experience necessarily corresponding directly to reality.  In addition I will show that in fact the Natural Sciences have escaped Husserl’s criticism of the sciences by utilizing various postulates and principles that integrate human subjectivity into the process of observation as a necessary component of the experience.

Ramirez, James “Parmenides: On Separation of the Forms” (Marsh 106, 9:45-10:30)

This paper reviews two of the arguments put forth in Plato’s Parmenides and defines Plato’s theory of the Forms.  In addition to defining, this essay also explicates why Plato believes Forms are a necessary contribution to philosophical inquiry and explanation.  The two arguments I consider in this essay are the Third man argument and Master/slave argument which are lobbed at Plato’s theory by Parmenides and create what he terms the “greatest difficulty” for the Forms.  Parmenides draws a sharp distinction between the realm of the Forms and the realm of sensible objects by investigating how the notion of self-predication separates real world objects from their formal essence.  I move to show how self-predication is also a problem for Parmenidean metaphysics and conclude with a very brief treatment of the taxonomy of Aristotle as it is used to clear up the confusion created by Parmenides.  Ultimately, Forms are essential to each of these philosopher’s metaphysics, but explaining the relationship between Forms and sensibles is a laborious philosophical conundrum.

Reece, Bryan “Intellectual Virtues and Reliability” (Marsh 106, 3:00-3:45)

Alvin Goldman, in Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology, intends to “identify the concept of justified belief with the concept of belief obtained through the exercise of intellectual virtues” (Goldman 439). However, as a thoroughgoing reliabilist, Goldman wants to say that our stored lists of intellectual virtues that we use for epistemic evaluation are in some sense reducible to considerations of reliability, since they were originally formed with reliability in view. Therefore, what confers justification is actually reliability, though we have come to think in terms of intellectual virtues and vices in giving epistemic appraisal. For Goldman, reliability is construed as a characteristic feature of those processes that “are deemed to produce a high ratio of true beliefs” (Goldman 441).  This reliability is a necessary condition for an intellectual virtue, and it is prior to our storing lists of intellectual virtues and vices. In Virtues of the Mind, Linda Zagzebski argues that “the motivation to know is not fully expressed by following well-known reliable belief-forming processes” (Zagzebski 466). I believe that this can lend support to the claim, contra Goldman, that reliabilist theories do not have the necessary apparatus for capturing our intuitions about intellectual virtues because they do not recognize a sufficiently broad sense of truth conduciveness. Therefore, I have availed myself of Zagzebski’s invitation in Virtues of the Mind to further flesh out and investigate this issue. It has become apparent that some reliabilists, like Goldman, have found merit in the idea of bringing evaluation of intellectual virtues into the justificatory picture. Presumably, this is due in part to the fact that they recognize the importance of affirming some sort of personal responsibility for the things we believe. It seems quite plausible that human beings exhibit some sort of epistemic agency, analogous to agency in ethics, by virtue of which we have at least something to do with our epistemic status. Given that consideration of moral virtues in evaluating agents and actions puts this personal responsibility in view in ethics, some might be inclined to bring consideration of intellectual virtues into epistemic evaluation in an attempt to reassert the idea of personal responsibility in a theory of knowledge. Goldman apparently thinks that he can get good mileage out of incorporating intellectual virtues into his theory of justification. But can a thoroughgoing reliabilist be consistent with this incorporation? Can the reliabilist do a good enough job of incorporating intellectual virtues to put personal responsibility back in view, but without radically altering his reliabilist tenets? I shall argue that he cannot.

Reese, Benjamin “Me, Myself, and Mead” (Marsh 212, 12:15-1:00)

The scientific method has had a great deal of success in explaining the physical world and has resulted in a unified natural science. However, attempts to apply the same methods to the study of humans have resulted in problematic and fragmented practices of social science. Using the theories of functionalism in sociology and behaviorism in psychology we can see a large divergence within the social sciences in regards to their reductionist principles. Also noticeable are predominant themes of determinism and external causality that are reminiscent of August Comte's conception of the positive sciences. Although uniformity, determinism, and objectivity are characteristics of the natural sciences, that must not entail that the social sciences must embrace these principles as well. Utilizing George Herbert Meads theory of self and John Dewey's critique of the 'reflex arc concept in psychology' we can begin understand the basic principles of human action and the important role subjectivity plays. Looking at the self, composing of the 'me,' I, and 'generalized other,' the human individual is then conceived as something that is intrinsically in a state of action and reflection and is neither completely atomistic nor a mere piece of a collective. A human being is something that is not determined by external causes, but instead creative and innovative. From this conception of action and the self a more fruitful approach to social science can be taken that radically differs from the methods carried out by the natural sciences.

Reeves, Gareth “Was It Good for You, Too?: The Compliance Problem for Contractarianism” (Marsh LL5, 3:00-3:45)

In this paper, I examine the compliance problem in Contractarian ethics. I argue that Contractarians cannot overcome this problem and as a result fail in attempting to base morality on a maximising conception of rationality. I begin by laying out the compliance problem and what it entails. Following this I discuss the response to the problem made by David Gauthier in his book Morals by Agreement and consider some objections to it. I conclude that these objections cannot be overcome and as a result Contractarians fail to connect morality and rationality as they wish to.

Robus, Olin “Science, Non-epistemic Values, and Basic Research” (Marsh LL5, 4:45-5:30)

Heather Douglas argues that the presence of inductive risk in scientific experiments necessitates the use of non-epistemic values by scientists in making decisions in the lab. I argue first, that non-epistemic values should not enter into science. Second, I draw a distinction between basic and applied research. I argue that all applied research can be reduced, in principle, to basic research. From here I show how non-epistemic values enter into science only through applied research, and how basic research can be shielded from these non-epistemic values. I conclude that non-epistemic values are permissible in applied research, insofar as they can ultimately be eliminated by the appropriate reduction to basic research.

Ross, Melanie “Epistemic Nature: Do Compatibilists Have the Resources to Secure Doxastic Voluntarism” (Marsh 212, 4:45-5:30)

Compatibilist solutions to the problem of doxastic involuntarism attempt to establish how beliefs can be appropriately agent-caused in spite of the fact that we cannot simply choose to adopt a belief by a sheer act of will.  I argue that the best way to interpret the compatibilist’s challenge is in terms of how an agent can have voluntary control over the response to his epistemic reasons, or evidence, for his belief.  This interpretation is leveled against Hobartian voluntarism, a compatibilist account of voluntary control that emphasizes the epistemic nature of the agent.  Although I do not provide decisive reasons for rejecting Hobartian voluntarism, I conclude that certain features of the epistemic nature fail to reveal what a compatibilist account of voluntary control should look like.

Ross, Ronnie “When the Lambs Stop Screaming: Empathy, Personhood, and the Male-dominated Phenomenon of Serial Killing” (Marsh 207, 2:15-3:00)

Vast amounts of research have been conducted studying the anomaly of serial killing. Biologists, sociologists, and psychologists have all engaged the phenomenon in depth. Even more, all of these fields have recognized that there seems to be a disproportionately high number of male serial killers. However, one field that has not fully examined this subject is philosophy. My study investigates the overabundance of male serial murderers in light of a discussion of an ethic of justice and an ethic of care. I examined research on physiological displays of empathy and justice and then combined these results with contemporary philosophical theory about justice and care. As a result of this process, I found that male serial killers have a distinct inability to even access an ethic of care and then subsequently misemploy an ethic of justice. By examining serial killing through a philosophical approach, my research begins to fill an area that has been largely overlooked.

Ruhl, Melissa “Philosophy as Continual Becoming: The Child in Levinas and Buber” (Marsh 214, 2:15-3:00)

The perennial philosophical need to define philosophy arises from the very nature of philosophical inquiry, which engages in a dialogue with the ever-changing world. This dialogue enables growth and development through participation with the world and also encourages the re-questioning of the previous growth and development. To ask of philosophy its essence is to engage philosophy in philosophical dialogue. Because of this, philosophy as dialogue resists the notion of an always already mature and able subject. Since engaging in dialogue means addressing and being addressed back, the subject who dialogues with the world is constantly maturing and growing and can never be said to have already matured and grown. The child, as a model of the philosophical inquirer then, seems to be the likeliest subject since children are beings who are rapidly and constantly becoming. Yet there seems to be a discomfort in the discipline of philosophy with understanding those, like children who do not have academic requisites, to have the capability to engage in philosophical inquiry. In this paper, I will put Levinas and Buber, who both consider themselves dialogic philosophers and who both discuss children as essential in some way to philosophy, in conversation with each other. On the one hand, I will begin with Levinas who discusses the child as essential to philosophy, but only for the father as subject of philosophy.  Levinas’ child, though vital to his philosophy, never himself becomes a philosophical inquirer. Buber, on the other hand, recognizes and celebrates the origination of every subject not only in childhood, but also from the womb of the mother in which the child is formed. His child proceeds into the world with a constant desire to engage it in relation. These differing conceptions of the child reveal how each philosopher conceives of philosophical inquiry. I will show that when Levinas makes the child into the Other who is merely another self for the father, he bars any chance of dialogue and growth in the philosopher just as he does when he makes the feminine Other into complete mystery. Because Buber posits the human as beginning with the inquisitive child who continues into adulthood constantly seeking out the world, he understands philosophy as dialogic engagement based on constant becoming. This will lead to my conclusion that in realizing that humans are born as children and not as mysteriously mature adults, we make possible the continual dialogic becoming of philosophers and philosophies.

Russo, Michael “Tales from Spinoza’s Twilight Zone: On the Possibility of Alternative Substance Despite Common Interpretations of Spinoza” (Marsh 212, 3:00-3:45)

The focus of this paper is to hypothesize the possibility of unknowable alternative substances, using the philosophy of Baruch de Spinoza as an edifice on which to build a theory. Unlike the later philosophy of Leibniz, in the end I will assert that—if we delimit this discussion to the framework of Spinoza’s Ethics—we can (only) suppose the existence of alternative substances, still we can know absolutely nothing about the nature of such strangeness. Moreover, we must ask ourselves if discussion about alternative substances is even worthwhile considering the principle notion explicated by Ockham’s razor (i.e., the law of parsimony). My argument is in three parts: First, I offer an analysis of book one of Spinoza’s Ethics; second, I discuss the possibility of alternative substances despite common interpretations of Spinoza; and finally, I address certain problems that arise concerning my own interpretation, primarily the problem of usefulness—meaning that I try to answer the question: “What’s the use of talking about an alternative substance if we can know absolutely nothing about it?”  In other words, even if we can agree that there is “room for” another substance, should we extend Spinoza’s monist philosophy beyond necessity?