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61st annual Northwest Philosophy Conference
October 23-24, 2009

Abstracts of papers 2009

Adair, Stephanie; “Unity and Difference: A Critical Appraisal of Polarizing Gender Identities” (Marsh 201, 12:00)

In the section on “Perception: Or the Things and Deception” of The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel draws out the inter-dependency of unity and difference.  In order to have a unity there must be differences that compose it, as a unity unifies different elements.  If in unifying these elements they cease to be different from each other, however, then the whole would no longer be a unity, as it would no longer unify anything.  It would be reduced instead to a simple singularity.  At the same time, in order to have difference the different elements cannot be wholly indifferent to each other.  It is only insofar as they relate to each other that they are able to differentiate themselves from each other. In this paper I take up the issue of the inter-dependency of unity and difference, applying it to gender identities.  I follow the psychoanalytically oriented exchange between Butler and Phillips, in which they agree that gender identities are a farce superimposed on un-gendered humans, but disagree in their assessments of to what extent this artificial binary should be dissembled.  If gender identities are artificially superimposed on us, then we must investigate how they are injurious or useful.  Should they be cast off or does it make sense to keep them?  Following this vein of thought, I look at the positive and negative effects of polarizing identities such as the male/female dichotomy, ending with a discussion of good and bad hate.

Agam-Segal, Reshef; “A Splitting Mind-Ache: The Case of Self-Legislation” (Marsh 101, 9:00)

In Modern Moral Philosophy Elizabeth Anscombe attacks the idea of self-legislation, at the heart of Kantian ethics. The very idea, she thinks, is suspect; it does not even make sense to say that we can or cannot legislate for ourselves. My aim is to clarify the challenge Anscombe’s argument poses to Kantian ethics. I elaborate, and add an auxiliary Wittgensteinian argument in support of, Anscombe’s claim: I argue that the reflexive use of the idea of legislation in “self-legislation” may indicate a lack of attention to the logic of legislation. This may be the result of being held captive by a picture: falsely expecting the grammar of legislation to remain constant even when the context of use drastically changes from non-reflexive to reflexive.

Ahmed, Saladdin; “Foucault, Truth, Genealogy” (Marsh 201, 2:00)

Foucault has mapped a new set of concepts by reintroducing the historicality of our understandings of what is true including “history” itself. Power is defused, truth is a value, knowledge is an essence-less form of violence, and the subject, as a historical entity, is conceivable only with relation to all these historicalities. Genealogy is the field and the approach that enables us to reconnect these concepts and make a philosophical use of them in terms of historical research. Although genealogy occupies a major position in Foucault’s philosophy, it has remained a vague term for many people.  I explain the idea and the role of Foucault’s genealogy. Truth, knowledge and power are the three key concepts in Foucault’s genealogy, so I explain the role of each concept in Foucault’s genealogy. I clarify key quotes from a variety of Foucault’s relevant works. The main question I try to answer is “why genealogy?” Genealogy is a critical method for historical research that tries to free itself from metaphysical elements and presuppositions that have deeply affected traditional history. 

Alexander, David; “Basic Justification and Reflective Defeat” (Marsh 214, 10:00)

In this paper, I defend the Principle of Reflective Defeat (RD), which states that if one is justified in withholding belief in the reliability of a source of belief, then one is not justified in trusting that source. The paper has two parts. In the first, I argue for the principle by showing that satisfying RD is necessary for avoiding an incoherent set of commitments to a source’s reliability. In the second, I consider the extent to which the principle is consistent with the existence of basic sources of justified belief. I argue that while RD is consistent with the existence of basic sources, it does suggest that reflective individuals should not have them.

Alfino, Mark; “Do Philosophers Have Anything to Say about Wisdom?” (Marsh 106, 4:00)

This paper raises the question, “Do Philosophers Have Anything to Say about Wisdom?” by looking at both the classical philosophical understanding of wisdom and recent work by contemporary social sciences. Given that philosophers have not made wisdom a central concern for some time, one might wonder if the relationship of philosophy to production of knowledge about wisdom is less central than many philosophers suppose. The question of the philosopher's role is complicated also by recent naturalist explanations of wisdom coming from psychology and by developments in cognitive psychology and cognitive anthropology, which seem to suggest a model for understanding wisdom.  I recommend that philosophers focus on meta-criticism of naturalistic efforts to account for wisdom as a cultural phenomenon and reject views that suppose that philosophy has unique access to a special object of knowledge called “wisdom.”

Arnold, Alexander; “On Mental Statism” (Marsh 214, 3:00)

Mental Statism is the thesis that all evidence consists in mental states. In this paper, I examine two arguments for Mental Statism and find both lacking. I then canvass the ways in which Mental Statism runs afoul of both common sense and philosophical positions that speak of non-mental things as evidence. I conclude by examining a strategy that the Mental Statist might employ to avoid its problems with common sense and philosophy.

Ashe, Eli; “Epiaesthogo” (Marsh 206, 11:00)

The formal structure of temporally logical knowledge is derived through the aesthetic sense.  Temporality is supposed as creation, which is understood as the emergence of complexity and simplicity.  It is argued that the creative function is structurally holonic, existing as both whole and as a part of something more than itself.  This is defined through an aesthetic logic, the aesthogo. What emerges from the aesthogo is an aesthetic knowledge, a beautiful knowledge, or ‘epiaesthetico’, understood as an equitable identity relation (i.e. what comes out on balance). While the structure of epiaesthetico is the aesthogo, it is argued that the meta-structure of epiaesthetico is the formal structure of emergence, hence of temporality, and thus of the existential more generally.  This meta-structure is defined as beautiful logical knowledge, or “epiaesthogo.” An outline of how to develop and study epiaesthogo of a philosophical topic through an open source methodology is presented.  Since the philosophical topic is existentially temporal, the paper contends that a methodology that develops and studies the philosophical topic temporally, through the meta-structure of its emergence (i.e. through its epiaesthogo), is a methodology to study the philosophy of the topic itself. Thus, it is an epiaesthogo that constitutes temporal knowledge of a philosophical topic.  

Atkinson, Camille; “Are Animals People, Too?” (Carnegie 311, 12:00)

I will respond to this by examining various philosophical perspectives and by arguing that there is a position that neither romanticizes nor objectifies animals. I believe it is a mistake to consider animals persons as it robs each of their unique identity and value. Humans and animals are indeed distinct but this need not entail that either is superior or inferior. There are those who insist that human beings are mere mammals; that we should expect no more from ourselves than we do of other creatures or that all should be treated equally. However, it quickly becomes apparent that this position cannot be consistently maintained in practice. Simply put, we have different expectations of our peers than our pets. On the other hand, there is a lot we can learn from them when it comes to leading a more contented life.

Backen, George; “Animal Lovers” (Carnegie 311, 11:00)

Bestiality is a well-entrenched taboo and prima facie perversion. And although sexual practices once socially and legally forbidden are now openly discussed and accepted, bestiality still has the power to create a fervent and visceral negative reaction. Accepting that the onus of proof rests with those that affirm, this essay will attempt to refute the central arguments condemning bestiality. The practical applications of these refutations are clear: Bestiality is widely criminalized and demonized, but if no warrant can be given for these sanctions, then decriminalization should follow and the circle of socially accepted sexual practices should widen.

 

Baehr, Jason; “Credit Theories and the Value of Knowledge” (Marsh 101, 11:00)

According to “credit theories” in epistemology, knowledge is essentially a matter of reaching the truth in a way that is “creditable” to or explainable in terms of the knower’s cognitive skills or abilities. One widely acclaimed advantage of credit theories is their supposed ability to solve the so-called “value problem,” according to which any plausible account of knowledge must entail that knowledge is always more valuable than mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that if the credit theorist’s general account of knowledge is correct, it follows that knowledge is not always more valuable than mere true belief, and thus that credit theorists are not in a position to overcome the value problem. I conclude by considering the implications of the argument for the overall viability of credit theories.

Bailey, Andrew; “What’s Wrong with the Philosophy of Mind?” (Marsh 101, 3:00)

Some strange cases have gripped philosophers of mind. They have been deployed against materialism about human persons, functionalism about mentality, the possibility of artificial intelligence, and more. In this paper, I cry ‘foul’. It’s not hard to think that there’s something wrong with the cases. But what? My proposal: their proponents ignore questions about composition (that is, questions about when some things make up another). And ignoring composition is bad. Indeed, materialists about human persons, functionalists about mentality, and believers in the possibility of artificial intelligence can plausibly deploy moderate theories of composition in defense of their views. And as it turns out, these strange cases constitute an interesting source of evidence for moderate theories of composition.

Baillie, James; “New Problems for Religious Pluralism” (Marsh 212, 2:00)

John Hick’s theory of religious pluralism posits the same ineffable spiritual reality, ‘the Real’, as the source of all major religious traditions.  He offers pluralism as the best explanation of salvific parity, the thesis that these religions are equally effective vehicles for salvation.  Most criticisms of Hick have focused on the explanans, arguing that the Real cannot play any explanatory role due to its ineffability.  I raise two difficulties for the explanandum, the thesis of salvific parity.  I call these the problems of bad religion and good secularism.

Barron, Stacey Jean; “The Moralism/Formalism Intersection in Kantian Aesthetics” (Marsh 206, 8:00)

In this paper I draw a comparison between Immanuel Kant as an aesthetic moralist and an aesthetic formalist. I define aesthetic moralism as the belief that art must coincide with moral concerns, decisions, and actions if it is both beautiful and valuable. Aesthetic formalism argues art's value and beauty are within its aesthetic rather than moral forms (i.e. color, shape, line). Kant's Critique of Judgment seems to actively advocate both theories, but I believe, and show here, that Kant's espousal of both really amounts to him bridging both to create a more complex and robust conception of art, namely, art's beauty and value, whether moral or formal, is within the discussion of the art-object itself, both created and defined by the genius of the artist and the interest of the art-viewer. The participants create art’s meaning and value.

Bartlett, Gary; “Activity and Experience” (Marsh 201, 8:00)

This paper takes as a springboard an intuition that in physical beings, conscious experience arises from some form of physical activity – in humans (and other organisms), neural activity. While the intuition is widely shared, it is almost totally ignored by philosophers, presumably because they see it as reflecting a merely contingent fact about the realization of our experiences. I urge that this is a mistake. I argue that it is no accident that our experiences require states of physical activity; and if it is no accident, then functionalist theories of experience, in particular, are in trouble, for they cannot countenance such a requirement except by pure stipulation.

Benchimol, Jason; “Voluntariness, Evaluative Judgment and Morally Culpable Ignorance” (Marsh 213, 4:00)

It seems uncontroversial that at least some agents who act wrongly because of ignorance are exculpated from moral blameworthiness. But under what circumstances does ignorance serve to exculpate an agent? It would be implausible to suppose that anyone who acts wrongly due to ignorance is automatically exculpated. In this paper, I critically assess Michael J. Zimmerman’s theory of culpable ignorance. Zimmerman argues that the conditions agents must satisfy to be culpably ignorant, and by extension to be fit targets of moral blame for acting wrongly due to ignorance, are very restrictive. The upshot of Zimmerman’s view is that very few agents who act wrongly due to ignorance are morally blameworthy. I defend an alternative theoretical account of culpable ignorance that is less restrictive than Zimmerman’s. I argue that my account more adequately tracks our reflective intuitions about the circumstances in which ignorance does and does not have exculpatory force.

Bernstein, Sara; “The Social Composition Question” (Marsh 101, 2:00)

The Special Composition Question in metaphysics asks: under what conditions do material things compose other things? I argue that there is a separate question, the Social Composition Question, for groups of people: when do people compose a metaphysically meaningful collective? I outline the structural similarities of questions about ordinary objects (such as baseballs and chairs) to questions about “social objects” (such as corporations and armies). I give several arguments for why the Social Composition Question is not subsumed under the Special Composition Question, and I outline several challenges that development of a principle of social composition faces.

Berry, Sharon; “A Posteriori Mathematics?” (Marsh 207, 2:00)

Are all mathematical facts a priori? I will argue that, if two common (but esoteric sounding) assumptions hold, then there are (very likely) a posteriori mathematical truths. The two assumptions are: that there are true, but a priori unknowable, pi 01 sentences, and that Malament-Hogarth space times are metaphysically possible. If you accept these claims, there turns out to be a simple route to the conclusion that there are mathematical facts that, not only can be learned empirically, but actually can’t be learned any other way.

Blackmon, James; “Physical Realizations of the Mental” (Marsh 106, 8:00)

The view that material brains are the physical “realizations” of minds and that neural activation states are the physical “realizations” of mental states is shown to lead to a number of consequences that are counterintuitive or absurd. An alternative view that avoids these consequences is suggested.

Braddock, Matthew; “Constructivist Experimental Philosophy Vindicates an Ancient View of Well-Being” (Marsh LL5, 12:00)

What is the nature of human well-being? This paper joins the ancient debate by advancing an ancient claim that is highly disputed by contemporary moral philosophers, namely the Aristotelian claim that moral virtue is (non-instrumentally) necessary for human well-being. Call it the Aristotelian Virtue Condition (AV): an agent S is well off only if she is morally virtuous. I defend this ancient claim by a novel approach that I call constructivist experimental philosophy, an approach that seeks a constructivist account of well-being by accurately eliciting the folk conception of well-being via eliciting folk intuitions about particular cases. More specifically, I challenge the commonplace rejection of AVC by philosophers by arguing that (i) the intuitions of the folk should play a methodologically normative role in the debate, (ii) that folk intuitions can be accurately elicited through a particular thought experiment (the “Crib Test”) and  (iii) that folk intuitions thus elicited will probably vindicate AVC.

Bradley, Daniel and Felix Ó. Murchadha; “Commemoration as Phamakon: The ambiguous relation between commemoration, historical distance, and the establishment of authority” (Carnegie 306, 2:00)

Commemoration lies at the heart of collective memory. And collective memory is the ground of authority in the recognition of communally established practice. This link between commemoration and authority is fraught with danger. For if collective memory is the ‘soil’ of historiography, the relation to that soil can be a perfidious one, and it is this that requires us to always maintain the critical distance between memory and history. When this distance collapses, when past is integrated into present, succumbing to the “temptation of identity,” the commemorative relation of the past becomes an ideological memorization and authority is reduced to sovereignty. In this way a static identity as eternal sameness sanctioned through a jealous and immediate possession of cultural identity is guaranteed through the abuses of commemoration. Inherent here is a refusal to recognize the limits of presence in the grasp of memory and the narrative distance required for historical truth. Thus, the reduction of authority to power and the reduction of identity to a possession that is owned without remainder in commemoration are mutually reinforcing problematics that share a common provenance in the denial of absence that occurs through the collapse of memory and history. Thus Paul Ricoeur’s Memory, History, Forgetting can be read as a passionate call that we maintain the polarity of memory and history against the absolutizing tendency of commemoration. However, in Ricoeur’s thought, this is not the last word on the relation of commemoration to our nature as historical beings. In the turn towards temporality, under the guidance of the call to justice, we are forced to reexamine the nature of our understanding of the past in the light of those who suffer its abuses. In this engagement with the epistemology of history, commemoration reveals a very different aspect of its nature, this time in the defense of a respect for the absence of the past through a challenge to the totalizing claims of historical consciousness. Thus, commemoration can be seen as a deeply ambiguous phenomenon for Ricoeur. On the one hand, in its imperialistic pretensions to a presence that denies the absence of the past, it is a tool used to both destabilize and exploit the fragility of communal identity, thus supporting the insidious claims of authority on the basis of bare sovereignty. On the other hand, commemoration is a corrective to the totalizing claims of a historical consciousness that would reduce truth to a study of abstract relations that itself denies the pastness of the past.

Braithwaite, J.W. and R.E. Jennings; “Why is Human Morality” (Marsh LL5, 9:00)

We argue that human morality was made possible by the same evolutionary processes that eventuated in linguisticity. Morality is fundamentally a linguistic phenomenon, but the developments that set us on the course for becoming linguistic also transferred other motor systems of the upper body from genetically underwritten controls to the control of epigenetic cortical systems capable of linguistic influence. Thus evolution has, in profoundly interrelated developments provided both the vehicle of moral response and the range of activities that constitutes its subject matter.

Brand-Ballard, Jeff; “Moral Constructivism and Evolutionary Psychology” (Carnegie 306, 4:00)

Some philosophers (Joshua Greene, Peter Singer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) argue that research on the empirical underpinnings of our moral beliefs supports either skepticism or error theory concerning some of our moral intuitions, such as the widespread intuition that it’s wrong to push the big man off the footbridge in a variation of the trolley problem. I review some of these “debunking arguments” and examine the most prominent rebuttal in the literature: moral constructivism (Neil Levy, Sharon Street, Hallvard Lillehammer, Guy Kahane). Taking T.M. Scanlon as a paradigm constructivist, I agree that constructivism blocks empirical challenges, but I argue that constructivism actually facilitates a different way of empirically debunking some of our moral intuitions, including ones that support deontology. Empirical research can provide clues to what rules would be rejected by reasonable people with evolutionary histories different from ours. Constructivists should recognize that such empirical evidence bears on the moral facts.

Bratkowski, Tad; “Pragmatist vs. Neo-Heideggerian Views on Technology: Applying the Debate to Virtual Reality and Computer Simulations” (Marsh 214, 11:00)

In this paper, I contrast the Pragmatist and neo-Heideggerian philosophies of technology by evaluating them in the context of their applicability to virtual reality and computer simulations. I start with Albert Borgmann’s Holding Onto Reality where he is critical of virtual worlds for their displacement of reality, which shows his neo-Heideggerian basis. I contrast this view with Larry Hickman’s as espoused in John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology, with its emphasis on instrumentalism and the real beneficial effects from technology. I apply both views in analyzing Paul Ford’s work with the disabled in “Paralysis Lost: Impacts of Virtual Worlds on Those with Paralysis”. I argue that Ford expresses concerns from both sides of the debate: possible advantages from a Pragmatist stance, and disadvantages from a neo-Heideggerian viewpoint. However, I argue in the end that pragmatic experimentalism is the stronger position to take in evaluating the possible effects of virtual reality technologies.

Brewer-Davis, Nina; “Political Obligation through Conversation” (Carnegie 205, 2:00)

The ground of political obligation is a classic issue in political philosophy.  I attempt to make progress on this issue by proposing an under-explored approach: political obligation is a type of associative obligation.  We have special obligations to friends and family in virtue of our shared history, and I argue that we have special obligations to co-nationals in just the same way.  The history we share with co-nationals crucially depends on our participation in the national conversation, through which we shape each other's beliefs and values.  Political obligation is thus grounded in our participation in the national conversation.  This approach has important advantages over more conventional defenses such as social contract theory, not least of which being that it avoids the debates over whether such obligations must be voluntarily acquired.

Bruno, Michael; “Minimal Enactivism” (Marsh 201, 9:00)

This essay defends what I call the minimal enactivism, i.e. the thesis that the phenomenal character of a subject’s conscious visual states constitutively depends on states of that subjects’ motor system. After contrasting it with enactive theories of perception more generally, I sketch a novel account of the distinction between causal and constitutive forms of dependence, and present four sources of empirical evidence that support minimal enactivism.

Brunson, Nicole; “Ignorance and Akratic Vice” (Marsh 213, 3:00)

In this paper I offer an account of vicious action that shows the necessary ignorance of the vicious agent. I first refer to Socrates’ claim that a person can only perform a vicious action out of ignorance, and then introduce the example of akrasia, or weakness of will, which seems to disprove this claim. Next, I consider Aristotle’s response to this example, in which he claims that while an agent knows the viciousness of the action, he does not have access to that knowledge as he is performing the action. Drawing from Bostock’s objection to this, I then consider the example of a person telling herself that she should not eat an éclair at the very moment she is eating it. I respond to this problem by first bifurcating the concept of moral knowledge into two types – superficial and internalized – then showing that the contradiction contained within the former consists of a deficiency in understanding (ignorance) on the part of the agent. With reference to Kant, I explain this contradiction as the agent’s tolerance of two separate and incompatible moral preferences. Last, I consider an objection illustrating an instance of akrasia that involves no inconsistencies. From this, I concede that akrasia can still exist as a subjective inner conflict, but maintain that the situation of the vicious person is not akratic, given an understanding of virtue and vice as implicitly social phenomena.

Bunch, Aaron; “The Body as Instrument and as ‘Person’ in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” (Marsh 106, 12:00)

I argue that an account of the human body as a mere instrument of moral agency (in Gregor 1963 and in Denis 2001) cannot explain Kant’s duties to oneself as an animal and moral being. To properly account for Kant’s views on suicide, self-mutilation, and sexual self-defilement, the human body must be regarded not merely as the instrument of a moral agent, but as an aspect of the moral agent herself, as a constituent of the indissoluble or “absolute” unity of a human person. The body thereby shares in the dignity of moral personhood, which constrains our treatment of it. In closing, I consider briefly whether Kant provides a sufficiently specific criterion for “intrinsically degrading” treatment.  I agree with Allen Wood that while Kant does not provide us with an indisputable, deductive decision-making procedure, he nevertheless provides a sufficient guide for open-ended reflection and discussion, which is the most we can expect from a moral theory.

Carson, Nathan; “The Extent of Kierkegaard’s Skepticism” (Marsh 207, 12:00)

Some scholars have named Kierkegaard the irrationalist Christian skeptic par excellence, while others have defended him as a critical realist and epistemic fallibilist endorsing a correspondence approach to truth and knowledge. With this debate in view, we examine the scope of skepticism in Kierkegaard’s epistemology, beginning with Johannes Climacus’s claim that “all knowledge is approximative” and always uncertain. We contend that while Kierkegaard is not a thoroughgoing skeptic, his critical realist defenders underemphasize his critique of the approximative knowledge project. We argue, in other words, that Kierkegaard holds a mitigated skepticism or epistemic fallibilism, which is both compatible with the uncertainty of knowledge and allows for approximative knowledge that corresponds to empirical reality. However, for Kierkegaard, the pursuit of approximation knowledge must be abandoned, for this venture is a corrosive, nihilistic danger to the “essential knowing” and “essential truth” of subjectivity he endorses, including the task of becoming a self.

Cashio, Anthony L.; “Image, Time, and Freedom: Cassier’s Encounter with Bergon’s Metaphysics of Matter and Memory” (Marsh 206, 4:00)

The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between the meanings an object bears and the temporal experience of this object.  To carry this out, I turn to the philosophies of Ernst Cassirer and Henri Bergson whose seemingly disparate philosophies are both concerned with the relationship between time, image, and meaning.  I argue that there is a distinct and interesting lesson to be learned about the metaphysics of time and freedom by looking to Cassirer’s own encounter with Bergson’s metaphysics of matter and memory.

Chen, Yue and R.E. Jennings; “Articular Models for First Degree Entailment” (Marsh LL5, 10:00)

We uncover a ‘naturally occurring’ first-degree system, AL of Articular Logic that is both relevant and paraconsistent. The principal semantic innovation is an informationally articulated, but nevertheless entirely classical representation of wffs as simple hypergraphs on the power set of a set of possible states. The principal methodological novelty is the general observation that distinct classical representations of wffs can be selected and combined with redeployments of classical inference to accommodate particular inferential requirements such as paraconsistency and relevance.

Chudnoff, Elijah; “Intuition and Inference” (Marsh 214, 4:00)

Intuiting that p and inferring that p are different mental states. There is reason to think that they are also phenomenally different mental states--that they have different phenomenal characters. In this paper I address the question: in what does the phenomenal difference between intuiting and inferring consist? I consider and reject views according to which the phenomenal difference consists in a mereological difference in how the mental states are composed, or in an epistemological difference in what kind of justification the mental states give us. I argue that the difference consists in this: intuitions are, like perceptions, presentational, while inferences are not. I explain what I mean by presentationality and make a case for thinking that intuitions are presentational, and that their presentationality is what distinguishes them from inferences.

Cuffari, Elena; “Come On, Rorty (Don’t Fear the Reaper): Why Rorty Should Ditch Davidson” (Marsh 207, 10:00)

This paper argues that Richard Rorty does not need Donald Davidson, nor, more particularly, does he need Davidson’s behaviorist model of language and metaphor, to get what he’s after. Moreover, no matter how creatively Rorty reads Davidson, nor how audaciously he sets this reading alongside the other philosophers he confidently appropriates (Wittgenstein and Heidegger being the most pertinent here, but also Dewey, Sartre, Gadamer), Davidson does not fit. The incongruity has the potential to undermine some of Rorty’s better claims. Reasons do exist as to why Rorty, a philosopher writing in the 1970s-2000s and known for being broadly read, stakes the heart of his project on an analytic behaviorist account of language acquisition and use that had been resoundingly trumped by linguist Noam Chomsky in the 1960s. This paper begins with an overview of Rorty’s metaphilosophical project, leading up to the Davidsonian view of language and metaphor he adopts. I cite in passing a few examples from Rorty’s writing on the more practical questions of selfhood (or self-creation) and liberal community to show the weakness and limitations of Davidson’s behaviorist view of language and metaphor for Rorty’s own projects. In the latter half of the essay, a critical exchange between Rorty and Davidson regarding truth and theories of meaning is examined, bolstered by commentary from Akeel Bilgrami. In the end it turns out that Rorty needs a more robust account of meaning – a richer interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life – than he is willing to concede. Rorty is wrong in thinking that he can do without a theory of meaning, but most wrong when he thinks that Davidson’s theory of meaning is the one he can’t live without.

 

Decker, Jason; “The (in)Validity of Modus Ponens” (Marsh 207, 4:00)

Vann McGee turned the 1980 presidential election into an argument against modus ponens. Some philosophers, however, such as Sinnott-Armstrong, Moor, and Fogelin, were unmoved by his examples and quickly sprang into action to defuse them. I’ll be arguing, against these philosophers, that McGee-style counterexamples are genuine counterexamples to modus ponens for English indicatives. Indeed, I will show that McGee-style examples do not exhaust the field; they merely represent one species in a much larger genus. Attempted responses to McGee’s counterexamples are often non-starters when directed at these other plausible counterexamples. After laying out and defending a number of examples, I’ll suggest that a Stalnakarian nearest-world account of indicative conditionals has the resources to explain why modus ponens is usually a safe form of inference, and why it sometimes fails.

Deery, Oisin; “How Our Experience As Agents is Mistaken if Determinism is True” (Carnegie 205, 8:00)

Deliberation, and the core experience of having robust alternative possibilities that seems to be required for it, is at the heart of what is important to us about agency. As I argue, however, if determinism is true, then this core experience is mistaken: our phenomenology is non-veridical. I reach this conclusion by arguing that if determinism is true, then we can’t do otherwise than we do, yet if our phenomenology is veridical, then we can do otherwise. I characterize agentive phenomenology as the experience of having alternative possible extensions of the present into the future, among which it’s up to us to choose, and any of which we can refrain from choosing. But, I argue, this has the consequence that agentive phenomenology has incompatibilist satisfaction conditions. I contrast my position with that of Terry Horgan, who argues that the veridicality of our agentive phenomenology has compatibilist satisfaction conditions.

Dominick, Yancy Hughes; “Images for the Sake of the Truth in Plato’s Symposium” (Marsh 213, 8:00)

Alcibiades, in Plato’s Symposium, says that he will have praise Socrates by using images (215a4-5).  He assures his companions, however, that this “is no joke:  the image will be for the sake of the truth” (215a6).  Alcibiades goes on to describe Socrates as full of images, and as speaking in words that are “bursting with images of virtue” (222a3-4).  This focus on Socrates’ images seems in tension with the view that Socrates exemplifies the proper lover earlier described.  The successful lover gives birth “not to images of virtue,” but to “true virtue” (212a).  How can Socrates burst with images and yet exemplify the lover who generates not images, but true virtue?  This question urges us toward a firmer grasp of this unique Socrates (221c-d) and his exemplary character.  Despite the apparent tension in the text, Socrates does indeed model the successful lover:  Socrates is filled with images, but those images engender true virtue in others.

Elliott, Brian; “Law, Violence, and Dissent in Benjamin and Agamben” (Marsh 212, 10:00)

This paper offers a critical evaluation of Agamben’s interpretation of the relationship between law and state violence in Walter Benjamin’s essay ‘Critique of Violence’. It is argued that Agamben fails to recognize the redemptive potential of revolutionary action in Benjamin’s essay. Contrary to Agamben’s reading, Benjamin affirms the revolutionary strike as a just form of collective violence or force, insofar as it overturns the state monopoly on power asserted through the law. By contrast Agamben holds that state law reduces humanity to a state of radically passive “bare life” and refers human redemption back to an indeterminate messianic potential.

Feltz, Adam and Edward T. Cokely; “The Philosophical Heritability Argument” (Marsh LL5, 3:00)

Perhaps we inherit philosophically relevant intuitions. This striking suggestion is not only possible, but also it is consistent with a growing body of empirical research. Stable personality traits are known to be highly heritable (i.e., owing to one’s genetic make-up) and are systematically related to many fundamental philosophically relevant intuitions. We argue this fact, in conjunction with the plausible principle that any adequate philosophical argument should take into account all the available relevant evidence, entails that philosophy should become an essentially empirical enterprise. We then discuss potential advantages of an essentially empirical philosophy.

Frankowski, Al; “The Nietzschean Sublime and the Political: A Contribution to Rethinking the Relation of Nietzsche’s Aesthetics to Political Ontology” (Marsh 212, 9:00)

I examine the implications for how Nietzsche thought about the political in relation to aesthetics from his early work on Greek tragedy. I argue that Nietzsche has a provisional view of the sublime that is a distinct inversion of the Kantian and Schopenhauerian projects. From the Nietzschean sublime we may be able to utilize his critique for how we think of the intersections between art, history, politics and culture. I argue that the Nietzschean sublime articulates a non-discursive excess to the cultural milieu that necessarily always renders the political as in confrontation with the absolute Other, which represents a reworking of political ontology and is critically comparative to Critical Theory and Philosophy of Liberation.

Fristedt, Peter; “Understanding across Contexts: A Gadamerian Approach” (Marsh 212, 12:00)

How is it possible for two people from very different cultural, social, or political contexts to understand each other? This paper considers the challenge to inter-contextual understanding that comes from the view that language is, in Cristina Lafont’s phrase, “world disclosing”—i.e. that different speakers understand from out of different holistically structured worldviews, and hence that there can be no mutual understanding unless there is near total overlap between ‘worlds.’ Gadamer’s hermeneutics, I claim, blocks this consequence by holding that language is a medium in which the distinction between interpretation and object of interpretation is paradoxically both maintained and overcome. This view gives us a way of thinking of the objects of individual interpretations as not simply dependent on their relation to the rest of the speaker’s worldview. Mutual understanding becomes a matter of mutual access to such worldview- (but not language-) transcendent objects.

Fritzman, J.M. and Kristin Thornburg; “How Analytic Philosophy Resurrects the Metaphysical Hegel” (Marsh 201, 10:00)

Recent developments in analytic philosophy provide the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel’s philosophy.

Frost, David James; “Empirical Moral Psychology and the Remains of Justification” (Warner 22, 4:00)

In this paper, I inquire into supposedly debunking scientific explanations of morality. As a case study, I consider Josh Greene’s recent debunking explanation of the folk judgment not to push the fat man in the footbridge version of the famous “Trolley Problem.” I argue that we should say, as a working definition: To debunk a subject’s moral judgment that P is to explain how the subject seems justified in making the judgment that P but is not justified. I also discuss what would be required to debunk morality per se. In the end, I show the debunking explanation in the case study fits our definition of a debunking explanation of a judgment and not of morality per se. Debunking doesn’t seem a threat to our “justificatory practices.” I show how debunking explanations enter into new justifications for different actions.

Gamboa, Steven; “Neo-empiricism and Intentionality: From co-variance to interactionism” (Warner 28, 10:00)

In this paper I critically review Jesse Prinz’s efforts to marry a neo-empiricist theory of concepts with contemporary semantic theories of reference and intentionality. After describing Prinz’s account and noting its virtues, I argue that it faces compelling objections and is untenable as it stands. In the final section of the paper, I propose a solution that draws both from the pragmatist tradition and from contemporary philosophical work on the evolution of cognition. I argue that pragmatically supplemented account of intentional content avoids the objections raised against Prinz’s version without sacrificing its main advantages.

Gawne, Richard; “Indexical Multiplicity and Possible Worlds” (Carnegie 311, 8:00)

I begin this essay by attempting to delineate what I take to be a unique and surprisingly important feature of indexicality that has not received adequate attention from previous commentators on the subject. I refer to this feature of indexicality as the phenomenon of indexical multiplicity, and argue that if this phenomenon is legitimate any philosopher who accepts David Lewis’ indexical theory of actuality is forced to concede that modal realism is the case. I conclude with an argument against Heather Dyke’s claim that the indexical theory of actuality is compatible with other accounts of possible worlds such as modal actualism and modal ersatzism. 

Goldberg, Zachary; “Van Inwagen’s Two Failed Arguments for the Belief in Freedom” (Carnegie 205, 11:00)

In chapter 6 of An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen presents an influential argument that we are justified in believing we are free. He does so by claiming that the determinist’s objection to the argument for the belief in freedom fails in the exact same way that the skeptic’s argument fails to prove that none of our empirical beliefs are justified. I show that this strategy to defend the belief in freedom fails due to a disanalogy. In a different (but related) argument, van Inwagen concludes that deliberating while holding the belief that you are free is inconsistent. He suggests that (1) inconsistency is an epistemic defect and (2) it is implausible that some truth is such that your simply believing it would make epistemically defective your engaging in so basic an activity as deliberation. Finally, I show that this argument fares no better than the former.

Gonzalez, Julian Roel; “Exploration of the Capabilities Approach and Its Accessibility” (Carnegie 205, 3:00)

This paper will analyze Martha Nussbaum’s Women and Human Development through a sympathetic exploration of the capabilities approach she proposes. Her theory advocates for individuals’ beliefs and her aim to argue for constitutional principles that all governments should have respect for the sake of their citizens, in order to successfully provide a valued concern for human dignity. The theory may fail by not go far enough to provide individuals an actual means to gain access to realizing certain capabilities. In addition, it may go too far in helping and into imposing change onto cultures that may not agree with her notions of the listed capabilities. Presented is the normative universal theory she presents, then examples of how the capabilities cannot merely be given to citizens, and finally a suggestion of an addition of the Aristotelian Principle as another element to her theory so as to make her argument more robust, but contributes to and addresses human dignity in a richer sense.

Grigoriev, Serge; “Some Noteworthy Problems in Davidson’s Treatment of the Notion of Evidence” (Carnegie 311, 2:00)

In one of his later papers, Donald Davidson explains that his theory of rational speech and action presupposes rationality in the treatment of evidence.  The purpose of this essay is to offer a critical examination of Davidson’s approach to this problem.  It begins by offering a sketch of the relationship between Davidson’s treatment of evidence in the context of radical interpretation and his well-known refusal to countenance epistemic intermediaries, resulting in a causal account of belief.  It is argued that Davidson goes too far in erasing the difference between languages and belief-systems; and, as a consequence, appears to ignore the fact that some perceptual beliefs may be more important than others epistemically, without being more important semantically.  Epistemically significant and reliable beliefs may often be more difficult to acquire than ordinary beliefs required fro communication; yet, it is our purported ability to distinguish such beliefs that gives us confidence in our system of beliefs as a whole.  Meanwhile, Davidson’s endorsement of the veridical nature of all belief leaves no room for drawing such distinctions.  In conclusion, it is suggested that the criteria for the rational treatment of evidence do not operate spontaneously, nor are they self-evident, but depend on the historical development of our intellectual practices.

Haramia, Chelsea; “A De Dicto Solution to the Non-Identity Problem” (Warner 28, 12:00)

Can we wrong persons who do not, and perhaps will not, exist? I examine this question as it applies to the non-identity problem and argue that a de dicto reading solves the problem commonly elicited from non-identity cases. I show that, under a de dicto reading, non-identity cases do in fact involve wrong action because such a reading renders intelligible easily adopted principles concerning harm. We need then to ask whether or not we are warranted in accepting such a reading. In this paper, I give both negative and positive reasons to adopt a de dicto reading of cases involving non-identity. Negative reasons involve the rejection of de re readings of such cases stemming from arguments of analogy. Notably, such reasons carry force only when coupled with the acceptance of the intuition that a wrong action occurs in non-identity cases. Positive reasons will not rely on such an intuition and can stand alone as justification for the adoption of de dicto readings. Such reasons stem from the methodology of assigning wrong actions. Ultimately, I argue that the combined force of these positive and negative reasons warrant the adoption of a de dicto reading of non-identity cases, thereby solving the problem of non-identity.

Hasan, Ali; “Skepticism and Spatial Objects” (Warner 28, 11:00)

I defend realism regarding an external world of spatial objects against what Vogel (2005) calls a “domestic, non-exotic skeptic,” someone who is willing to grant that we have direct access to the contents of our own experiences and grant the legitimacy of inference to the best explanation, but denies that we have justification for the existence of the external world.  I argue that the existence of a world of spatial objects provides a systematic explanation of the spatial structure of visual experience, and that it provides a better explanation than traditional skeptical scenarios.  The argument is in some respects similar to versions offered by Russell, Moser, BonJour, and Vogel, though the appeal to projective geometry makes for a more compelling argument.  Moreover, while I agree with Vogel that skeptical hypotheses with significant explanatory power are more complex than, and for that reason inferior to, the real world hypothesis, my argument takes a different route is not vulnerable to certain problems with his own strategy.

Hudson, Aurora; “How Can Language Do Work?: The Problem in Rorty’s ‘Feminism and Pragmatism’” (Marsh 207, 8:00)

In Richard Rorty’s “Feminism and Pragmatism” essay in Truth and Progress, he argues for a conception of language that does work, in this case in the service of feminist ideals of liberation from oppression. While it is the case that language can do the kind of work Rorty wants it to do, Rorty cannot account for how, given his particular view of language. Rather than being a question at which Rorty can simply shrug and respond that the “how” of the matter is for another vocabulary to discuss, I contend that this problem points out the impoverished nature of Rorty’s conception of language. First, because predictive power is important to a vocabulary concerned with affecting change and without even a belief in an underlying structure to language such that results are repeatable, much less an analysis of such structure, the vocabulary cannot posit that it can know what “creative misuses” or novel metaphors will do, so a prescription for such in the service of particular ends is unjustified. Second, Rorty’s claim about what language can do, specifically its influence over individual feelings, contradicts his own view of language as historically contingent and gaining meaning through a communal, evolutionary process. Finally, as an argument for feminists to take up Rorty’s neo-pragmatism this essay fails because other theorists have proposed the same kind of work for language in vocabularies that can account for their own prescriptions. The problem I find in this essay is not that Rorty is wrong about the work language does. As I will discuss later, shifting vocabularies, creative misuses of words and novel metaphors can, do, and should play a key role in libratory praxis.  The problem is that Rorty cannot account for how language can do the work it does within his own framework. Not only can he not account for the prescription he writes, his assertions about what language can do actively contradict his view of language.

Hunt, Roger; “The Development and Defense of Kant’s Ideality of Time” (Marsh 206, 3:00)

This paper goes through the development of Kant’s thesis asserting the unreality of time.  Confronting Newton’s idea of absolute/mathematical time, Kant comes to the conclusion that time is the form of inner sense and is the mode by which we construct a causal picture of universe.  He receives numerous criticisms of this old, but radical, view, as it seems to contradict the axioms on which the current cosmological sciences were built.  Lambert and Mendelssohn provide the heaviest criticisms, but it seems that Kant always has an answer.  Studying his Inagural Dissertation, his correspondences with several philosophers, and both editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, we find an evolving definition of what it means for time to be ideal/unreal.

Jenks, Rod; “Fire in the Cave” (Marsh 213, 9:00)

Scholars have already agreed on the significance of many of the details of the cave analogy from Republic VII, but not on that of the fire in the cave. I reason that the sun outside the cave is the ground of everything, both inside and outside the cave, and thus, the fire must have some parallel crucial role to play inside the cave. I consider several possibilities, arguing finally that the fire represents the human longing for synoptic understanding. Hunger for understanding is arguably the source of the being of representations in the mind. However, this desire can be satisfied either by sophistic misrepresentations or by genuine nous, and Plato presents us with a choice: how will we use the fire burning inside us? I explain escape from the cave by appeal to the ascent passage from Symposium, and I suggest that question whether the prisoners’ release from their chains is voluntary or compelled is a false dilemma.

Jennings, Ray and Robert Warner; “Knowledge and Understanding” (Marsh LL5, 11:00)

It is argued that the recipe for knowledge has itself become at best a dog’s breakfast, and that knowledge as intellectual goal should be thrown over in favor of improved understanding. Examples are furnished from electrocardiography.

Jones, Emma; “‘The Private Poem of the Pervert,’ or, Rorty Creates Freud Ex Nihilo” (Marsh 207, 9:00)

In this paper I critically assess Richard Rorty’s discussions of Freud, particularly in his chapter “The Contingency of Selfhood,” from Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Rorty presents an impoverished view of Freud’s work upon which there appears to be no distinction between mental health and mental illness, and “self-creation,” rather than psychic health, is the primary value. I suggest that this problematic reading of Freud emerges out of Rorty’s own understanding of “self-creation,” which in turn is grounded in a Davidsonian theory of language and metaphor.

Jones, Todd; “Are Customs and Conditioning Competitors?” (Warner 22, 3:00)

The situations which social scientists explain using concepts like custom and norm often tend to be situations where many other kinds of explanations seem plausible as well    (e.g. biological, psychological, economic, historical). Do these other explanations compete with the custom/norm explanations or do they complement them?  We need to carefully consider this question, and not just assume that various accounts are all permissible at “different levels of analysis.” In this paper I describe two families of non-competing accounts: 1) explanations of different (but similarly described) facts, and 2) accounts which seem to be differ but are really different parts or versions of the same underlying explanation. I argue that, while many types of apparent competitors don’t really compete with customs, but there will usually be some that do.

Kahn, Leonard; “The Valence of Reasons and the Thick/Thin Distinction” (Warner 28, 4:00)

According to holism about reasons, any property that provides a reason for a belief, an action, etc. in one context can provide a reason against the very same belief, action, etc. in a different context, and, indeed, can provide no reason at all in yet another. I consider a line of argument for holism that relies on Williams' distinction between the thick and the thin, an argument which I call the divide and conquer approach. I contend that the divide and conquer approach faces a serious problem. It erroneously assumes that the distinction between the thick and the thin is a difference in kind, rather than a difference in degree. Even if we ignore its misunderstanding of this distinction, the divide and conquer approach is incapable of providing a plausible story about why certain kinds of properties are normatively inert, a story it must tell in order to support holism.

Kaspar, David; “If I Don’t Do It, Somebody Else Will” (Marsh 101, 10:00)

This paper examines the paradox of deontology. Many attempts to undo the paradox have assumed that to do so we must find the single feature that justifies constraints. Such attempts have notoriously resulted in new instances of the paradox.  In this paper we take a fresh look at the deontology paradox. First, we examine whether the paradox is really a problem for deontological theories. Next, we consider wrong-makers, and correct a curious feature of the main approach taken to them. This helps us understand how responsibility is allotted in paradox situations. Finally, since there is no deontology paradox without the situations used to generate it, we critically examine the structure of such situations. We find that paradox situations are impossible. We do all this to show that doing wrong for fear that “somebody else will” can be no more than an excuse, and not a way to make deontological theories consistent.

Kling, Jennifer; “Becoming Fully Virtuous: A How-To Guide” (Marsh 101, 8:00)

Hursthouse argues that there is a “standard list” of virtues and that it is possible to validate this list as objectively correct using a form of ethical naturalism. Assuming that her argument succeeds and thus that there is such a validated list, in combination with both the virtue ethicist’s belief that humans should work to become more virtuous and the fact that humans have a finite span of time in which to work, leads to some interesting questions about which virtues we ought to work on first. Taking for granted that someone wants to become more virtuous, that she wants to (and does not already) fully possess the virtues on the standard list, the question then becomes, in what order should she work on achieving those virtues? In other words, how should she decide which virtues to work on first? I argue that the order in which a person should work on acquiring the virtues is determined both by her current character traits and her society. While she does need to acquire all of the virtues in order to be fully virtuous and thus to have the best chance of living a flourishing human life, the order in which she should work on acquiring them is relative to her character traits and her society. Furthermore, I argue that, if the above claims are true, then it seems that there can be no absolute ranking of the virtues.

Koopman, Colin; “Pragmatist Resources for Experimental Philosophy” (Marsh LL5, 4:00)

Recent attention given to the upstart movement of experimental philosophy is much deserved. Now that experimental philosophy is entering a stage of maturity, it is time to consider its relation to other philosophical traditions that have issued assaults against philosophical habits also criticized by the experimental program. Focusing on Appiah’s recent report on experimental philosophy and recent work by leading experimental philosopher Knobe, I offer a comparison between experimental philosophy and philosophical pragmatism. I discuss two kinds of pragmatist resources that should prove useful for experimental philosophy: replacing intuition with inquiry, and substituting interdisciplinary inquiry for disciplinary isolation.

Krizan, Mary Katrina; “That-en: A case for restricting potentiality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics Q.7” (Marsh 213, 12:00)

In Metaphysics Θ.7, Aristotle gives his most complete explanation of the distinction between potentiality and actuality, as it applies to the potential to be or become an artifact or natural substance. It is a general project of mine to argue that Aristotle’s conception of potentiality, and his criteria of being potentially are extremely restrictive; in general, some material x is potentially some y only when x is the most proximate material cause of y. In this paper, I examine one piece of evidence in favor of restricting potentiality, which is introduced as a point about linguistic usage in Metaphysics Θ.7, at 1049a18-24. I begin by laying out the passage and then show how Aristotle’s explicit claims in the passage commit him to a restricted conception of potentiality. I then consider an objection to one of the premises of the argument, which utilizes a case of gradual replacement, and show why it does not succeed in undermining my argument. 

Lammi, Walter; “Thinking Anew About Ideology” (Carnegie 306, 12:00)

Contemporary ideology studies are dominated by models that go back to the Marxist correlation of a substructure of material conditions and superstructure of ideas that insensibly support hegemonic powers. While I do not quarrel with the value of this model for its own purposes, its explanatory power does not cover the entire range of what we generally consider ‘ideology’. This has become particularly evident since the rise of Islamist ideologies in the last decades. For all the variations among such ideologies, they have in common the fact that one learns the ideology, becomes committed to its goals, and acts on that commitment. This kind of learned ideological system actually represents an ultimate faith in reasoning: one follows reasons to their conclusions and acts on those conclusions to the point, if one is courageous enough, of death. In this paper I suggest a new philosophical approach to understanding such ideologies, with the help of Hegel, Heidegger, Gadamer and others. Ideology turns out to be much more closely related to philosophy than generally thought. It also constitutes a modernist, post-Enlightenment historical phenomenon, contrary to what many believe. Moreover, ideology is not simply a matter of false consciousness. To learn an ideology reflects a genuine spiritual search, even though it results in an intellectual dead end where arid, dogmatic notions of the human are taken for reality and action seeks to realize a hopelessly abstract future. In Hegel’s terms, this fatal flaw is due to the edifying nature of ideology.

Latham, Noa; “Scepticism and A Priori Probability Principles” (Marsh 101, 12:00)

In this paper I consider some standard sceptical scenarios and examine what plausible a priori probability principles would allow us to reject them. I consider breadth, commonsense, simplicity, flukishness and arbitrariness, and argue that the only plausible candidates for basic independent a priori probability principles concern simplicity and flukishness. I show how these principles support intuitive metaphysical views in response to the sceptical challenges of solipsism and Humean skepticism about laws.

Logue, Jessica; “Cinematic Distractions” (Marsh 206, 9:00)

I argue that films, unlike other artforms, are particularly vulnerable to a phenomenon I call “cinematic distractions.” By “cinematic distractions” I mean several related factors dealing with foreknowledge of the actors in the film, attitudes about the director, physical comfort or discomfort while watching the film, and a host of other features that distract viewers from the pure experience of watching a film. I argue that the experience of watching a film is one that is subject to a variety of factors that are non-aesthetic and yet influential. I believe these distractions lead to the formation of judgments that are based, at least in part, on the distractions themselves rather than the raw elements of the film. Thus, the experience of film-going is one that sometimes may involve a kind of non-sequitur where judgments made about a film are based upon information that is not actually pertinent to the merit of the film itself.

Lopez, Jason; “The Pluralist View of Self-Deception” (Warner 28, 2:00)

Though it is common for those who research self-deception to argue for a particular characterization of self-deception above others, they will also occasionally mention that there might be different types of self-deception that their theory might not be able to cover.  In response to the problems with arguing the former and in order to go beyond the commonly vague suggestion that is the latter, this paper will spell out the Pluralistic View of Self-Deception; there is not one type of self-deception and there instead are many.  In order to motivate the Pluralistic View, it will be necessary to examine the different approaches to characterizing self-deception and argue that, on all of the approaches, the Pluralistic View results.

 

Manninen, Bertha Alvarez; “The Pro-Life Pro-Choicer: Battling the False Dichotomy” (Warner 28, 3:00)

In this paper, I respond to Julia Hanigsberg’s call for the pro-choice/feminist community to articulate a “vision of the value of intrauterine life" and illustrate how individuals who are in favor of abortion rights can also, simultaneously, respect the value of fetal life.  This can be done, I argue, in two ways. First, pro-choice advocates need to accept, without condemnation, that many women do feel that abortion constitutes a somber loss, and this loss needs to be grieved in a socially open and sanctioned manner. In other words, pro-choice advocates have to fight against the stereotype that those who are in favor of abortion rights see abortions as morally innocuous actions, comparable, as Mary Anne Warren puts it, to obtaining a haircut. Second, pro-choice advocates need to support social programs that aid women facing unwanted pregnancies in order to help curb the prevalence of abortions. The ultimate goal for the “pro-life pro-choicer”, then, is two fold. First, we must defend a woman’s right to control her bodily and reproductive autonomy; however, we must also support the contention that most abortions constitute a time of sorrow or loss, and more needs to be done to ensure that it is a rarely exercised right.

Marshall, Amanda; “The Intuitive Appeal of Multiple Realization” (Warner 22, 10:00)

According to a long-running consensus, Putnam’s argument from multiple realization constitutes a decisive objection to the type-identity theory of mind. Despite its status as philosophical orthodoxy, this verdict is often casually assumed, rather than concluded after careful reflection. This motivates a fresh assessment of Putnam’s argument, which I undertake in this paper. I suggest tradition has exaggerated the extent to which it undermines the reductionist program. Putnam’s case crucially relies on folk intuitions that require further justification. Moreover, our intuitions regarding multiple realization have more complicated relations to reductionism and functionalism, respectively, than has been recognized.

 

Matey, Jennifer; “Can Blue Mean Four?: What Synaesthesia Tells Us About Perceptual Content” (Warner 22, 9:00)

In recent years, a growing number of philosophers have defended the view that conscious perceptual experiences have content in virtue of their phenomenal characters (Chalmers 2004, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Siegel 2006, Siewert 1998). One still relatively under-explored issue, however, concerns what sort of information the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is capable of conveying about the world. Positions on this issue fall into two general categories. Conservative views hold that only directly sensible properties such as colors, shapes and the spatial relations among these properties are represented in perceptual experience (Tye, 1995). The liberal position on the other hand, holds that information over and above these properties can be perceptually represented. This paper presents a counterexample to conservative views, drawing on the visuo-perceptual phenomenon of higher-grapheme color synaesthesia.

Metcalf, Thomas; “Omnipotence, Moral Reasons, and the Logical Problem of Evil” (Marsh 212, 3:00)

This paper defends a new version of the Logical Problem of Evil. Section 1 argues that all extant plausible analyses of omnipotence require that an omnipotent being be able to actualize any “important” state of affairs that any other being can actualize. Section 2 explains that this condition presents a dilemma for theists, both horns of which lead to a highly undesirable position called “effective moral nihilism.” Section 3 defends a new version of the Logical Problem of Evil for theism, a version apparently immune to all previous and conceivable defenses.

Morris, Kevin; “What’s Wrong With ‘Brute’ Supervenience?” (Marsh 106, 9:00)

Physicalism is true only if how things are supervenes on how things are physically. Yet it is far from clear that physicalism can be completely explicated using the notion of supervenience. One reason for this is that merely maintaining that how things are supervenes on how things are physically leaves open the possibility that this supervenience might be “brute” and inexplicable. But what’s wrong with brute supervenience? While I’ll concede that there is a sense in which brute supervenience conflicts with specifically physicalist commitments, I’ll argue, contra the suggestions of Terence Horgan and Andrew Melnyk, that the need to rule out the possibility of brute physical supervenience is better understood as stemming from more general metaphysical and epistemological scruples. In other words, insofar as a physicalist shouldn’t allow for brute supervenience, this is best accounted for in terms of commitments not specifically tied to a physicalist framework.

Moyer, Derek; “Searle’s Sincerity Condition and the Role of Psychological States in Speech Act Theory” (Warner 28, 8:00)

John Searle’s 1969 book Speech Acts filled out the much of the work done by J.L. Austin for understanding an aspect of language that had heretofore remained uninvestigated—how we do things with words. Searle’s now canonical analyses show how language works as a rule-governed activity, and he brilliantly broke down supposedly simple interactions to show how complex linguistic communication is. Searle developed rules for various kinds of speech acts, that is, conditions under which a speech act of such-and-such kind may be successful. His most famous example is of the speech act promise. One of the conditions of the speech act promise is what Searle calls the sincerity condition. This condition states that the promiser must intend to do the thing promised. I show that in fact this is no condition at all for the speech act promise, and that furthermore a speech act that is expressive of a psychological state need not actually be carried out by a speaker with that psychological state. There is in fact no sincerity condition for speech acts. I briefly connect this mistake in Searle’s analysis to his theory of meaning, showing that he is bound to make this mistake since he thinks meaning involves intention.

Muchalla, Rhea; “A Binding Culture: Interrogating the Way Culture Functions in Everyday Life” (Carnegie 306, 3:00)

In our everyday life culture is situated to do specific work in organizing ourselves and our relationships. I propose that in our daily lives and discursive practices culture often functions as a binary system. That is, there are those seen as having culture and those seen without it. This binary system ends up not only separating people along one, strict line but ends up working as a support structure for systems such as racism and sexism. While supporting these harmful structures this binary of culture leaves limited room for people to carve out identities. In a binary system of either/or, those who do not fit perfectly on one side or the other end up being ostracized or ignored. Thus, the function of culture and the binary that results from its usage must be interrogated in an effort to destabilize racism and sexism and create more room for us all to be in this world.

Nichols, Shaun; “On the psychological origins of dualism: Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap” (Jefferson 223/224, 5:00)

Consciousness often presents itself as a problem for materialists because for any description we might give about the physical facts, there seems to be something about conscious experience that hasn't been fully explained.  This gives rise to an apparent explanatory gap. The explanatory gulf between the physical and the conscious is mirrored in the broader population, in which dualistic intuitions abound.  Drawing on recent empirical evidence, this talk presents a dual-process cognitive model of consciousness attribution.  This dual-process model, we suggest, provides an important part of the explanation for why dualism is so attractive and the explanatory gap so vexing.

Picciuto, Vincent; “Phenomenal Concepts and the Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness” (Warner 22, 8:00)

This paper adapts an account of phenomenal concepts to form a novel version of a dual-content, higher-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness: the higher-order quotational thought theory. Contrary to the received view of phenomenal concepts, which merely employs phenomenal concepts in response to various anti-physicalist arguments, it is argued that such concepts partly constitute phenomenally conscious states. Thus, in addition to providing a response to anti-physicalist arguments, it is argued that phenomenal concepts can play an important explanatory role in an account of the nature of phenomenally conscious states. After discussing two potentially insurmountable problems for standard higher-order theories, it is shown that the novel version introduced avoids such problems and has additional explanatory advantages over similar, competing dual-content theories.

Pierce, Tony; “Dewey’s Denial of Determinism” (Carnegie 205, 10:00)

In this paper I examine John Dewey’s theory of freedom for moral responsibility that constitutes a multi-faceted denial of Determinism.

Pratt, Aaron; “Emerson and Eckhart: A Unified View of the Moral Life” (Marsh 201, 4:00)

It is often argued that Ralph Waldo Emerson described an ethics founded on secular self-realization independent from a conception of God. In this essay I argue that “real Being,” “The One,” “The Over-Soul,” or “God,” that Emerson describes throughout his works is not merely a rhetorical device, but is a necessary condition for the moral life. Meister Eckhart von Hoccheim presented a similar ontological account involving a God that unites all things to it and through it. From this, Eckhart derives the idea of a moral life characterized by a particular type of mental and spiritual activity that leads to a greater union with this theological “One,” or God. If it is the case that Emerson and Eckhart share this conception of “The One,” and that the accounts of the moral life they derive from it are substantially the same, then we should rethink the “secular” interpretation of Emerson.

Raskoff, Sarah; “Socrates on the Unity or Disunity of Desire” (Marsh 213, 10:00)

In their book Plato’s Lysis, Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe argue that Socrates supports a unity of desire in the Lysis and believes that the object of all forms of desire is the proton philon, or first friend. However, this thesis is inconsistent with the disunity of desire that Socrates defends in both the Charmides and the Gorgias. I will argue that Penner and Rowe incorrectly attribute a unity of desire to Socrates. I will begin by showing that their view both creates philosophical problems and also fails to square with the text of the Lysis itself. I will then discuss how Penner and Rowe’s defense fails to address the apparent disunity of desire that Socrates supports in both the Charmides and the Gorgias. Next, I will consider an interpretation that explains the disunity of desire in the Charmides and the Gorgias. I will conclude with my own application of that view and show how it can address what Socrates has to say about desire in the Lysis.

Rasmussen, Joshua; “What We See In Dreams” (Warner 22, 2:00)

I provide a new answer to the question, “What sorts of things might we be aware of in cases of non-veridical perception?” In the first part of the paper, I argue that the objects of immediate awareness, such as images, cannot fall under any of the traditional ontological categories. I then articulate and motivate a new ontological category under which the objects of immediate awareness might fall.

Rettler, Bradley; “Presentism and Fatalism Revisited” (Marsh 101, 4:00)

If personal conversation is any indication, metaphysicians are becoming increasingly attracted to the view that the conjunction of presentism, libertarianism, and bivalence is inconsistent. I offer two arguments that they are consistent. Using the resources I develop, I then respond to my opposition’s print representative: a recent argument by Michael Rea. Using a parody argument, I show where and how it goes wrong.

Rice, Rebekah; “Reasons, Agency, and Alienation: A Critique of Reason Externalism” (Carnegie 306, 8:00)

When I bring my car to a stop at the intersection, what sorts of things can count as my reasons for stopping?  The “received view” in the philosophy action posits that the real reasons for an action must be propositional attitudes, typically, of course, beliefs and desires. This view is “internalist” insofar as it requires that reasons for action be internal states of the agent. Reason “externalists,” on the other hand, maintain that “external situations,” that is, stop signs and their ilk, can be the real reasons for an action. On this view, the stop sign can itself be my reason for stopping and we needn’t make any further appeal to my internal propositional attitudes in order to locate the reason for which I stopped. In this paper I argue that, following some considerations offered by Jaegwon Kim, reason externalism opens the door to a devastating variety of alienation between an agent and her actions and, as a result, there is good reason to remain internalist about reasons for action.

Roberts, Brooke; “Apologizing Without Regret” (Carnegie 306, 10:00)

A common belief about the nature of regret is that regretting some event E is closely linked to being sorry for the occurrence of E. Or more specifically, that if one is sorry for E then she must regret E. We will call this the sorry-regret hypothesis (SR hypothesis). This paper shows the SR hypothesis is mistaken- that one may be sorry that something she played a role in happened, but not regret it. I take the rejection of this “truism” to be a positive development. I offer two lines of argument for rejecting the SR hypothesis. One line of argument is based on counterexamples. For example, imagine a Robin Hood type fellow who robs a bank and gives the stolen money to the poor. I take it to be plausible that he may be sorry for robbing the bank, but not regret that he robbed the bank (perhaps since he thinks positive consequences came of doing so). This shows that a crude reading of the SR hypothesis is subject to counterexamples, and should be refined accordingly. The second argument I offer is a more serious attack on the validity of a reconstructed argument for the SR hypothesis. It is desirable to reject the SR hypothesis since there is a component of regret that many will not want not to be saddled with every time they are sincerely sorry for some event that they played a part in. To regret something, one must wish that she had not done that thing/acted differently. A person is the person she is (speaking loosely) because of the actions she has performed (i.e. if one had acted differently then one would, to some extent, be a different person). If one regrets something she did, then she wishes that she were a different person. I think this is a worrisome consequence, and so rejecting the ST hypothesis and thereby severing the alleged tight link between being sorry for something and regretting that thing is desirable.

Robinson, Pamela; “The Negation Problem for Expressivism: Solutions and Implications” (Warner 28, 9:00)

In this paper, I examine Mark Schroeder’s assessment of the negation problem for expressivism. Schroeder argues that there is only one solution, and that if the expressivist accepts it she must ultimately extend her non-cognitivist account of normative sentences to cover descriptive ones as well. If Schroeder is right, this severely weakens the expressivist position. Not only does it burden the expressivist with radical views concerning the philosophy of mind and the nature of natural language, it also undermines a major justification for expressivism: the view that beliefs aren’t inherently motivating. I argue that there is another strategy open to the expressivist, and, moreover, that neither solution commits her to a non-cognitivist account of descriptive sentences.

Rothenfluch, Sruthi; “‘Knows’ and Adjectives” (Warner 22, 12:00)

Epistemic contextualists attempt to eliminate or reduce skepticism about the semantic context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ by drawing comparisons to terms whose contextual variability is universally accepted or at least significantly less controversial. I will argue here that ‘knows’ resembles the context-sensitivity of comparative adjectives, as both expressions correspond to linear standards of application. I will then address some objections to this analogy.

Rottschaefer, William; “Second Philosophy and the Explanatory Power of Truth” (Carnegie 311, 4:00)

In her book Second Philosophy: A Natural Method, Penelope Maddy advocates that philosophers practice Second Philosophy, answering philosophical questions using the best results of the sciences. In this paper, I assess Maddy’s second philosophical account of truth. In order to explain successful language use, Maddy adopts a hybrid view of truth composed of a disquotational theory of truth and accounts of indicator relations between beliefs and the world as disclosed in local epistemologies. I argue that the causal account that she gives of good and bad indication relations is inadequate, maintaining that the processes that constitute these relations are functional and not merely causal. For as indicators of success conditions, they refer to goal states of well functioning epistemic processes. Making use of the explanatory power of scientifically based selection theories, I propose a modest, second philosophical correspondence theory of truth as necessary for explaining successful language use.

Rowell, John; “Descartes’ Challenge to the Atheists” (Marsh 207, 11:00)

I place myself in meditative mode, following brief instructions on meditation provided by Descartes. In this mode, I especially planned to test Descartes’ theory of substance dualism and his conception of God. Using three conditions for meditation, the attention condition, the preconceived opinion condition, and the withdrawal from the senses condition, I did indeed arrive at substance dualism but not the conception of God. This conception proved elusive because it cannot be derived from the grounds Descartes gives us.

Sager, Alex; “Part Time and Temporary Work: Exploitation, Injustice, and Autonomy” (Carnegie 205, 4:00)

The increasingly flexible labour market of today’s developed economies has led to increasing job insecurity and to the replacement of significant numbers of full-time, permanent jobs by temporary and part-time positions.  I argue that an economic and political system where many people are obligated to rely on part-time or temporary jobs is unjust. More precisely, temporary and part-time positions can only be justified against an economic background where a real opportunity for permanent, full-time employment exists. My argument against non-standard work is based on liberal autonomy and personhood, rather than economic insecurity or lack of access to benefits. Forced reliance on part-time and temporary work undermines the “experiments in living” necessary to fully achieve autonomous personhood and to flourish. Thus, my objection goes deeper and holds even governments addressed many of the effects of non-standard employment through social programs to reduce the burdens of unemployment and underemployment.

Sample, Hope; “Responses to Hume’s Missing Shade of Blue” (Marsh 206, 12:00)

The aim of the paper is to give a new analysis of the abstraction and association response to the missing shade of blue counterexample to Hume’s copy thesis.  The first section sets up the missing shade of blue example and defines all the relevant terminology to the example. The next section outlines various responses to the counterexample. Finally, I present a new formulation of the abstraction and association response, which asserts that the missing shade of blue example is not a counter example without destroying the simple complex distinction.

Scheiter, Krisanna; “Aristotle on Pleasure, Pain and Emotion” (Marsh 213, 11:00)

In this paper I claim that Aristotelian emotions are essentially pleasures and pains that have a psychological, rather than a physical, cause. W.W. Fortenbaugh claims that for Aristotle emotions are not always accompanied by pleasure or pain. For example, hate and kindness are neither pleasurable nor painful. Even though Aristotle does not include pleasure and pain in his definition of hate and kindness I argue that it is highly unlikely they are completely devoid of these feelings. I also consider the import Fortenbaugh places on Aristotle's claim in the Eudemian Ethics that sensual pleasure and pain accompany emotions for the most part. I claim that most pleasures and pains characteristic of emotions are due to a physiological change in the body, but some pleasures, like that of contemplation, do not require the body. Thus, Aristotle is just indicating that some pleasures and pains characteristic of emotion are not sensual.

Smith, Basil; “The Incoherence of Social Externalism” (Marsh 214, 8:00)

Social externalism (from Burge, etc) belies our intuitions about how we count our beliefs and their contents. Typically, we hold that any given intentional state (e.g. the belief that p) has only one content (p). Externalism cannot assume this, and is committed to the opposite. That is, social externalism is committed to the position that our belief states host many contents. And, it is committed to the (obvious) fact that these contents often contradict each other (e.g. “sofa” verses “safo” contents). If social externalism is true, our minds are doubly incoherent.  However, since our minds are not so incoherent, social externalism must be false.

Smith, Mark C R; “Conceptual Practice and Objective Constraints in Mathematics” (Marsh 207, 3:00)

A large portion of contemporary philosophy of mathematics seeks, in one way or another, to tether the notion of mathematical objectivity to the kinds of practices that are operative in mathematics, practices which are engaged in and justified for reasons that are themselves largely non­­-mathematical. Such is the case, though in very different ways, with intuitionism in the manner of Dummett, instrumentalism of Hartry Field’s kind, and mathematical fictionalism (for instance, Balaguer 2009). I argue, however, that all of these accounts are inadequate in the light of what I dub the “argument from constraint,” an example of which is the explanation of why it’s impossible to square the circle. (It has to do with a very interesting property of π.) I examine this argument, and contrast it with the familiar indispensability argument, which holds that mathematics is indispensable to natural science and therefore brings commitment to mathematical objects.  This argument comes in for some criticism more or less on grounds of its irrelevance to its own purported conclusion. In the end, I argue that the idea of objectivity as conformity with conceptual practices is too thin actually to do the duty demanded of it, and I sketch out some elements of a notion of objectivity as a relation to an autonomous subject matter. Objectivity cannot be just an internal, but must also be an external, relation.

Sosa, Ernest; “Armchair Philosophy” (Jefferson 223/224, 5:00)

An account and defense of armchair philosophy and its epistemic standing.

Spelman, Jonathan; “Knowledge As Cognitive Achievement” (Warner 22, 11:00)

In order to explain why knowledge is both quantitatively more valuable than and qualitatively different from any epistemic standing falling short of it, virtue epistemologists argue that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement and therefore finally valuable. Duncan Pritchard disagrees, however, and in a recent manuscript, entitled The Value of Knowledge, contends that knowledge is not a kind of cognitive achievement. To prove his point, Pritchard attempts to demonstrate that it is possible to have cognitive achievement without knowledge, particularly in cases where environmental luck is present. In demonstrating that, Pritchard presents two hypothetical cases of environmental luck, the first of which is used to show that achievement is possible in such cases whereas the second is used to show that knowledge is not. Were the two cases analogous, as Pritchard claims, his argument against virtue epistemology would be sound. I, however, argue that the two cases are not analogous, and in doing so attempt to preserve virtue epistemology’s argument for the final value of knowledge, particularly the conclusion that knowledge is a kind of cognitive achievement. 

Stockton, Matthew S.; “Ethically Defensible Acts of Immorality: Rethinking Ethics in Virtual Realms: (Marsh 214, 12:00)

As technological advancements have increased access and engagement with virtual worlds, participants are continually pressed to rethink their own ethics and entertain the possibility of engaging in behavior they would likely regard as unethical in the tangible world. Participation within these virtual worlds can involve committing acts of dishonesty, malevolence, theft, and adultery if the user so chooses. For this reason, the question of whether or not such behavior is ethically defensible becomes a matter of debate. This article asserts that participation in these virtual acts represent a type of playing in the moral sandbox where users are able to better reflect on and strengthen their own moral reasoning both inside and outside of these virtual experiences. As such, the ethical case for embracing these virtual opportunities is stronger than the paternalistic case for suppressing them.

Stonestreet, Erica Lucast; “Being in Charge: The Moral Significance of Choice” (Carnegie 306, 11:00)

There are normally multiple eligible ways of understanding what is at stake in a given situation. In addition to consequences, there are also expressive considerations: the attitude with which an action is undertaken can make a considerable difference in what it means, even if the measurable outcome is the same. Yet it is possible for even the reasons provided by expressive considerations to come to an impasse as well. What is a person to do? Picking arbitrarily in such a situation can be powerfully tempting, and much of the time there’s no reason not to. I argue, however, that choice itself has expressive implications that can sometimes require an agent to make a deliberate choice rather than pick arbitrarily, even when all of the eligible options are good enough. In particular, choice expresses an important kind of respect for oneself through engagement with both the values at stake in the decision, and the significance of the decision itself.

Szymanski, Ileana; “Philosophy of Food: How our choices with respect to food create habits that can be mirrored in the choices we make to find happiness in every-day life” (Carnegie 306, 9:00)

In this paper I would like to address the claim that the habits that we develop with respect to evaluating sources of food and sources of happiness affect each other. In particular I would like to explore the idea that when we build a habit of restriction in the evaluation of sources of food and there is no good reason for this restriction (that is to say, when we become picky eaters) there is a possibility of spillover of this same kind of uncritical restriction into the area of evaluation of sources of happiness for us. Thus, becoming a picky eater will have consequences beyond our food choices.

Thompson, J.J. and R.E. Jennings; “Biology and Linguistics: Whence Hierarchy?” (Marsh LL5, 8:00)

Human language, as it presents itself to observation, is a physical and more specifically a biological phenomenon. It manifests itself in colloquy and more recently also in inscription. Linguistic interventions, whether conversational or inscribed, are physical interventions that have highly specific physical effects upon other humans. Nevertheless, although Evolutionary Biology and Physical Anthropology are trusted for our understanding of the earliest stages of human colloquy, both philosophers and linguists choose other idioms. Philosophers tend to dwell upon the conventional character of linguistic effects, and concern themselves with the nature of convention and meaning. Linguists have supposed that at some stage of its evolution, language changed in such a way that its story could be (perhaps had to be) continued in a new, structural but non-biological, idiom. Chomsky expressed the hope that formal grammar would eventually illumine colloquy, and others accordingly took the emergence of syntax as the stage at which to swap theoretical idioms. From a biological point of view, what is physically tractable about the conventionality of linguistic significance is this: that the physical significance of a linguistic act itself has a history: it lies within the explanatory mandate of a biological theory to bring that causal history within the purview of general evolutionary principles. (Meaning is given no theoretical role.) Some such general principles characterize the properties of the engendering relation by which the physical effects of present speech evolve epigenetically from ancestral effects of ancestral speech. Functionalization can be taken to reveal specific features of engendering: what it tends to preserve, what it does not, and why. But functionalization is a very particular instance of larger epigenetic evolutionary tendencies of colloquy. A more general understanding is to be had. If that understanding is to be continuous with that of evolutionary biology of language, and fully integrable with biological understanding more generally, the methods of such a direct study of colloquy should be biological, not semantic

Thornburg, Kristin and John Fritzman; “How Analytic Philosophy Resurrects the Metaphysical Hegel” (Marsh 201, 10:00)

Recent developments in analytic philosophy provide the resources to articulate and defend the metaphysical reading of Hegel’s philosophy.

Tiehen, Justin; “Explaining Causal Closure” (Marsh 106, 10:00)

The physical realm is causally closed. But why is it causally closed? That is, what explains causal closure? In this paper I argue that physicalists are committed to accepting one explanation of causal closure to the exclusion of others, and that this has implications for how physicalism is to be defended. In particular, I argue that this commitment poses problems for the causal argument for physicalism.

Uzgalis, William; “‘Did I do that?’ Locke, The Circularity Objection and Q-Memory” (Marsh 214, 2:00)

In this paper I defend Locke’s theory of personal identity against Bishop Butler’s charge that it is circular and Anthony Flew’s related charge that Locke abandons the theory in sec. 13 of II. XXVII. I do so by showing how Sydney Shoemaker’s account of quasi-memory in “Persons and their Pasts” nicely supplements Locke’s theory and illuminates the puzzling features of Locke’s sec. 13 cases. The conclusion is that memory theories of personal identity must include both the possibility of false memory and remembering what other people did to avoid the circularity objection. Memory theorists of personal identity should welcome this result.

Vachapittack, Charles T.; “Negotiating Influences” (Carnegie 205, 9:00)

In order to talk of alternative possibilities one must first show that it is possible to have a glimpse of freedom. The challenge that freedom faces can be summed up in Strawson’s Basic Argument. The basic argument eliminates alternative possibilities due to a regress problem that nothing can be a cause of itself. Compatibilism can be seen as a strong option to breaking away from the basic argument. However, the compatibilist options comes up short, because of the inability to distinguish between first order desires and second order desires in association with our volition. Compatibilism in turn falls to the regress problem put against basic argument. The next move is to turn to libertarianism. By looking at being caused as opposed to being determined and considering how our influence work in us may gives a faint chance for responsibility and could maybe bring back talk of alternative possibility.

Vance, Chad; “Conceivability Is Not a Guide to Metaphysical Possibility” (Carnegie 311, 9:00)

Conceivability is sometimes thought to be a guide to possibility. The sort that conceivability is supposed to map onto is often agreed to be that type of possibility we call metaphysical possibility. Roughly, something is metaphysically possible if it exists in at least one possible world. I believe that the view asserting that conceivability is a guide to this sort of possibility is mistaken. Demonstrating that conceivability does not map onto metaphysical possibility will rely heavily on carefully defining two relevant sorts of possibility—logical and metaphysical—and arguing, contrary to some, that these are actually distinct. I will, in fact, make use of a further distinction between two sub-types of logical possibility—broad and narrow—and argue that conceivability really maps onto what is commonly called broad logical possibility. This will be important in working towards the final goal of this paper, which is to refute that view which says that conceivability is a guide to metaphysical possibility. David Chalmers, the primary advocate of this view, advocates that view for two reasons: The first is that he believes broad logical possibility to be identical to metaphysical possibility. The second is that he does not think what he calls “strong necessities” are conceivable. I will overthrow both of these claims. Thus, my project here is to refute a mis-understanding that has arisen in metaphysics due to vague or incorrect uses of the term possibility; specifically, I will offer a refutation of Chalmers’ view that metaphysical possibility and broad logical possibility are not distinct, and that conceivability is a guide to them.

Villaran, Alonso; “Overcoming the Problems of Heteronomy and Deduction in Kant’s Idea of the Highest Good” (Marsh 106, 3:00)

The purpose of this paper is to identify the criticisms pointed out against Kant’s idea of the highest good in the English-speaking world, particularly in the framework of the so-called “Beck-Silber Controversy,” and to defend it against two of them in particular: those of heteronomy and deduction. In a first movement, I list, name, and explain the criticisms. In a second, I attack the problem of heteronomy. Finally, I show how the highest good can be deduced from the moral law.

von Stein, Alex; “A Survey of Doxastic Voluntarism” (Marsh 214, 9:00)

“Doxastic voluntarism is the position that we have some control over our beliefs or epistemic processes. The problem of doxastic voluntarism is how to reconcile the intuition that we have control as epistemic agents, that we respond to reasons, with our position in a world governed by causal laws. In this paper I examine competing accounts of our capacities to control our beliefs and epistemic processes with the result that only what I call “hybrid voluntarism” correctly accounts for our epistemic capacities.”

Wahl, Russell; “Analysis and Acquaintance” (Marsh 206, 2:00)

Throughout his career, Russell held that analysis was at the heart of philosophy, and he had an account of analysis, illustrated in his paper the “Regressive Method of Discovering the premises of Mathematics” which we can see referred to again in later works, particularly Our Knowledge of the External World and the Analysis of Matter. Analysis works backwards to a set of simple concepts and basic propositions about them from which the whole field of mathematics can be deduced. The analysis yields the logical structure of the discipline. It does not intend to give epistemological foundations to the discipline. Beginning around 1903 Russell introduced his principle of acquaintance with his account of the role of denoting concepts in propositions. This principle appears to constrain analysis in a way foreign to the spirit of his original project and appears to mark an epistemological turn in Russell’s thinking about analysis. This turn appears even more pronounced when Russell proposes, in 1914, his “supreme principle of scientific philosophizing” that “wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities.” I argue that despite the heightened epistemological concerns, Russellian analysis, even as presented in such works as “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” should not be thought of as primarily epistemological.  While the principle of acquaintance demands that the “constituents” of propositions are objects of acquaintance, the entities referred to in the analyzed propositions do not have to be, and are not, objects of acquaintance, nor does analysis yield propositions that are epistemologically foundational.

Walsh, Kate Padgett; “Intersubjective Critical Distance” (Marsh 201, 11:00)

I argue that a Hegelian approach provides resources for an interesting and distinctive account of how we reflect on desires. Hegel argues that any account of how we achieve critical distance must take account of the extent to which we are fundamentally social beings. More specifically, the Hegelian claim is that there is no pre-social identity or self that can be separate out from a socially-constructed context of thought and value. Instead, what is distinctive about this approach is the idea that what when we reflect on desires we make use of shared self-conceptions that are neither universal nor particular to individuals.

Warner, Robert and Ray Jennings; “Knowledge and Understanding” (Marsh LL5, 11:00)

It is argued that the recipe for knowledge has itself become at best a dog’s breakfast, and that knowledge as intellectual goal should be thrown over in favor of improved understanding. Examples are furnished from electrocardiography.

Westacott, Emrys; “Must Good Art be Edifying?” (Marsh 206, 10:00)

In What Good are the Arts? John Carey criticizes the way devotees of so-called high art worship the arts in a quasi-religious manner. This attitude, he argues, encourages contempt for those who are thought to be aesthetically less creative, knowledgeable or appreciative. But the "religion of art" rests on an assumption that Carey himself does not entirely jettison--namely, that the primary value of the arts lies in their capacity to edify and promote social progress. This approach to the arts, which insists that their deepest raison d'être lies in their beneficial moral or political influence, is ubiquitous among critics and theorists, even among those who would claim to be most free from moralizing tendencies. It is never considered enough for a work of art simply to entertain, or be pleasing or beautiful; it must also, if it is to be valued highly, make us more reflective, more critical, more self-aware, more compassionate, and so on. Such a view of the arts underlies the distinction between high art and popular art that Carey effectively critiques; but it also underpins his own claim that literature is superior to the other arts. It pervades academic literary criticism; it is a major reason for the general undervaluation of comedy; it explains the inferior status of crafts vis-à-vis the arts; and it is responsible for the characteristically modern indifference of critics to questions about beauty. But the belief that good art is, or ought to be, edifying should be challenged and in many instances rejected.

Williamson, Diane; “Is ‘the Guise of the Good’ the Achilles Heel of Rationalism?” (Marsh 106, 2:00)

Kieran Setiya’s recent book, Reasons Without Rationalism, offers a criticism of, what he takes to be, Kantian rationalism. His strategy is to go after, what he argues is, rationalism’s reliance on “the guise of the good.” Setiya has the double task of showing that “the guise of the good” is a problem and then showing that rationalism relies on it—that “the guise of the good” is rationalism’s Achilles heel. I argue that Setiya’s discussion of “the guise of the good” is not precise enough: there are different senses of this notion at work in philosophy, and not all of them are objectionable, nor is it accurate that “Kantianism”—Setiya focuses on Korgaard’s theory—requires it. Nevertheless, Setiya’s discussion does get at an important problem with contemporary Kantianism (constructivism in general, not just Korsgaard’s interpretation, although hers might be the most egregious) and a parallel tension within the argument of the Groundwork: its seeming reliance of the philosophy of action. Oddly, Setiya does not reject the philosophy of action’s foundational role in ethics, although he is the perfect position to make this more radical observation. Instead, his positive remarks bear many similarities to Korsgaard’s ethics. My contention is that ethics not only does not need a foundation from action theory, but that such a move is blocked outright, as it is a violation of Hume’s Law.

Wretzel, Joshua; “Concepts and Correspondence in Kant’s Metaphysics of Intentionality” (Marsh 106, 11:00)

In Tales of the Mighty Dead, Robert Brandom attributes to Kant two claims which are central to his historical narrative of the metaphysics of intentionality. First is that semantics subtends correspondence, or that one must first settle the meanings of claims if one is to understand how those claims match up with the world. Second is that Kant dualizes conceptual schemes and empirical contents by opposing the causal order of intuition to the conceptual order of judgment. In this paper, I argue that neither claim is attributable to Kant, from which it follows that we should look elsewhere for a post-Kantian thread on the metaphysics of intentionality. I argue that judgment in its proper use does not reflect upon some raw, ungraspable sense-data, but only upon conceptually articulated experiences. I then show how the proper rendering of Kant’s thought compels an answerability to the rational principles of the subject.

Yaqub, Aladdin; “Divine Unity in al-Ghazali’s Incoherence of the Philosophers” (Marsh 212, 4:00)

The medieval Islamic philosophers held a certain conception of the divine unity that assumes the necessary existent to be both one and simple: there is only one necessary existent and it admits no composition whatsoever. In The Incoherence of the Philosophers al-Gazālī presents, on behalf of the philosophers, several arguments for this conception and his critique of these arguments. In this paper I consider six of these arguments and offer two possible interpretations of them. The first interpretation sees the first argument as employing the simplicity of the necessary existent to establish its oneness and the other five arguments as invoking oneness to establish simplicity. The second interpretation doesn’t offer a new reading for the first argument but sees the other five arguments as defending the simplicity of the necessary existent based on its basic concept. I present reconstructions of three arguments and explain my preference for the second interpretation.

Zamzow, Jennifer; “Advantages of Taking a First Person Perspective When Making Moral Judgments” (Carnegie 205, 12:00)

All of our moral judgments must be made from some perspective or point of view. I can take a first person perspective by maintaining my point of view as the agent, or I can take a third person perspective by imagining that I am judging from the point of view of an independent observer. The prevailing view is that we should adopt a more objective third person perspective to avoid self-bias. I argue that philosophers may have been too quick to dismiss the first person perspective. For empirical evidence suggests that taking a first person point of view might actually help us make better moral judgments by making the effects of our actions on others more salient to us, making us more likely to take into account the particular details of the situation, and motivating us to reason better about the situation.

Zarpentine, Christopher; “Taking Diversity Seriously: Experimental philosophy, synchronic and diachronic approaches to the study of concepts” (Marsh LL5, 2:00)

Experimental philosophy applies the methods of the social sciences to the investigation of folk judgments involving philosophically important concepts. The results have often been quite startling. In this paper, I focus on one aspect of these results: the surprising amount of diversity among folk judgments. I begin by briefly reviewing some of the kinds of diversity revealed by these studies. I then consider two strategies employed by philosophers to demonstrate that the appearance of diversity is misleading or illusory. The first strategy, “thin slicing,” involves distinguishing different concepts expressed by an ambiguous term. The second strategy involves invoking the notion of competence to discount some judgments as performance errors, and thus explains the appearance of diversity as a result of subjects making mistakes. I argue that these strategies, while useful for some purposes, have limits. I distinguish two different approaches to the study of concepts: synchronic and diachronic. I argue that, while these two strategies are often helpful idealizations for synchronic approaches, it is not legitimate to use them to exclude diachronic approaches. The issue of conceptual diversity is best understood from a diachronic approach. Thus, we must be careful not to use these strategies to insulate philosophy from certain kinds of inquiry, in particular, inquiry into conceptual diversity as exemplified by work in experimental philosophy. I conclude by briefly discussing some of the important issues that are raised by taking diversity seriously.