14th annual Pacific University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
April 16-17, 2010

Abstracts of papers 2010

 

Abstracts for the 2010 conference will be posted in February 2010. Below are the abstracts from the 2009 conference.

 

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13th annual Pacific University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
April 17-18, 2009

Abstracts of papers 2009

Anderson, Patrick, “The Dilemma of Foreknowledge: The Shortcomings of Augustine and Others” (Marsh 207, 4:00-4:45)

Augustine was one of the first philosophers to give an elaborate account of the human free will. He did so to flesh out the apparent dilemma between his theological views of God’s foreknowledge and the necessity for free will. The fact that many other since Augustine have pondered the issue is alone enough to prove that he did not solve the problem; but the truth is that all of the most notable defenses of compatibility, formulated by many philosophers over time, have not solved the problem. Here I will examine the defenses of Augustine, David Ray Griffin, and Gerald L. Schroeder (who has slightly modified Boethius’ compatabilist stance) and show that none of these approaches accomplishes the task. There seems to be only two choices: have free will or live out a predetermined existence. Given that humans must have free will, we are left with one question: what must we believe about God?

Anderson, Wes, “Paul Churchland on Introspection” (Marsh 106, 2:15-3:00)

In this paper, I attempt to clarify Churchland’s Introspection Thesis and lessen the tension it brings to his work. I will study it in light of Churchland’s overall philosophical holism. I will show that Churchland’s view of introspection as allowing us to know what is being introspected “as it really is,” can only be properly understood if we embed the Introspection Thesis within his epistemological holism. When we do this, we can relieve the tension between Churchland the Cartesian and Churchland the non-Cartesian about the mind. More specifically, I will argue that Churchland the Cartesian believes that we can know the vehicular properties of first-order representations as such. Yet as a non-Cartesian or re-conceptualist Churchland believes we can only represent the vehicular properties. We must represent vehicular properties, yet we can represent them in different ways. We can represent them with our blunt common sense concepts or with more precise neuroscientific concepts. When we view Churchland as a holist, neither of the Cartesian sounding aspects of introspection stand in the way of a coherent epistemological holism about the mind.

Ashe, Eli, “A Logical Dilemma” (Marsh 101, 2:15-3:00)

In this paper some limits of logical decision-making processes will be explored and the implications of those limits constituted into a pedagogical practice of living dangerously.

Baumgartner, Andrew, “The Fallacies of Fundamentalism” (Marsh 101, 9:45-10:30)

Debates between science and religion often arise because of an apparent dichotomy.  It is my position that this dichotomy is false; it arises from the fundamentalist extremes which both sides are prone to.  My thesis is that the apparent dichotomy between science and religion can be discarded once the fundamentalist positions from both sides are shown to be statements of policy for a preferred method.  I synthesized science and religion using Aristotle’s four types of causes. I read Darwin’s Origin to better understand evolutionary theory and Augustine’s Literal Interpretation of Genesis to better understand the creation account in Genesis.

Beck, Daniel, “Care to be Just: Suggestions for an Integrated Moral Perspective” (Marsh 213, 2:15-3:00)

Care ethicists like Nel Noddings and Carol Gilligan have done much to articulate an alternative moral point of view that is successful in addressing the concerns and sensibilities of women. In contrast to the “care thinking” of an ethic of care, the “justice thinking” of traditional ethical theories has largely failed to take into consideration the moral psychology of both men and women. In recognizing the shortcomings of “justice thinking,” I am not recommending its complete abandonment. Yet, there is little agreement among ethicists as to how the moral styles of “justice thinking” and “care thinking” should co-exist, if such co-existence is even possible. In this paper, I examine several suggestions by Carol Gilligan and Virginia Held as to how justice and care should relate to each other in a unified moral perspective. In the end, I offer up a different suggestion wherein neither care nor justice is privileged in the moral point of view. While care may most often take precedence in the shaping of virtuous character and justice may most often take precedence in the giving of moral justification, each is always checking and tempering the other. My particular suggestion for the synthesis of care with justice draws influence from Susan Okin’s analysis of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.

Blesi, Lauren, “Man’s Essential Nature: Feuerbach, Morality and Medical Practice” (Marsh LL5, 4:45-5:30)

How should a doctor view his patient – as a specimen, an engine to be repaired or as a fellow human being?  In the bioethical dilemmas of modern man, it is difficult to morally justify any particular approach to practicing medicine.  The responsibility of the physician is clear; he is to treat the illness of a patient and most importantly, to forestall death.  The Hippocratic Oath gives us some indication of the definition of the physician’s profession but new technology and medical research have challenged our conceptions of exactly what should be considered ‘medical treatment’.  Often, physicians unknowingly base many of their fundamental attitudes of practicing medicine on their personal beliefs which can result in a misguided judgment when presented with an ethical predicament.  In this paper, I explore the quality of compassion and the possible means to ethically justify this element in medical practice.  By applying Ludwig Feuerbach’s concepts of the essential nature of man, I will argue that a theological compassion is inauthentic and therefore, an unjustifiable approach to compassionate medical care.  Instead, I will argue in favor of treating each patient as a fellow man by applying Feuerbach’s species-being ideal as a means to elucidate ethically justifiable compassion in health care.

Brumett, Ashley, “Cautious Endorsement: Preventing an Extended Mind” (Marsh 201, 9:45-10:30)

Burke, Ryan, “Ratios and the History of Western Philosophy” (Marsh LL5, 3:00-3:45)

I will be dealing with the concept of the ratio as it travels through the course of Western philosophy.  Namely how the idea of Pythagoras’ ratio brings with it the a reverence of finitude as it deals with wanting to keep numbers and ratios exactly defined, a reverence for abstraction as it deals with abstracting numbers, lines, shapes and planes from their context and working with them as such, and a reverence for the logistic method of Greek geometry as it is used to keep methods of thoughts, like mathematics and philosophical arguments, finite and abstract so that the proofs turn out exact. By covering over what fit outside the box of abstract, exact-finitude, Western thinkers made progress, but lost meaning.  They wanted to find order and purpose in the universe, but set arbitrary boundaries by which they thought order and purpose ought to fit into: logical/illogical, rational/irrational, definite/undefined, sense/nonsense.  I believe that there is order in the universe; I also believe that the order in the universe can go beyond what can be caught in the mouse trap of the abstract, exact, and finite.  Furthermore, I believe a right relationship is needed to determine what stays and what goes; Pythagoras had faith in ratios described by whole integers, so irrational numbers had to go.  But whole integers could not save Pythagoras’ soul.

Callanan, L. Pippa, “Quining Qualia: The Difficulty of Eliminating” (Marsh 214, 11:30-12:15)

This essay critically assesses the incompatibility of the neo-Cartesian and eliminative materialist models as conceived by Dennett in “Quining Qualia”. I argue that his intuition-pumps are inadequate as internal criticisms as demonstrated by his reliance on neural processes to explain the ineffability of qualia, what I call an external criticism. This method of criticism has important methodological consequences. I argue that either the models are incompatible, and Dennett’s criticisms are ineffective, or there is some conceptual overlap that allows for an effective criticism. Although the intrinsic and relational properties of qualia are incompatible, I will show that a more fundamental conceptual overlap exists between the neo-Cartesian and eliminative models. I rely on a Wittgensteinian understanding of language to argue that the new language of neuroscience necessarily relies on the pre-existing language of qualia. This is problematic for eliminative materialists because the pre-existing language of qualia is neo-Cartesian. Finally, I suggest the modest claim that while elimination is not impossible, the mechanism of elimination can proceed initially through reduction, based on the conceptual overlap created by language.

Canepa, Frank, “The Russellian World and Deep Religion” (Marsh LL5, 4:00-4:45)

In this essay I draw on a standard critique of the naturalist world view about morality (namely that it doesn't explain it well at all) and form similar argument from a different angle. My argument is that the "Deep Religious" world explains the amorality and lack of meaning of a naturalist world while the naturalist world cannot explain the morality and meaning in the Deep Religious world, thus giving a certain credibility to the "Deep Religious" world view.

Case, Spencer, “A Metaphysical Framework for Virtue Ethics” (Marsh LL5, 11:30-12:15)

In the second half of the twentieth century, philosophers like G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Geach, Philippa Foot, and Alasdair Macintyre began finding inspiration in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. This renewed interest in Aristotle has lead to a resurgence of virtue ethics relative to ‘moral’ theories like Utilitarianism and Kantianism. Unlike post-enlightenment theories, virtue ethics is concerned with the cultivation of certain states of being and habituation, rather than with acts alone. This resurgence of virtue ethics has been accompanied by a new wave of criticism of virtue ethic approaches. These attacks have focused on both the normative implications of neo-Aristotelian theory and its metaphysical underpinnings. The broad purpose of this article is to offer a defense of virtue ethics. First, I will introduce Peter Geach’s functional conception of good, which he presented in his article “Good and Evil” and defend it from the criticisms of R.M. Hare. Then I will demonstrate how Geach’s view of good might serve as the metaphysical basis for a virtue ethic theory. My next task will move from the metaethical to the normative level to anticipate a criticism already partially explored by R.M. Hare in his response to Geach. A virtue-based approach seems to face difficulties in explaining how a system of morals grounded in virtue can issue categorical statements. I will resolve this dilemma by showing how something like categorical force can exist within limited normative contexts, like chess playing, and suggesting it may function the same way with the context of living a human life. 

Chen, Shuye, “Science and Scientific Creationism” (Marsh 101, 10:30-11:15)

This essay explores many of the concerns brought up by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I pose scientific creationism as a problematization of science. It brings up the questions of underdetermination and uncertainty in science. In order to resolve these questions I analyze the epistemic justification of each on a meta-level -- I am interested to see whether the methods of production of scientific creationism are the same as science. I then explore the implications of having different theories that are equally justified on reliabilist criteria (that they are both determined through equally reliable and justified methods).

Coad, Rebecca, “Martha Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach and the Problem of Psychological Oppression” (Marsh 101, 8:00-8:45)

Martha Nussbaum’s “capabilities approach” is a philosophical resolution to issues of gender inequality and sexism.  In her article “Women and Cultural Universals”, Nussbaum argues that there are certain capacities that all people need to develop in order to live fully flourishing lives, and that governments around the world have an obligation to provide each person with the opportunity to fulfil these capacities.  The result should be an alleviation of institutionalized and culturally perpetuated sexism.  An important aspect of Nussbaum’s argument is that she sees culture and social norms as being part of the problem, but created a normative theory for the world’s policy-makers.  This paper will take Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and apply it to a strictly North American context to draw two conclusions: First, gender inequality in North America cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of adaptive preferences or some form of internalized oppression.  Following from this, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach may be an excellent foundation to argue for legal equality, but falls short at addressing the psychological aspects of sexism and is therefore an insufficient foundation for substantive equality.  

Cohn, Eli, “Nozick on Closure” (Marsh 106, 4:45-5:30)

There has been a recent movement in epistemology to dent the Closure Principle as a way out of the skeptical trilemma. Externalists have favored denying closure, but this idea has been met with hostility by other epistemologists. This paper examines the role of Closure in the skeptical trilemma and the externalist arguments that closure should be denied. Specifically, the paper focuses on the denials of closure by Robert Nozick, which he bases on his truth tracking theory of knowledge. I conclude that the Nozick’s attempt to deny Closure has failed for a variety of reasons, and epistemologists must find another way out of the skeptical trilemma.

Costello, Willie, “Rethinking the Metaphysical Charge Against Poetry in Republic X” (Marsh 212, 12:15-1:00)

The first half of Republic X is somewhat of an oddity: a discussion of the harmful effects of poetry coming at the end of a long discussion of the nature and benefits of justice. Some scholars use this apparent discontinuity in the text to dismiss Book X as a tacked-on addendum with little relevance to the main focus of the dialogue; this paper, in contrast, aims to present an interpretation of Book X that incorporates it as a vital part of Plato’s argument. By means of a novel comparison between the argument against poetry and the allegory of the cave, I argue that the role of Book X is to comment on the defense of justice itself, showing us why we should believe this defense and how we should react to it. In this way, I demonstrate how an argument about poetry is really an argument about us.

Cotten, André, “The State of Racism” (Marsh 206, 8:00-8:45)

This paper addresses racism in America and how it has evolved through the passing generations. What makes this article especially poignant is that it brings to light where America as a nation is after the election of our first African-American president. This defining moment in American history would lead some individuals to proclaim that Americans have finally overcome their race relation difficulties and achieved the dream that Martin Luther King, Jr. preached about during the Civil Rights Movement. The election of Barack Obama was a significant step closer but it does not signify the end to racism.

Cox, Michael, “He Can Have His Cake, but You Can’t Eat It, Too: Universal Salvation in the Analects” (Marsh LL5, 12:15-1:00)

This paper analyzes Edward Slingerland’s interpretation of universal salvation within Confucius’ Analects. Slingerland equates Confucian virtue with salvation, and goes on to assert that individual salvation can and will be transformed into universal salvation. Working closely with the text of the Analects, I will be arguing against Slingerland’s thesis by providing an alternative reading and alternative interpretation of the passages Slingerland uses to support his position.

Curtis, Sarah, “The Metaphysics of Farming” (Marsh 213, 10:30-11:15)

This summer, research was undertaken supported by a grant given by the Wiancko Charitable Foundation to the Environmental Studies Program at Pacific Lutheran University.  The goal of the research was to ascertain how metaphysical assumptions affect the practices of farmers in the region and thereby understand how metaphysical assumptions have an impact on the environment.  It was the task of this research team member to frame our findings within an understanding of ecofeminism; the basic premise of which is “that the ideology which authorizes oppressions such as those based on race, class, gender, sexuality, physical abilities, and species is the same ideology which sanctions the oppression of nature.” Written here is a summary of the basic concepts of ecofeminism, how ecofeminism differs from animal rights activism, how ecofeminism differs from feminism and how two selected farms may be tied into an ecofeminist understanding of metaphysical assumptions.  The concluding remarks include analysis of certain implications of the research and where this research may be furthered in the future. 

Dennis, Lisa, “A Modern Repudiation of the Allegory” (Marsh 212, 11:30-12:15)

The purpose of my paper is to argue against Plato’s most famous Allegory of the Cave analogy found in the Republic Book X.  Using a dialog format set in a coffee shop, a modern philosophy student, Isaac, challenges Plato’s ideas by using his own famous concepts against himself. I’m attempting to invalidate his philosophy that all art is referential and therefore deceiving and useless by juxtaposing a painting of his Allegory of the Cave against the written work itself. I read once “Those who live near waterfalls cannot hear the water,” I’m attempting to show that maybe Plato himself was too close to his Philosophy to see that since language is based on individual references it might be just as deceiving as art. 

DiMeo, Daniel, “Environmental Ethics: The Need for a De-disciplined Pragmatic Philosophy” (Marsh 212, 8:00-8:45)

Paradox is inescapable in ethics. Our world, undeniably, contains suffering, uncertain, and evil. Yet the individual wishes to do ‘good’. Any ethic must admit to this state of things; it must provide a way to live a good life while surrounded by evil. Environmental ethics, as an emerging paradigm, also has to form its foundation from within the modernist/postmodernist culture of its birth. I intend to show in the following pages that, while a metaphysical justification for acting ethically is ideal, it is never fully possible until the ethical idea becomes a part of one’s experience. Living an ethic is the only way to truly know an ethic. Thus, while the search for theoretical justification of an environmental ethic is philosophically valuable, it cannot be the whole thing. A societal ethic of the environment requires the ethicist to takes his arguments out into the world, so that they may be taken up by society as more than a particular discipline within a philosophical field, but as a way of life.

Donner, Alicia M., “Population Control: Financial Incentives, Freedom and the Question of Coercion” (Marsh 212, 9:45-10:30)

As the global population climbs swiftly toward seven billion, concerns have arisen regarding whether the planet can healthily sustain an ever-increasing population—and for good reason.  From an environmental perspective, the earth simply cannot support the burgeoning numbers.  This can be perceived when one considers the lasting effects of the Green Revolution: methods that have succeeded in creating the food surplus that the planet and its inhabitants enjoy also have succeeded in degrading many natural systems to a point where it is no longer certain if they will recover, or will even continue to produce the food the world depends on at current levels into a foreseeable future (Roberts xxi).  Emboldened by this odious fact and others, many have set out to formulate an ideal method to curb population growth.  Those who advocate population control fall into two camps: doomsdayers and cautious optimists.  Doomsdayers like Garrett Hardin advocate strict social sanctions on procreative rights.  Though intended to end the population crisis with an urgency well suited to its namesake, these limitations on personal freedoms bother more people than just the average libertarian.  Furthermore, aggressive and coercive strategies of population control tend not to pan out in the long run, as those repressed try to assert their freedoms and skirt the policies.  At the other end of the spectrum lie the cautious optimists, such as philosopher Clark Wolf, who seek to curb population growth while maintaining personal freedoms through the use of social incentives, such as educational and economic opportunities and an increase in social security.  Although this option may seem like a reasonable solution, experience informs that relying strictly on voluntary methods has proven to be only minimally successful and slow going, especially when the preferred family size remains higher than the necessary replacement rate.  Therefore, I intend to argue for a solution that is a compromise between these two extremes: using financial incentives to encourage a decrease in fertility, making smaller families more appealing, and increasing social programs, is a method of population control that ensures individual freedoms while achieving the desired goal of population stabilization or even decrease.

Downes, Phillip, “The Kantian Expansion of the Qualifications of Civilization” (Marsh 212, 8:45-9:30)

Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory has generally been ignored in environmental ethics, because most environmental ethicists contend that Kant’s theory is out of date and useless to making sense of the environmental dilemmas. My paper plans to demonstrate that the Kantian moral theory is still a relevant theory in environmental ethics because Kant can explain our duties to animals, only by means of our duties to other autonomous agents. My paper also incorporates Jeffery Reiman’s conception of civilization to evaluate the Kantian moral theory, in order to demonstrate that animals can be helped, and a society can advance its civilization simultaneously with Kantian ethics. My paper concludes that the Kantian moral theory can indirectly protect animals, which allows a society to become more civilized. Plus, I find that under the Kantian moral theory a society is normally obligated and morally obligated to include animals into calculations for civility. I conclude that Kant can justify extensive respect for nonhuman animals.

Dunleavy, Casie, “Identity as Fiction and What This Means for Gender Existentially” (Marsh 101, 8:45-9:30)

In this essay, I take on Sally Haslanger’s idea that identity itself, specifically gendered identity, is a fiction created by others in the past and present in a particular culture.  This essay depicts identity both in its “objective” form, that is, always scripted by others, while also looking at subjective experiences of identity, including my own.  I conclude with the statement that some fictions are oppressive, which reveals the troubling realization that people, by their very identity (which is cultivated by social forces) seems fixed in oppressive scripts.  Re-writing these scripts autonomously is a difficult task, since the very tools which we use to change norms pertaining to identity have been constructed by dominant figures of the past as well.

Eddy, Eric, “Alternate Choices and Moral Responsibility” (Marsh 207, 4:45-5:30)

Is free will and moral responsibility dependent on the availability of alternate possibilities? According to Dr. Harry Frankfurt the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is not a necessary condition for moral responsibility. His counterexample asserts that a person can be morally responsible without the availability of alternate possibilities. However his intuitive argument overlooks how alternate choices plays in to moral responsibility. Using a principle of possible alternate choices it can bee seen why Frankfurt’s counterexample seems to be intuitive, but ultimately shows the necessity of alternate choices for moral responsibility. This paper discusses the difference between alternate choices and alternate actions and how alternate choices is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.

Eidse-Rempel, Kajia, “On Abortion” (Marsh 213, 3:00-3:45)

In Judith Jarvis Thomson’s article “A Defense of Abortion,” she attempts to prove that abortion is just even if we assume that the fetus is a person and thus worthy of full moral value. She challenges the premise that the fetus’s (person’s) right to life guarantees it the right to use the woman’s body, by associating body with private property.  I will argue that her use of the right to private property is problematic in its own terms, requires further explanation than is given, and treats the issue of abortion in a superficial and trivial manner. The moral and emotional gravity involved in making the decision to end another person’s life is not addressed by a simple rights versus rights calculus. It is a decision that reflects a woman’s understanding of her own value and the value of everything around her, and it ought to be made with full knowledge of its implications.

Elgin, Sam, “Knowledge In or Out of Context” (Marsh LL5, 9:45-10:30)

Epistemological contextualists maintain that the standards of application for the word "know" vary with context.  Sometimes the standards are high; other times low.  I argue that contextualism faces some answerable problems, but remains counterintuitive.  Additionally, if contextualism is true, it does not have the epistemological significance that it first appears to.

Farris, Jason G., “Spirituality Is Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s Spritual Path of Individuality” (Marsh LL5, 5:30-6:15)

This paper reveals a thesis that argues for a spirituality that is subjectively based upon each individuals experience with God.  Through comparing and contrasting various writings of Kierkegaard, his pseudonymous works, and other scholarly works, an argument is developed that is between Kierkegaard the man of either/or objectivity and that of Kierkegaard the man on the path of individuality, with a subjective spirituality resulting in a unique and passionate relationship with God.  Spirituality and faith cannot be explained fully or be accounted for through an objective philosophical approach.  Although Kierkegaard, in his angst, tried to unveil the lack of faith that he felt was in the Danish Church, he in turn contradicted himself by attempting to determine the reality of that same spirituality which can only be truly measured by God. Kierkegaard’s own writings reveal this self contradiction and results in a sublime understanding of spirituality as a subjective experience of the individual, for which true passion, authenticity, and faith can only by determined by God.

Feore, James, “Plato on America: From Aristocracy to Tyranny” (Marsh 213, 8:45-9:30)

In The Republic, Plato discusses a pattern of political decay whereby states start in the form of Platonic aristocracies and slowly transition to tyranny. The unfortunate problem with this account is that it seems confusing and unfamiliar from a contemporary viewpoint, robbing it of much of its potential insight. The solution to this problem is remarkably simple as an examination of changing American politics reveals the presence of just such a process. Analogies for Plato’s states of transition – such as Enlightenment aristocracy, frontier timarchy, and fundraising plutocracy – can be observed throughout various periods of American political history, and those yet unobserved are subject to reasonable anticipation. Seen through this lens, the stages of transition become more readily understandable, easier to examine, and seem to offer more relevant insights into modern politics.

Frein, Aaron, “The Dissolution of Kant’s Self” (Marsh LL21, 4:00-4:45)

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant presents us with three different possible definitions of the self: empirical, transcendental, and logical. By examining two portions of the Critique, the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, it is clear that two of these selves  (the transcendental and the empirical) are representative of the two opposing philosophical schools which Kant presents as his predecessors (rationalism and empiricism), while the third form represents his own conception of the self. It is the goal of this paper to show the reader that Kant’s version of the self, while providing powerful insights into the nature of the debate, still fails to accomplish the fundamental aim of his project, as it fails to provide us with an identity that is unified, knowable and meaningful.

Glasscock, Allison H., “To Be Truly Happy: Fortune, False Goods, and Happiness in Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy” (Marsh 214, 4:00-4:45)

Woven amongst the myriad, tangled themes of Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy is a lengthy examination of fortune, true happiness and the relationship between the two. Brought low by the turning of fortune’s wheel, Boethius turns to his muse, Philosophy, for an explanation of his misfortunes and asks her to show him what true happiness is. The arguments with which Philosophy follows this request are complex and fraught with possibilities for misinterpretation: Does Philosophy offer one account of true happiness or two? Is fortune a necessary component of true happiness or is true happiness completely self-sufficient? Commentator John Marenbon argues that Philosophy advances two different conceptions of true happiness and that, ultimately, they conflict with one another (“Rationality and Happiness: Interpreting Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy”). Contra Marenbon, I argue that Consolation does provide a coherent account of true happiness, and it is an account that is surprisingly void of conflict betwixt two incompatible conceptions. What Marenbon interprets as an alternative conception of true happiness is actually part of Philosophy’s gradated, and ultimately satisfactory, answer to Boethius’s urgent questioning.

Grayot, James, “Philosophical Therapy” (Marsh LL21, 9:45-10:30)

This paper began as an exercise in language philosophy. More specifically, it was to explore Wittgenstein’s beetle/box thought experiment as an attack of the concept of private language. However, this has proven to be a daunting task. This is partly due to ambiguous use of dichotomies with regard to private/public language distinctions. Through sorting logic from rhetoric, I reveal what I believe to be a much more effective use of disjunctive propositions for employing dichotomies. However, this work only leads me to exploring more deeply rooted problems for the issues of privacy. That is, through understanding conceptual schemes via W.V. Quine, it becomes apparent that the private language issues are entrenched in the bedrock of philosophy. This being the case, philosophers should discontinue squabbling over semantic battles and return to the source: that whatever ontology we endorse, will dictate our conceptual scheme, and further, support our corresponding philosophies. Therefore, I believe privacy to be an issue more deserving of psychoanalysis, than philosophical scrutiny.

Griffin, Shannon, “A Look at the Morals and Ethics of Friedrich Nietzsche” (Marsh 206, 9:45-10:30)

This is a research paper on Friedrich Nietzsche’s ethics.  It outlines Nietzsche’s ideas on the ethics of his time as well as his own views of ethics.  Within this the different characteristics are presented of what would be considered the ethically good or higher types of man.  Outlining a new way of seeing of how one ought to act within the world.

Gutierrez, Eric, “Human Freedom and Leibniz’s Theodicy: Is God the Author of Evil?” (Marsh 207, 10:30-11:15)

For this paper I’ll be examining G.W. Leibniz’s response to the problem of evil in his 1710 work Theodicy. One of Leibniz’s aims in the Theodicy is to show how human freedom is sufficient to vindicate God of blame for allowing evil to exist. His view is that, in our daily lives, the necessary conditions of human freedom – that is, the possibility that events could be otherwise (contingency), the reasoning ability of humans (intelligence), and the fact that our perceptions are self-originating (spontaneity) – are met, thus grounding the origin of evil in human acts. In my paper I evaluate this argument and show how the third condition of freedom, spontaneity, is not met. Spontaneity fails to obtain because God actualizes each person’s essence and thus determines it. Hence, a person’s perceptions are not fully self-originating, and human freedom fails to obtain.

Hale, Amanda, “Descartes’ ‘Traditional Epistemology’” (Marsh 207, 8:00-8:45)

In Descartes’ “Traditional Epistemology”, I examine how Stanley Cavell’s explanation of traditional epistemology, as described in The Claim of Reason, is exemplified in Descartes’ “Meditations”. I use what Cavell provides in The Claim of Reason as a guide to examine the way in which Descartes presents skepticism.

Hallett, Danielle, “Romance and the Wonder of Nature” (Marsh 106, 8:00-8:45)

Charles Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection was, and by some still is, accused of tapping the final nail in the coffin of a now lifeless, but once aestheticized, meaningful, and moralized nature. Whether this is hailed as a triumph for liberal, rational science or seen as a victory of degenerate atheism, it is often accepted as a legitimate story. There are some however, who reject the claim that the theory of natural selection implies a purely mechanical understanding of nature and provide alternative accounts of the moral and aesthetic implications of the Darwinian conception of nature. The final chapter of Robert Richards’ 2002 book The Romantic Conception of Life, entitled “Darwin’s Romantic Biology” is one such example. Richards argues that the Romantic philosophy of nature of Goethe is latent in the language of The Origin of Species and follows from a consistent application of the theory of natural selection to the natural world. In this paper I offer arguments in favour of rejecting the idea that the Darwinian theory of natural selection, as presented by Darwin in The Origin, is committed to a Romantic philosophy of nature.

Harris, Adam, “History and the Historical: A Critique of Historical Materialsim” (Marsh 212, 2:15-3:00)

Historical materialism attempts a view to history beginning with its most fundamental truth: that humans live.  In order not only to live, but also to sustain life, humans must produce to meet their needs.  This, for Marx, is the beginning of history.  As such, Marx is forced into the assumption that material conditions of production provide the conditions of a given historical period, and that ultimately these conditions are the process through which history is produced.  History is therefore working towards a product, and its end, according to Marx, is a world-wide communist state.  Marx’s formulation of history, valuable as it may be to our understanding of the subject as a whole, is entirely off base from reality.  Though he may not logically misstep, his premises cause him to stumble into a gross misinterpretation of history.  If, then, we look closely at some of these premises, we should be able to determine why the Marxist view of history is not only wrong but also dangerous.       

Havens, Holly, “The Aesthetic Character of Erotic Love” (Marsh 213, 5:30-6:15)

Sex is often viewed today through the lens of biology or as merely a means to an end. However, there are many problems with this view, including the issue that sex is not reducible to a subject-object intentional relation. This paper, drawing from the work of Merleau-Ponty, seeks to explore the rich topic of erotic love and how it can be perceived aesthetically and phenomenlogically. I shall focus on topics such as "What is the natural attitude of love?" and explain how erotic love is not identical to sex, but is a much deeper, more complex phenomenon.

Huie, Mary, “A Response to Sandel Concerning Assisted Reproductive Technology and Its Effects on Solidarity” (Marsh 212, 10:30-11:15)

This paper is a response to arguments presented by Michael Sandel in his book The Case Against Perfection. I will also focus on Sandel’s arguments concerning the prolific use of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) and their impact on social solidarity and norms of self-perception. The development of these technologies brings about new ethical issues that must be addressed before their widespread use is accepted by any society that chooses to engage in this practice.

Kehr, Sean, “How Not To Do Things With Words: Arguments Against Performative Utterances” (Marsh LL21, 10:30-11:15)

It is my assertion that this basic tenet has a flaw that has been overlooked in its presentation. In this paper I will attempt to show what I see as a serious problem for the theory. The central question of this problem is concerned with whether or not the analysis of language using the performative utterance model escapes the need to rely on simple rule following. I will show through this paper that not only does it fail to escape such a condition but more over if it can not it also fails to illuminate any new understanding of language.

Kemmsies, Alex W., “An Account of Statistics in Methodological Individualsim” (Marsh 201, 12:15-1:00)

The debate between Methodological Individualism and Holism has raged for centuries. Is society comprised of its individuals or are individuals determined by society? Western society finds solace in a practice of Methodological Individualism, a doctrine upon which our economic theory is based upon. In the struggle between these two paradigms, J. W. N. Watkins argues the case for Methodological Individualism. In his account, statistics is dismissed as a valid example of Methodological Individualism. In doing so, Mr. Watkins unintentionally provides an argument for Holism. If Methodological Individualism is to hold its ground in western society, statistics cannot support a Holist argument and Mr. Watkins’ arguments against statistics rebuked.

Kuhr, Matthew, “Balding and the King of France: Another Look into the Russell, Strawson Debate” (Marsh LL21, 11:30-12:15)

The philosophical study of language has concerned itself for many years with the issue of reference and meaning. Out of this concentration, a dialogue between Bertrand Russell and Peter F. Strawson developed. Russell and the Theory of Descriptions where challenged by Strawson and his Theory of Sentences. Russell then rebuffed Strawson’s argument and a few decades latter J.W. Austin threw his hat into the ring on behalf of Russell. It is at this point that I wish to jump in and defend Strawson. The first section provides a brief account of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions. Section two outlines Strawson’s Theory of Sentences in contrast to the Theory of Descriptions along with Strawson’s critique of the Theory of Descriptions. The third section discusses J.L. Austin’s treatment of this dispute as well as Russell’s response to Strawson. Part three also includes my own critique of both Russell’s response and Austin’s defense of Russell. In the fourth part of I hope to show how a synthesis between the two disbands most disagreement and strengthens the Theory of Descriptions. 

LaBarre, Kevin, “Moral Responsibility and Petitionary Prayer” (Marsh LL21, 8:45-9:30)

When someone says that you are morally responsible for something it intuitively seems as though they are saying that you are fully morally responsible for that thing.  The goal of this paper is to attempt to show that it is hard to see how someone could be fully or wholly morally responsible for the outcomes of their prayers if petitionary prayers are efficacious.  The first thing I will present will be a main worry that many people have when discussing petitionary prayer, and an objection to it.  Next I will present three arguments in response to that objection and some responses to those arguments.  Lastly I will conclude the paper with a recap of the main discussion.

Lambert, Dennis, “(De)construction / De(con)struction” (Marsh 206, 5:30-6:15)

The purpose of this paper is to examine Jacques Derrida’s philosophy of deconstruction and how it has contributed to postmodern philosophy in general. Deconstruction could be said to have been introduced through Derrida’s critique of structuralism, but it has since gone on to bring the entire tradition of Western philosophy under doubt. Deconstruction involves a process of decentering binary opposites, such as man/woman, light/dark, etc. Since meaning arrives through these binary opposites, the process of decentering them can be problematic as well as liberating. Through researching this philosophy, it could perhaps be said that deconstruction is the major theme of postmodernism.

Lande, Kevin, “Rorty, Relativism, and Ethnocentrism” (Marsh 206, 2:15-3:00)

In this paper I will set out to substantiate Rorty’s position of relativist ethnocentrism, grounded in the pragmatic framework. While some sort of relativism is the inevitable consequence of pragmatism, this pragmatic relativism directly entails what Rorty termed “ethnocentrism.” This is just to say that insofar as we accept “reality” in terms of our ongoing coping practices in the world, as opposed to an absolute, permeating substratum that causally determines the truth-values of statements, we must be inclined to accept the thesis that values and desires are relative to the cultural and historical circumstances that produce them. However, from a pragmatic starting-point, this does not allow us to attribute all respective values equal weighting. For it is just by virtue of the relativity of values that we firmly establish their conversational objectivity and absoluteness, such that values are once again hierarchized with respect to our current historical and cultural position. Pragmatism, carried out to its full conclusion, leads to a relativism so radical that it re-establishes objectivity and philosophical discourse on firm grounds—more secure than the expedient foundations of Rorty’s ethnocentrism. While Rorty laid out the groundwork for this argument, he did not complete the project, instead halting at the point of “ethnocentrism.” I want to at least continue along the lines that the pragmatists set out, most explicitly refined by Rorty in terms of relativism—both philosophical (the relativism of “reality” to our pragmatic projects of coping) and moral (the relativism of values to particular cultural and historical trajectories)—and ethnocentrism (the decision to, despite some form of relativism, argue the correctness of our own position based on its usefulness in coping).

Laughlin, Jonathan, “The Pride and Ignorance Found in Euthyphro’s Cave” (Marsh 213, 8:00-8:45)

This essay focuses on what can be learned from Plato’s work through his verbal dynamic between the characters involved in his dialogues, focusing on the Euthyphro.  This is done by pointing out three flaws in common analyses of the dialogue: reading Plato’s work as a modern work of philosophy, approaching smaller dialogues as historical support for other works, and reducing his dialogues to nothing more than the search for Socratic definitions.  The Euthyphro is then analyzed along with the allegory of the cave to show that Plato was attempting to show more in the Euthyphro than a simple definition of piety.  By doing this, a deeper understanding of his views on Athens one finds an underlying theme of the struggle necessary to reach wisdom through reasoning. 

Lederer, Thomas, “Individualization in Relation to Language: A Study of Habermas and Lacan” (Marsh 213, 12:15-1:00)

My paper addresses the debate of whether the self must achieve individualization through mutual recognition or through separation from the Other. My first premise is that this question can only be adequately addressed from the perspective of language and as such includes a brief argument that the mode of original self-reflection is symbolically structured. I take the work of Jurgen Habermas to be representative of the first position and draw out from his argument the following central conclusions: i. language is inherently rational and provides the individual with the critical capacity necessary for his self-legislation as an individuated agent ii. that the argumentative processes of language presuppose other universal procedural obligations ( the application or norms, need interpretations, ego development) that are likewise based upon mutual recognition and individualization. I then turn to George Herbert Mead to address in more detail how structures of linguistically communicated interaction provide for the subject’s relation to himself and his actions. These last two points are re-interpreted from the work of Jacques Lacan and used as a transition into the opposing view that mutual recognition is impossible and the Other as language is a limitation upon individualization whose influence must be overcome. I extract two central arguments: i. that the ego as it is given through language is illusory and restricting ii. that language forces us to adopt the desire of the Other as the reference points for all our activities and that the unconscious drive behind all our practical engagements is the renunciation of subjectivity; as such when we take the perspective of the Other through language we renounce agency. Lacan’s account of individualization must take place outside the domain of the Other. I conclude by considering the strengths and weaknesses of each position by focusing on fundamental framework or methodology that informs each theorist’s specific claims.

Lerner, Jonathan, “Does It Hurt?: Are Performance Enhancing Drugs Morally Permissible in Sports” (Marsh 214, 5:30-6:15)

Modern competitive sports have ushered in a new era of training techniques, as well as the use of Performance Enhancing Drugs (PEDs) as a means for athletes to gain competitive advantages. The majority of the sporting community has denounced these PEDs and banned them from their organizations. Yet, there is a fundamental flaw in the current decision to ban these substances: While the agreement on doing so is nearly universal, almost no one has been able to formulate an effective moral argument against them. In this paper, I will be discussing some of these arguments, namely those outlined by Robert L. Simon , W.M. Brown, and by Laura Morgan. I intend to combine these ideas to form a clearer understanding of the issues, and to present a moral argument against PEDs that will, hopefully, lead to further inquiry.

Long, Emily, “Comparison of Schelling and Hegel’s Philosophies of Aesthetics and The Absolute” (Marsh 207, 12:15-1:00)

Maekawa, Mika, “The Devil Inside: A Psychological Introspection of the Philosophy of Bad Action” (Marsh 214, 10:30-11:15)

What happens when you act dishonestly? By this I mean the very internal and external steps leading to an incontinent action, as well as a third party evaluation of said act. What causes us to stray from the virtuous life and is there any hope of returning to it once we have fallen? Aristotle paints for us a picture of the Good life through virtue, contemplation, and friendship in Nicomachean Ethics. From him, subsequent thinkers cite “the Philosopher” as they develop the idea of a free will and how we are able to choose the virtuous path. It seems as though, in order to have goodness, we must have its counter – and, more importantly, the freedom to choose vice. The rational animals that we are, though, how could such a choice appear desirable? If lying could get you out of a pinch, how can concepts of truth and morality require an alternative action? Using Aristotle’s Ethics, Stanley Cavell’s Cities of Words, the works of medieval thinker John Duns Scotus, and an article by contemporary philosopher Donald Davidson (“How is Weakness of the Will Possible?”) I will analyze my own fall – and how I plan to get back up! Aristotle, Scotus, and Davidson help me to answer the question: what happened? Armed with what we know of the Good life, the will, practical reason and freedom I will take a, unfortunately, uniquely personal analytical look at a seemingly everlasting moment of weak will.

Martin, Trevor, “An Acceptable Definition of Art” (Marsh 101, 4:00-4:45)

A significant piece of the endeavor toward a true theory of aesthetics has been the identification of a proper definition for the term art.  I argue that there are exactly two necessary conditions for an object to be considered art: 1. that it be a creation, and 2. that the creator presents it on virtue either of its form or content or both.  I find that this definition is most intuitive and likewise consistent with the discourse of laypersons and aestheticians; the definition should include all works considered by them to be of aesthetic significance, and exclude none.  After raising the definition from what I believe to be this proper metaphysical and creator-relative foundation, I respond to possible counterexamples to the definition—based on those things included as art under the definition as well as those excluded—that I believe are likely to be considered by the reader.

McKearn, Mike, “A Study of Civic Attitudes in Kant and Plato” (Marsh LL21, 5:30-6:15)

This paper is an attempt to compare the formulation of the civic attitude of philosophy elaborated in Plato’s Crito and Immanuel Kant’s essay “What is Enlightenment?” It contrasts the more straightforward relationship between an elaborated way of thinking and a way of living in the Crito with Kant’s less clear relationship, wherein thinking and acting both take place, but are no longer clearly related.  Ultimately, I arrive at the conclusion that Kant’s formulation of a philosophical discourse without direct relation to actions has unacceptable effects for subjects and society as a whole.

Mecham, Christian, “To See It Feelingly: The Philosophy of Sound and Echo in Mark Z. Danielewski’s House of Leaves” (Marsh 101, 5:30-6:15)

In this paper I examine the importance of sound in the novel House of Leaves by Mark Z. Danielewski.  In particular I focus on the discussion on echo in chapter V and the wider philosophical importance that derives from that.  Drawing from the poetry of John Hollander, the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud, and a wide variety of religious teachings, Eastern and Western, I discuss how sound both effects the human understanding of the world empirically and psychologically.

Morlock, Kaley, “Welcome to Facebook!: Assessing Existential Values and Authenticity in the Virtual Domain” (Marsh 213, 11:30-12:15)

“Facebook helps you connect and share with the people in your life,” states the homepage of the virtual phenomenon obsessively known to the collegiate atmosphere. Facebook permits members to chat, share photos, advertise events, join groups, and stalk your ex-boyfriend.  The necessity of Facebook is social and moreover existential assertion through a virtual participatory experience. However, its pervasiveness is troublesome inasmuch as its anonymous convenience devalues empirical authenticity. The individual exists outside of the real, creates a projected persona and transcends into the simulacrum, not an imitation of the real, but something entirely in-of-itself, comfortably replacing interactions and communication—the totality of human experience. In this paper I will examine the existential quandaries of Facebook in conjunction with Jean Baudrillard's notion of the media provoked simulacrum and Louis Althusser's practices of ideological recognition.

Murphy, Alana, “Giving Patients Hope and a Future: A Multidisciplinary and Holistic Approach to Medical Diagnostic Delivery” (Marsh 212, 4:00-4:45)

This paper will examine how current medical diagnostic models can cause drastically negative effects on patients. A diagnosis marks the first step towards a patient's recovery or decline, and as such, must begin with respect for the patient's autonomy. Without proper patient-physician dialogue, patient recovery can fail. There currently exists varied medical ethical models that delineate how physicians deliver diagnosis/prognosis to patients. This paper addresses two contrasting models: the autonomous model, which is used in the United States of America and the paternalistic model, which is utilized in Russia. I contend that both models fail to respect the integrity of the patient's autonomy, and neglect to provide the patient with adequate information about his/her prognosis, thereby placing the patient at a significant disadvantage during the treatment process. I propose we utilize a multidisciplinary commission and a holistic approach to diagnostic delivery allowing medical specialists and family members to engage in the diagnostic/prognosis delivery, ultimately altering the current paradigms of diagnostic delivery.

Myers, Brady, “‘A feature that cuts across the ages’: Concept and Immancnce in Deleuze and Guattari” (Marsh 206, 4:00-4:45)

In their final collaborative work "What is Philosophy?", Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari offer a new way to understand philosophy as a practice, starting with what they claim is its most basic act: the creation of concepts. In this paper I test their account through a series of my own examples; I also seek to strengthen the link between their articulation of the concept as the fundamental unit of philosophical experience and their controversial claim that philosophy is a strictly 'non-discursive' practice. Lastly, I am interested – in light their constructivist model of philosophy – to problematize not only the history of philosophy as it is conventionally viewed, but also prevailing notions of philosophical “progress.”

Nesse, Glen, “Atoms and the Void” (Marsh 106, 11:30-12:15)

I had originally intended to begin this paper with a quip about how I intend to convince you, by the time you’ve reached the end of the paper, that you do not exist. And that if you should come to accept your own non-existence, you might possibly vanish in a poof of existential smoke (as the popular portrayals of philosophy would have you believe). But on second thought, I realized that if the reader should miss my sarcasm, the paper had a decent chance of landing in a waste basket before half the page was read. Thus I decided on a slightly more conservative (if unconventional) introduction of talking about the previous introduction, instead of actually introducing the paper. Perhaps I should get to that. “By convention sweet, by convention bitter, by convention color: but in reality atoms and the void.” The title for this paper is owing to Democritus. Mereology, the study of the relationship between parts and wholes, played an important role in the metaphysics of many Socratics and Pre-Socratics. This isn’t a paper on ancient Greek philosophy, however. Our concern here is with the contemporary metaphysical discussion – specifically what Peter van Inwagen has termed “The Special Composition Question”. The debate tangentially ties into a number of other metaphysical subjects, thus I feel it necessary to start the paper with a number of assumptions. My hope is to convince the reader, by the end of the paper, that there are only two viable answers to The Special Composition Question: Universalism and Nihilism. Further, I hope to show that the latter is not as bad an option as it is oft assumed to be.

Nitchals, Ellen, “‘Meaning and Reference’ Revisited” (Marsh LL5, 8:00-8:45)

Putnam's assertion in “Meaning and Reference” that “meaning just ain't in the head” is based on a series of thought experiments regarding Oscar and his Twin Earth doppelganger. However, in trying to prove his hypothesis he asserts a few rather misled premises regarding perception, his own SameL relation, and the importance of scientific discoveries in determining meaning and reference. This paper aims first to demonstrate where Putnam has gone wrong, then to show why meaning must (at least in part) be determined by what's “in the head.”

O’Donnell, Patrick, “Being-in-the-World, Representation, and Authenticity: Death in Being and Time” (Marsh 201, 4:00-4:45)

The following is an expository and interpretive piece on Martin Heidegger’s characterization of death in his magnum opus Being and Time. Eschewing biologically, theologically, and psychologically-based accounts of the phenomenon of death, Heidegger attempts to show that death is a matter of fundamental ontological importance for human life and an understanding of “the meaning of Being” in general. This has two underlying conceptions. The first is that the human being is an entity which is constantly “on its way towards death” in the sense that it runs headlong into futural possibilities which are finite. Human beings eventually “run out” of possibilities to pursue, and so the very ability to project oneself into possibilities must be understood as predicated on the existence of “the end” in death. Every matter of “life,” then, is similarly a matter of death, since life has the character of a “constant dying,” or a constant directedness toward the end of all future possibilities. The second underlying conception is that death is a radically individuating phenomenon which “lays claim to” a single life, which becomes isolated from the everyday shared world that we experience as a public, normative, and interpreted realm. It is then incumbent upon this life to come face to face with the certainty of its death and to individually comport itself toward this reality in a manner which is “authentic.” Heidegger’s conception of authenticity will also be explained, and in this explanation it will be shown that his conception of death is an unambiguous call to mindful self-awareness and resolute strength in the face of finitude.    

Ok, Rebecca, “On the Consistency of Common Sense and a Kooky View” (Marsh 106, 12:15-1:00)

Peter van Inwagen presents a metaphysical view in his book Material Beings which entails that there are no tables, chairs, or other inanimate composite material objects. Further, he maintains that everyday assertions and expressions of common sense belief are often true and that this is consistent with his antirealist views. If such a view as this is coherent, it provides an example of how to forward a radical ontology without rejecting common sense. The question with which this paper will be concerned is whether or not such a view is coherent. This question will require an examination of Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, paraphrase, fictional discourse, plural quantification, and finally a return to Quine for a model of how to account for the truth of existential sentences about chairs in non-philosophical contexts and their falsity in philosophical ones.

Olmstead, Erik, “Apperception and the Categories: An Explanation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction” (Marsh LL21, 3:00-3:45)

Immanuel Kant thought that there were “no enquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty [of] understanding than those [he had] instituted” in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic section of his work the Critique of Pure Reason, which is commonly labeled the transcendental deduction. Kant’s transcendental deduction tries to establish that it is only through the categories that we are able to have any experiences whatsoever. However, one of the standard objections to this argument is that by Kant’s own definitions, his argument is false, as it results in a contradiction. What then is the truth of the matter? What I have accomplished in this paper is to explicate as well as I can Kant’s argument in the transcendental deduction, drawing upon several recent interpretations to aid me. After this explanation, I critically respond to the standard objection given above, by using Henry Allison’s distinctions between epistemic and ontological conditions in Kant’s writing to deflate this apparent contradiction.

Park, Jordan, “Time: As a Measure of Change” (Marsh 207, 2:15-3:00)

Many philosophers, physicists, and theologians regard time as one of the most fundamental features of the universe. This absolutist view of time may seem to be the most intuitive and conventional approach to describe change and all that it involves. For example, most folks believe that it is absolutely true that they are n years old, for any number n.  However, I reject age and any other temporal notion as absolute. The refusal of the seductive pull toward an absolutist view of time is not without precedent. Aristotle holds a similar view to mine. I advocate that time should be defined as a measure of change. Such a definition best corresponds to our direct experience with time. Our system of time is synced up with the rotation of Earth.  If we had a human colony on Jupiter, time may be vastly different. Jupiter is the fastest rotating planet in our solar system. As such, Jupiter-days would be just under ten Earth hours. Using the same time system, people living on Jupiter would have life spans exceeding 180 years (ceteris paribus). To be consistent with Earth time, a unique time scheme would have to be founded on Jupiter – matching up with different changes. Thus, the purpose of time is to measure patterned or cyclical changes in the universe. But what happens when one adopts this view of time? The aim of this essay is to elucidate the following consequences of defining time as a measure of change: (1) time cannot serve an active role as a ‘mover of change’, (2) time’s relationship to change is dependent, in that it cannot exist without change, and (3) any account of time can be reduced to a story of change – consequently forcing time to be insubstantial and only a feature of human consciousness.    

Parker, Marc Anthony, “The Ethical Implications of Evolutionary Theory” (Marsh 106, 8:45-9:30)

The theory of evolution by natural selection provides a very powerful lens for viewing the order of the world.  The effect of this scientific revolution upon the area of moral and ethical discourse was felt soon after Darwin’s publication of The Origin of Species, and it quickly sparked a debate as to whether or not evolutionary theory has the capacity to explain human morality.  This argument has not yet been resolved, and I doubt it will, at least, for a very long time.  I believe it will continue, as well, because the temptation of a scientific grounding for morality is so great.  It would, however, afford someone who considers the ethical implications of evolutionary theory to view that activity as examining ethics through a particular lens which illuminates some of its aspects, potentialities, and limitations, but not as something which defines it.  This essay first describes popular ideas involved in the debate about evolution and morality, and then it espouses a compromising position by virtue of this alternative approach that bypasses the traditional deadlock.  In taking that position one finds that evolutionary theory does not give a complete account of morality.  However, one also finds that it points to limits on moral possibilities and to where the actual source of morality lies.

Partridge, Chris, “On the Moral Permissibility of Voluntary Amputation” (Marsh 212, 4:45-5:30)

Across the globe men and women are laying on railroad tracks, freezing their limbs, and infecting healthy digits, all in voluntary pursuit of amputation.  While our initial response might be to dismiss these individuals as irrational or psychotic, significant research suggests there are several legitimate reasons competent agents seek the elective amputation of healthy limbs. This paper focuses specifically on apotemnophilia, the erotic interest in one’s own amputated limb.  I argue that it falls within a patient’s right to sexual autonomy to seek out and procure an elective amputation.  I pursue using a modified version of Andrew Altman’s argument for the right to pornography under sexual autonomy.  I address pertinent objections regarding the means-ends distinction of rights, competence of seemingly incompetent agents, and the short-comings of less drastic alternatives.

Peet-Walker, Katie, “What Is Disabled?: A Critique of Social Norms and their Implications” (Marsh 213, 9:45-10:30)

Phalen, Peter, “Reference, Representation, Truth, and Some Problems That Are Better Left Unsolved” (Marsh LL21, 12:15-1:00)

The problem of reference has ramifications in every field of philosophy, but perhaps none more so than epistemology. After all, it seems that we cannot know the truth-value of a proposition concerning matters of fact if we cannot compare the content of the proposition with the object(s) it refers to. In this paper, I argue that it is not only problematic to assign truth-value to non-referential propositions, but that this assignment leads to true contradictions, an obvious absurdity. A functional theory of truth requires a functional theory of reference. I attempt to demonstrate some probably insurmountable difficulties with both direct and indirect (description-based) theories of reference, in part with an appeal to various paintings by Picasso, particularly from his cubist period. Finally, I look to Virginia Woolf to provide us with an example of what life looks like without truth. This life, I maintain, is a better one, and so the problem of reference should not (and as I argue cannot) be solved.

Pons, Bo, “Video Games as an Art Form: The Aesthetic Nature of Cheating in Video Games” (Marsh 101, 4:45-5:30)

Contemporary pop culture cannot be separated from the growing popularity of video games. This paper identifies this popularity and continues its philosophical discussion of the status of video games as an art form. Not only will the paper reevaluate the debate, but also advance the area of focus to include the aesthetic nature of cheating in video games. The paper begins with some background of the psychology of cheating to provide understanding of its aesthetic consequences. Another introductory section includes the evolution of cheating in video games to allow unaware readers of the topic’s relevance and significance. In reference to the status of video games, this paper deeply analyzes the aesthetic qualities that support the premise of accepting video games as art. After identifying video games as giving aesthetic experiences, the main focus of cheating in video games begins by defining real time, story, and competitive games. Through a comparison of cheating in these three video games types and art forgeries, this paper evaluates the aesthetic nature of cheating with an overall psychological perspective. The paper concludes by contrasting the real time and story games with competitive games and how the difference between their personal and interpersonal nature affects the aesthetics nature of cheating, similar to classical arts and other “arts” such as sports.

Pratt, Aaron, “In Search of Aristotle’s Ousia: An Epistemological and Ontological Inquiry” (Marsh LL5, 2:15-3:00)

Aristotle laid the groundwork for metaphysical inquiry not in his Metaphysics, but in Categories, a logical work. In doing so, and in the specific explication found in the opening of Metaphysics, he establishes a philosophical paradigm for thought that inexorably links the ontological and the epistemological realms of inquiry. Further evidence for such a connection is found in the term ousia, which Aristotle uses in both works to help understand first, in Categories, how objects are identified, and second, in Metaphysics, how this same property truly exists in the real world. This study focuses on this vital and perplexing term and the approaches to its interpretation that have been presented by the scholars Sir David Ross, Jonathan Lear, Joseph Owens, and John Randall, Jr. It is primarily a search for the true meaning of ousia, the understanding of which leads from an understanding of language and knowledge into an understanding of being itself. Mirroring Aristotle’s own practice of beginning in philology, the study undertakes to chronicle the evolution of the term ousia throughout the past two thousand years, then moves on to consider its use in Categories, and subsequently in Metaphysics. The analysis of ousia and its place in Aristotle’s united ontological/epistemological presentation of questions of being both renders clarity in understanding the link between how human beings think and experience the world and how the world itself truly exists, but also elicits criticism over its inherently dual nature.

 

Price, Zachary, “Word Vomit: A Heideggerian Analysis of Semiotic in Sartre’s Nausea” (Marsh 201, 5:30-6:15)

A professor of mine once said, “Sartre believed that ‘being’ and ‘nothingness’ are the same. How can we trust someone like that?” Certainly, the epigraph seems to bear the possibility of being interpreted in support of such an equivocation, but it seems hasty to make this judgment, as my professor did, on the basis of a book title. Such is the paranoia that Sartre and his existentialism produce in certain readers. It seems that, for the sake of intellectual integrity, a more penetrating and, indeed, violent look must be taken to get to the truth of the matter. This prejudging fear is not limited to Sartre alone, however. Martin Heidegger is another of the many continental philosophers who often find themselves in the predicament of being prejudged. In Heidegger’s case, his association with the Nazis is the subject of critique. This looks bad on its face. And yet, the story is not so simple – nor damning – as his critics would like for us to believe. Saying, however, that we cannot hold prejudices as reasonable facts does not necessarily make them untrue. As I said above, we must inspect every case before casting judgment. Thus, we must ask of Sartre, “What have you said about ‘being’?” Here I will deal only with the question of Sartre’s thought to a small extent by examining one of the many fronts on which he is attacked – that is, by examining his views on language and signs. My project, therefore, will be to journey through certain key passages of Nausea using the analytic tools provided by Martin Heidegger. This paper will thereby show that words and other signs, for Sartre, are representations that create disclosable realities – without them, being is concealed in its unconcealment.

Quirk, Kevin, “Where Do Heroes Go When They Get Old?” (Marsh 214, 4:45-5:30)

My paper concerns certain questions surrounding the problematic of free will and its relationship to happiness, with which we are presented in a near death experience.  I will use Darren Aronofsky’s new movie The Wrestler, as a reference point; the movie brings up the aforementioned questions in a poignant and humane way, offering us insight not only into the questions, but the specifically human aspects of them.  By following the lead character of the film, Randy ‘The Ram’ Robinson, as closely as he does, Aronofsky presents us with Ram’s pain in a very personal and visceral way.  We live with Ram, experiencing what it’s like to be looking at the what can best be understood as ‘the rest of your life’ after we become too old to do what we love.  Ram is faced with the question of whether his life is worth living once he loses what he loves, and we the viewer empathize strongly, facing questions of our own such as: ‘Were we Ram, would we do it all again?’  Questions that challenge the notion that we should do what we love no matter the consequences.  Surely Ram has led the life of his choosing, and now that it’s over and he’s not dead, he’s got to figure out what to do next.

Rabenberg, Michael, “Richard Rorty’s Defense of Irrationalism” (Marsh 206, 3:00-3:45)

Richard Rorty presents his ethnocentric pragmatism as an antidote for irrationalism, which he defines as withdrawal from or hostility toward conversation. In this paper, however, I argue that Rorty’s pragmatism depends upon irrationalism. I defend my thesis in two sections. In the first, I argue that Rorty’s “strong poet,” who produces vocabularies which are conducive to the Rortyian project, actively cripples the ability of anti-pragmatists to present and defend their views. In the second, I argue that the ethnocentric pragmatist—insofar as he is an ethnocentrist—cannot genuinely tolerate the voicing of a large class of utterances. Strong poetry and ethnocentrism, then, to some extent preclude conversation. I conclude my paper with the claim that Rorty’s failure to combat irrationalism suggests that irrationalism—as Rorty defines it, at least—is unavoidable.

Ranger, Justin, “Proof, Custom, and the Nature of Beliefs in Pascal’s Philosophy” (Marsh 106, 10:30-11:15)

How does Pascal expect The Wager to work? He claims that reason has no effect in the decision process of believing in God. I begin by assuming that the wager is valid. I then examine in Pascal’s writings how he thought people come to hold beliefs. I then evaluate how this view influenced how he thought people would respond to the wager. I propose several counterarguments to his view of belief formation and a rebuttal to each.

Ratzel, Eric J., “Delimiting the Explanatory Authority of Heterophenomenology” (Marsh 214, 12:15-1:00)

In this paper I investigate the extent to which Daniel Dennett’s heterophenomenology could possibly give a felicitous rendering to the status of first-personal experience. I move into this problematic by way of first-personal utterances, considered both within and without the context specific to Dennett’s plan-- the multi-layered apparatus of natural scientific experimentation. Dennett claims that with respect to “I” the only account available is one of reference. I attempt to show that with respect to the first-personal experience such a referential account is possible in a certain limited sense, a limited sense which Dennett is unable to be thoroughly sensitive to. In order to do this I have utilized the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, in particular her account of “I” that is precisely non-referential in character. After giving critical scrutiny to Dennett’s position, in light of Anscombe’s work on the subject, I investigate a few insidious symptoms of Dennett’s position with respect to the nature of literary fiction and literature more generally that emerge at all because of his inability to take seriously Anscombe’s non-referential model for “I”-talk. Thus this final portion of my paper is really an investigation into the character of Dennett’s dogmatism.

Robinson, Pamela, “Kripke and Chalmers’ ‘Intuitive’ Arguments against Identity Theory: Why They Fail” (Marsh 201, 8:00-8:45)

I will examine two arguments against mental-to-physical identity theories: one posed by Kripke; the other: the more recent ‘two-dimensional argument against type-B materialism’ by Chalmers. Token identity theory, (like simple supervenience) is often taken to be the weakest form of materialism in philosophy of mind in that it’s implicitly accepted by all materialist theories. In this light, any argument against identity theory in general threatens materialism as a whole. I aim to show that (1) the force of each author’s attack springs from the same intuition that there is no distinction between the experience of a mental state and that state itself, (2) that the arguments rest on the assumption that this intuition is true, (3) that in each case it is an illegitimate assumption to make, and finally (4) that for this reason (ultimately: circularity) neither argument endangers identity theory (much less materialism in general).

Rueter, Kaycie N. “Anxiety and Self-Knowledge: Understanding the Origins of Self-Knowledge and Opening up the Possibilities of the Self” (Marsh 214, 8:45-9:30)

This study is a research overview of previous materials in psychology and philosophy pertaining to anxiety and how it relates to self-knowledge and individual freedom. It focuses heavily on previous studies and theories of the self. It also summarizes the existential view of anxiety and its disclosive properties using Heidegger’s Being and Time as a focal point. Ultimately this paper intends to point out how useful Heidegger’s interpretations of human knowledge and his account of anxiety could be in a clinical setting. Authenticity is something that every human being faces at some point and thus it is of universal importance to the human species (or Dasein) to understand the useful properties of anxiety in terms of understanding the self.

 

Russ, Benjamin, “The Meditations and Dreaming: Featuring The Matrix” (Marsh 207, 9:45-10:30)

In my argument I deal with Descartes' dream argument, which is introduced in the first of his Mediations on First Philosophy.  In the sixth meditation, Descartes rejects the global skepticism that the dream argument raises, contending that our experience must be of the real world because we can distinguish the difference between dream and real experiences.  However, I do not find this argument convincing, and I offer the film “The Matrix” as a counterexample.  If we find the dualistic picture provided by the film even remotely compelling, then it casts doubt on the dream-waking dualism that Descartes believes he has dismissed.

Ruxer, Chelsea, “Externalist Foundationalism” (Marsh 201, 2:15-3:00)

Just as foundational, a priori knowledge is necessary to verify the truth value of our beliefs, it seems that some externally caused beliefs must serve as foundations if we are to acquire adequate knowledge of an external world.  Externalism is necessary to anchor our internal experiences in a real external world, and considering the role of both internal processing and external causes should give us strong justification for our many of our beliefs.  Utilizing both these external and internal foundations is necessary to establish that what we consider knowledge reflects an objective reality external to our minds.

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Schulte, Thomas, “Moral Worth and Inclination: What Kant Did Say” (Marsh LL21, 4:45-5:30)

One objection that is commonly raised to Kant’s moral theory is that one is unable to enjoy doing what is right.  Richard Henson holds to this objection in “What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action.”  This paper is an attempt to show that this common objection results from relying too heavily upon the examples Kant gives in the Groundwork.  By bringing forth what Kant has to say about Duty in general, I hope to show that Kant’s notion of moral worth is not incompatible with having inclinations to act in accordance with duty.

Schumacher, Melissa, “Counter-Intuitions: Two Views of an Apparent Time-Travel Paradox” (Marsh 207, 3:00-3:45)

How do we succeed in continuing to exist from one moment to the next? There are two broad categories of answers to this question, known as endurantism and perdurantism. Endurantism is the view that we persist by wholly existing at each moment. To wholly exist is to have no parts at any other places or times. There is a strong intuition that we do wholly exist, that no other parts are needed to make us whole. Perdurantism conflicts with this intuition. The perdurantist view is that we persist by having a part that exists at each moment. We are four-dimensional beings made up of many temporal parts, and at each moment only one temporal part exists, not the entire person. This view gains plausibility from current physics, in which time is standardly thought of as just another dimension, so once a person has been exposed to those ideas, perdurantism may seem more intuitive to them. In this paper I will compare the relative plausibility of endurantism and perdurantism in one test case: the self-visitation scenario. There are many different en-durantist and perdurantist views on what exactly is happening in this case. I will consider what I take to be the most plausible of each. My goal will be to draw attention to an intuition we seem to have that perdurantism preserves and endurantism does not. Once I've established what I take to be our two main intuitions about this case, I will explore the possibility of finding a view that accommodates both of them.

Svetich, Erik, “A Defense of Scientific Progress” (Marsh 206, 11:30-12:15)

The question of whether science has progressed and, if so, how it progresses is valuable to the future of scientific research. In the past five centuries many scientific fields have arisen and dispersed, countless theories have been adopted and later discarded, and technologies which would stretch the bounds of imagination are now readily available at Wal-Mart for the cost of a hair cut. It is not surprising, all things considered, that the received view holds that science does progress, and that it progresses towards a better understanding of the world as it really is. Yet many philosophers, even those who intend to defend natural science as uniquely distinguished from the social sciences and humanities, have concluded that the received view inadequately or falsely represents progression in the sciences. Pierre Duhem, W.V.O Quine, and Thomas Kuhn deny that science progresses by a strict logical procedure; and Quine and Kuhn go so far as to argue that science does not and cannot progress towards any specific goal. Karl Popper has attempted to defend many of the tenets of the received view against these rigorous attacks, but I am not sure that he has accomplished his goal. I intend to argue that progress has been generally mis-defined and that science does progress. In this essay I will initially lay out the received view of science. Next I will discuss what kind of knowledge, if any, experimentation can provide. And lastly I will discuss how science can be said to have progressed given my epistemological conclusions.

Teltser, Keith, “Defense of Givinism” (Marsh 201, 3:00-3:45)

It is a widely accepted principle that we must have justified beliefs before we can have knowledge.  A couple competing theories have emerged that try to explain the nature of how people obtain justified beliefs.  Among these competing theories, the two most popular ones, very generally, are foundationalism and coherentism.  In this essay, I will explore both of these ideas as they try to put forth a working model of belief justification.  I will also discuss a way the two can be combined to provide an account of the justification of intuitions without falling into the infinite regress problem discussed by Laurence BonJour.

Templin, Carl S. and Franklin M. Welter, “Concerning World Domination” (Marsh 206, 8:45-9:30)

This paper provides an overview of three suggested or attempted means of securing world domination, including the positive and negative aspects of each possibility. First discussed is the possibility of world domination through military conquest. Second is the possibility of a secret society ruling known nation state governments. Third is the possibility of world domination by means of a world constitution. The goal of this paper is to not only show why these forms of government have appealed to people over the years, but also to show why they should not be attempted, and why they are ultimately not feasible. Over the course of this essay, we have utilized the works of philosophers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, Arendt and Habermas, who have all developed political theories relating to the topic of this paper. In addition we have also utilized the works of historians such as Guy M. Rogers, Lewis V. Cummings and George Potts to provide historical evidence of subjects relevant to our discussion concerning world domination.

 

Tierney, Hannah, “Empathy and Moral Agency: A Foray Into the Moral Lives of Autistic and Psychopathic Individuals” (Marsh 214, 9:45-10:30)

It is often debated if empathy is required for moral agency. By investigating cases of individuals who are clearly incapable of being moral agents, we might discover in what ways they are deficient. However, this can lead to counter-intuitive results. Psychopaths are commonly thought to be excluded from the moral community, largely because they lack empathy. Yet autistic people, intuitive moral agents, are also thought to lack empathy. In this paper, I investigate two accounts of this difference and conclude that autistic individuals are moral agents because they are capable of ‘identifying’ empathy, while psychopathic people are not.

Trbovich, Steve, “Philosophical Dogmas and Their Pseudo-Problems” (Marsh 206, 4:45-5:30)

The subject of this paper is the heavily disputed existence of, function of, and knowledge of universals; also known as essences, abstract ideas, intentional definitions, and forms.  20th century British philosopher J. L. Austin explains universals in terms of the question which prompted their postulation: "why do we call different things by the same name?  In reply to this, the philoprogenitive invent theories of 'universals' and what not, some entity or other to be that of which the 'name' is the name."1  Hence, whenever we think that we are calling different things by the same name, we are in fact mistaken, for, in actuality, the name we utter or scribble is not the name of many things, but the name of one thing, namely, the universal of which all those other things partake.  There is no shortage of philosophical literature on this topic.  For many of us, it was a lecture or chapter on Plato's theory of forms that marked our initiation into philosophy.  Those who agree with Plato go by many names: Platonists, essentialists, objectivists, etc.  Those who take up a stance in opposition to Plato are called nominalists, particularists, constructionists, etc.  They do not believe that universals exist, but rather, that only particulars do.  Nominalists, however, agree with essentialists that, if universals are not the entities which are "that of which the 'name' is the name," then something else absolutely must be. The first half of this paper is largely expositional; in that it surveys three attempts by philosophers over the years to account for universals: their existence, their function, and our knowledge of them.  In particular, I am interested in philosophers' attempts to answer the question, "Given that universals, or something sufficiently like them, exist, how did our pre-historic ancestors - and how do contemporary human infants - become acquainted with universals for the very first time?"  So that we are all working with the same notion of universals, part I will provide a detailed account of universals in general.  It also contains an essentialist argument for their existence.  Then, in parts II and III, I shall consider two proposed accounts for the initial acquisition of our knowledge of universals by pre-historic human adults, and contemporary human babies.  Part II also gives a nominalist account of universals in general, so as to balance the essentialism expressed in part I.  Finally, in part IV, I shall advance arguments against all forms of essentialism and nominalism, and all versions of the dichotomy between universals and particulars.  More specifically, I aim to show that all of the philosophical problems which arise out of the acceptance of the universal/particular dichotomy, of which the problem of our initial-acquaintance-with-universals is but one example, are, in fact, pseudo-problems which philosophers bring upon themselves.  To worry about whether universals or particulars are what give meaning to our words and statements is akin to worrying about which causal factors affect our love lives more, the positions of the stars and planets, or the arrows which flying baby cupids shoot at us.  It is my contention that we do not need cupids or constellations to explain our love lives, and we do not need universals or particulars to explain how language functions.

Turner, Maureen, “Where, oh where can my little HOT’s be?” (Marsh 10:30-11:15)

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the canonical Higher Order of Thought (HOT) understanding of consciousness that David Rosenthal espouses in “A Theory of Consciousness” cannot be correct because it does not accommodate the evidence provided by actual introspective experience. First, Rosenthal’s view is interpreted. Then, it is shown that, as per HOT theories, upon introspection a subject should become aware only of the existence of a higher order thought. This is clearly not the case. When a subject introspects, she is aware of the contents of the mental state that the introspected HOT represents. In conclusion, Rosenthal’s HOT view is rejected.

Vanderlaan, Matthew, “Batman and Overman” (Marsh 201, 11:30-12:15)

The link between philosophy and pop culture is one often overlooked by scholars.  However, the relevance of philosophical thought to most modern literary fads and tropes is undeniably fascinating, especially the realm of comic books and super heroes.  However, how ethical theory seems very pertinent to superheroes, concepts of metaphysics and epistemology seem unrelated to superheroes, which is completely fallacious.  The alien mindset of a superhero enables an intriguing analysis of their behavior and actions in relation to the limits of humanity.  Batman specifically stands out as an example due to his wholly human nature.  His most notable foe, the Joker, likewise is nothing more than a human with a mental state unlike any living person.  These foreign mentalities make them perfect candidates for study with Nietzsche’s concepts of the overman in that the behavior of the overman is almost perfectly in line with that of a superhero or super-villain.  However, the question is then raised: Which is closer to true ascendance beyond humanity?

Van Elswyk, Peter D., “Recovering Luminosity” (Marsh 101, 11:30-12:15)

In this paper I argue for a theory of luminosity which escapes Tim Williamson’s reductio and the difficulties that other theories have incurred in attempting this task. In doing so I isolated a class of conditions which differ from other conditions insofar as they are not segments of a gradated series of conditions (i.e. de-linked), but series-independent in the sense that an agent has no related conditions obscuring her awareness of the condition’s obtaining. A condition can be de-linked because it is phenomenologically stable. This strategy of mapping out certain exempt domains of conditions proves useful in recovering the (KK) principle. Plagued by a similar reductio, the (KK) principle can be similarly fixed: If what is known in the antecedent of the (KK) principle is an item of knowledge that can be considered a member of this de-linked class, then the consequent of (KK) still follows as a rule of inference.

 

Von Stein, Alex, “Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Norms” (Marsh 101, 12:15-1:00)

Doxastic voluntarism is about the degree to which we have control over the formation of our beliefs. If we can control our beliefs, then our norms will tell us that we ought to believe, at least in certain situations. But it is not clear that we do have any control over our beliefs. This implies that we have no epistemic obligations to believe at all. But surely we have obligations to believe some propositions and not others! I present the problem of doxastic voluntarism and evaluate three responses to the question of voluntarism: non-voluntarism, direct voluntarism, and indirect voluntarism. I argue that only indirect voluntarism gives a coherent account of our capacities to form beliefs. I then evaluate deontic, consequentialist, and aretaic (virtue theoretic) conceptions of epistemic norms as they pertain to voluntarism. I will argue that the indirect voluntarist thesis does not privilege any one formulation of epistemic norms, and all three conceptions may be conceived of such that they do not require direct access or control over belief.

 

Ward, Randall, “Self-Recognition and Conscious Awareness” (Marsh 106, 3:00-3:45)

The mirror test is a measure of self-awareness developed by Gordon Gallup involving mirrors and dye. Both Gallup and Daniel Povinelli agree that the mirror test distinguishes some animals from others: those that recognize their reflection have a self-concept, those that don’t, do not. However, their arguments vary as to what sort of self-concept the mirror test actually demonstrates. Gallup claims that the mirror test is proof that apes are psychologically self-aware. Povinelli, on the other hand, claims that the mirror test only shows what he calls a “kinesthetic” self-concept. While Povinelli would like to claim that these two modes of self-awareness are quite different, it seems that the distinction he endeavors to produce is either muddled or even non-existent.

 

Waterman, Chloe, “Refined Desire and The Human Good” (Marsh 106, 9:45-10:30)

While Richard Kraut makes effective objections against a crude version of the desire-satisfaction account of the human good, his objections prove ineffective against a refined view of desire-satisfaction.  Crude desire-satisfaction states that an agent’s life goes well to the extent that her desires are satisfied.  Kraut has three main objections to desire-satisfaction and ultimately favors an objective goods account of the human good.  I propose a modification to desire-satisfaction such that Kraut’s objections are no longer effective that includes illegitimating desires if they are illogical or not conducive to an agent’s overall good. An agent is living her best life if she is pursuing a goal that she logically perceives as worthy, regardless of the content of her goal or desire. Each person’s subjective good is equally valid, regardless of the content of his desires that work towards the fulfillment of his definition of a good life. Desire-satisfaction is correct pending an agent’s desires are first order desires (“overall” desires) or sub desires working towards those first order desires, the agent is making no mistake in fact or logic, and her desires are determined clear-headedly and whole-heartedly. 

 

Way, Emery K., “Faith, Skepticism and the Suicide of Reason” (Marsh 106, 5:30-6:15)

At the dawn of the Christian era there came in tow with its surging growth the resurgence of a unique question in the dialogue of western philosophy. This is the said “faith-reason” problem. The “problem” is often stated as something like the following; how can one continue to hold beliefs which are based on faith without at the same time abandoning the supposed certainty of reason. Many have taken on the task of reconciling the two concepts or raising one above the other. The views on the matter are nearly as numerous as the number of philosophers who have penned their thoughts. Yet is the gap between faith and reason really as wide as we make it out to be or are we perhaps creating our own illusionary problems by failing to recognize the limits of rationality and the necessity of faith? Are we failing to see that faith and reason are not perennial opposites which exist in constant conflict with one another, but rather are two sides of the human condition which exist as constituent parts of the whole. In the course of this essay we will undertake a brief overview of the subject as a whole while focusing on two of the more well known Medieval thinkers on the subject, St. Augustine and St. Aquinas. After we have done this I will articulate where I believe they has gone wrong in the solving of the “problem” of faith and reason.

 

Welter, Franklin M. and Carl S. Templin, “Concerning World Domination” (Marsh 206, 8:45-9:30)

This paper provides an overview of three suggested or attempted means of securing world domination, including the positive and negative aspects of each possibility. First discussed is the possibility of world domination through military conquest. Second is the possibility of a secret society ruling known nation state governments. Third is the possibility of world domination by means of a world constitution. The goal of this paper is to not only show why these forms of government have appealed to people over the years, but also to show why they should not be attempted, and why they are ultimately not feasible. Over the course of this essay, we have utilized the works of philosophers such as Aristotle, Hobbes, Kant, Arendt and Habermas, who have all developed political theories relating to the topic of this paper. In addition we have also utilized the works of historians such as Guy M. Rogers, Lewis V. Cummings and George Potts to provide historical evidence of subjects relevant to our discussion concerning world domination.

 

Westra, Evan, “The Quantum Coin-Toss: Evaluating Robert Kane’s Libertarian Model of Free Will” (Marsh 207, 5:30-6:15)

A businesswoman is on her way to an interview for a high-paying position that would undoubtedly further her career. Along the way, she passes an alley, and happens to see an assault taking place. She is faced with a decision: stop the assault and miss her interview, or continue on her way. This is the famous scenario used by Robert Kane to demonstrate his theory of libertarian free will. Kane’s book, The Significance of Free Will (1996), has been acknowledged by even his philosophical opponents to be the best libertarian theory of its kind available. Kane’s theory draws upon complex data from modern cognitive science to construct a detailed, naturalistic model of libertarian free will that is intended to address and overcome worries about “spooky” metaphysical elements in traditional libertarian theories. In spite of its sophistication, however, Kane’s theory is still vulnerable to the fundamental obstacle to indeterminist accounts of moral responsibility, known as the Luck Objection, as well as a host of other objections. In this essay, I show how Kane’s commitment to indeterminism and alternate possibilities only hampers and confuses his theory, and how his criterion for ultimate responsibility is overstated to the point of incoherence. The best way to deal with worries stemming from the free will debate, I argue, is to constructively revise our understanding of concepts like moral responsibility; certain elements of Kane’s theory can even be fruitfully applied to this end. First, however, I will briefly review the basic arguments of the free will debate, with special regard to the difficulties facing a libertarian theorist like Kane.

 

Whipple, Jake, “Being As Doing” (Marsh 214, 2:15-3:00)

This paper follows the ideas of naive action rationalization put forward by Michael Thompson towards the goal of expanding the ways we can conceive our basic actions. In conjunction with Greek ideas of the form of life, the argument unfolds to a point where we can begin to understand our form of life as an integral explanation for rationalization of action.

 

Wolfe, Sean, “Reconciling Honneth’s Theory of Recognition with Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action” (Marsh 214, 3:00-3:45)

This paper attempts to fuse the existential emphasis on a subjects non-rational being, or individuated stance towards the world, with the normative framework of Jurgan Habermas’s inter-subjectivly rooted Theory of Communicative Action. The solvent will be Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recogntion. Honneth’s theory of recognition provides us with an important understanding of how the normative speech acts of Habermas break down at the empirical level, not as a violation of implicit language rules, but as a much more fundamental failure of recognition. Honneth goes on to claim that it is the subjects identity that is damaged by this failure to recognize, a process of socialization which limits the subjects ability to fully conceive of his unique sense making abilities. For Honneth then, an unhindered subject is key if society wishes to encourage the pluralizing legal recognition of various rights at the social and individual level.  Once a subject realizes his freedom and openness at the levels of self-confidence, self-respect and self- esteem, he is able to articulate his unique viewpoints against the normative framework of Habermasian institutions. Thus Honneth shows how a subject can remain within the Habermasian life world while still maintaining an existentially oriented openness to ones being, or identity.

 

Wright, Ben, “Lucidity While Dreaming and Its Possibilities” (Marsh 213, 4:00-4:45)

In this paper I will be discussing the benefits and philosophical implications of the process of lucid dreaming. Lucid dreaming is the process by which one is able to retain lucidity, consciousness and control, while dreaming. The concept of lucid dreaming first became an interest of mine after watching the film “Waking Life”. In this film the main character finds him unable to wake up from a dream and floating through various different dreams, during which he talks about the possibilities of dreaming. By the end of the film, the main character realizes that he has died and when the dream ends, at the end of the film, he floats away. The main message that one walks away from the movie from is that anything is possible while dreaming, realistic conversations with people are possible, and it poses the possibility of the afterlife being a kind of dream. My purpose in this paper, however, is not to convince you that the afterlife is all a dream and that it can be controlled, but rather to inform you about the possibilities of lucid dreaming and of a relatively new way of thinking about the afterlife.

 

Young-Lawson, Mindy, “A Nietzschean Response to the Demands of ‘Beauty’ in Contemporary Western Society” (Marsh 206, 10:30-11:15)

Continually, we strive to discover meaning.  But what happens when this search ceases because we presume to understand the meaning of something with complete certainty?  What is the result when we view our interpretations as exhaustive and ignore any other interpretations?  I argue that contemporary Western society has given up its continual search and reinterpretation of meaning and has instead replaced this quest with the reassuring position of certainty.  Specifically, I am interested in the particular way human beauty has been interpreted in contemporary society, and argue that this interpretation of beauty is fixed, narrow, and oppressive.  Taking my cue from Nietzsche in Genealogy of Morals, I argue that contrary to our current interpretations, meaning is neither objective nor stable, but instead is continually being acted upon, and subsequently reinterpreted by various forces.

 

Zillhardt, Jacob, “Kantian Empathy in Art and the Practical World” (Marsh LL21, 2:15-3:00)

The ability to understand and feel for one another is necessary to making a positive impact in the world and living happily.  Yet, in such a time of global conflicts within diverse contexts, how can any single person try to relate and reach out to others who are from completely different backgrounds?  In this essay, Kant’s Critique of Judgment is applied to the everyday concept of empathy in order to understand how we as individuals can approach others’ joy and suffering through the medium of art as well as through common moral values that everyone shares.  By doing so, I hope to show that empathy is achievable and important for making a difference in the lives of others.