

## Great Britain's Motives in Jammu and Kashmir

The beginning of the Kashmir conflict was a tumultuous experience that defined the terms of the crises in its later years. Struggles in Kashmir have been a long, drawn-out debacle of politics, terrorism, and war. For the past sixty-three years, India and Pakistan have used both peaceful negotiation and war in attempt to control the land known as Jammu and Kashmir, which are the same principality. Problems between the Hindu minority and the Muslim majority in Kashmir dates back to 1846.<sup>1</sup> A Hindu maharaja was on the throne there for one hundred years and maintained horrible conditions for the Muslim majority of Jammu and Kashmir. These issues between the Hindus and the Muslims were a larger problem for British India as a whole, which eventually led to the partition of British India into two countries: India and Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Independence for British India was not an easy achievement and the difficulties of securing Muslim rights led to the creation of Pakistan. Ever since India and Pakistan earned their independence from the United Kingdom in 1947, there has been strife between the two nations.<sup>3</sup> Jammu and Kashmir became a problem because each nation had important reasons for controlling the territory. Great Britain also had its own interests in the Kashmir conflict.

Great Britain had maintained a presence in the region for over 200 years and controlled the area known as British India from 1858-1947;<sup>4</sup> because of this, the Indian subcontinent became vital for Great Britain's economic and foreign policy. Even when India and Pakistan gained their independence, Britain did not want to lose these economic

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<sup>1</sup> Behera, Navnita Chadha, *Demystifying Kashmir*, The Brookings Institution Washington D.C 2006, pg 14

<sup>2</sup> Bose, Sumantra, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, Harvard University Press Cambridge 2003, pg 30.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Dasgupta, C., *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947-1948*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2002, pg. 11

and strategic military advantages. Though India and Pakistan were no longer colonies of Britain, the British continued to manipulate their affairs.

In 1947, the Cold War was just beginning and fear of the Soviet Union spreading communist ideals around the world consumed the foreign policy of Great Britain. Because of this, military bases were needed in Asia to encircle and spy on the eastern regions of the Soviet Union. India and Pakistan are located south of the Soviet Union and close enough that any attack from the British Royal Air Force could reach any target in the USSR. Thus, the Cold War foreign policy of Great Britain depended on maintaining military bases in India and Pakistan even after they had lost political control.<sup>5</sup> India and Pakistan also held vital economic importance to Great Britain, through both resources and trade relations with other nations.

The Middle East's oil was as an important commodity for Great Britain in 1947 as it still is today.<sup>6</sup> Great Britain did not want to lose access to this oil because it was such a vital resource and one of the most important items in their economic policy. They believed if they allowed Pakistan to lose Kashmir, that the Muslims of the world would become furious with Great Britain.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, India could not lose territory either because Great Britain wanted to maintain their primary position in the Commonwealth as a trade partner; Pakistan was also in the Commonwealth. I argue that Great Britain determined that it was in its interest for the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan to be unresolved, and that, from the outset, Great Britain intentionally prolonged the situation there to better serve its political and economic interests.

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, pg 13.

<sup>6</sup> ... pg 16.

<sup>7</sup> ... pg 17.

Archival material found in secondary sources and documents examining the situation from the perspective of the United Nations demonstrate this clearly. Specifically, the archive material includes letters and telegrams between the United Kingdom Cabinet and Prime Minister Clement Atlee. In addition there are secret orders given by India's Governor-General, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and the commander of India and Pakistan's armed forces, Commander Auchinleck, that describe how the British set up their manipulations in Kashmir. In addition, to the British perspective on this conflict, sources from India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan's representative at the United Nations, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, also show how India and Pakistan viewed the British role at the beginning of the dissent.

To understand the British role in this discord, the time covered in this paper is from October 1947, the date when this hostility began, until January 1948, the date of the first important meeting of the UN Security Council over the dissension. The focus here is how Great Britain's Cabinet was able to implement their manipulations on India and Pakistan. These manipulations concentrated on finding a peaceful solution in which neither India nor Pakistan regretted the loss of Kashmir. The idea presented here is a new topic because it is not in support of either India or Pakistan acquiring Kashmir. By examining these motives, people can realize that fighting and terrorism continues today in Kashmir because of British desires at the outset.

When historians discuss the Kashmir dispute, the topic of Great Britain's involvement is not often addressed. Because the struggle is now entering its sixty-third year and many horrible events have occurred, Great Britain's involvement in the beginning has become lost in the historical record. In addition, since the Cold War

encouraged secret diplomacy behind closed doors, the issues of their diplomatic actions were not initially chronicled in texts about Kashmir. A side effect of this is that authors writing about the discord in Kashmir are only now realizing how influential Great Britain was in the beginning. Another common aspect in the historiography is that authors tend to favor the position of either Pakistan or India, because the conflict is on-going.

There has been a lack of information on Great Britain's involvement in the Kashmir hostility in historical works. This is often the case because the topic of diplomacy is not the author's focus, such as Praveen Swami's, *India, Pakistan and The Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947-2004*. This is noticeable in Swami's book because he is concentrating on the covert operations that India and Pakistan unleashed against each other in Kashmir. Swami's work is an example of most books about Kashmir because, as his main argument portrays, there are recent problems to confront and solve, such as terrorism: "In essence, this book presents a new map of Jammu and Kashmir, a re-drawing of events with the jihad and its authors at the centre."<sup>8</sup> In addition to works like Swami's, others usually focus on the entire Kashmir conflict and not just a specific area.

In Sumantra Bose's work *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, the primary focus is on the overall struggle so that a solution to the conflict can be found. Her main argument focuses on achieving a peaceful solution to the hostility: "The Dual purpose of this book is to explain how the Kashmir issue has come to present such a grave threat to South Asia's peace and to global security in the early twenty-first century, and to shed

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<sup>8</sup> Swami, Praveen. *India, Pakistan and The Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947-2004*. Routledge, New York, 2007, pg 3.

light on what can be done about this situation.”<sup>9</sup> This is an interesting idea for a work and Bose hopes to reach a wider audience for her book to inform them of the current situation. Then there are works like Navnita Chadha Behera’s *Demystifying Kashmir* that focuses on the political scheming between India and Pakistan.

Behera’s focus is on the political scheming, which encompassed the entire struggle. Her argument in this work is that the dissension in Kashmir was improperly labeled as a mere territorial dispute, when it is in fact, a deeply rooted problem between Hindus and Muslims. Like most authors who write about the Kashmir dissent, Behera only briefly mentions the influence of Great Britain.<sup>10</sup> Works like these are useful, especially since Behera does not favor India or Pakistan, even though she is a teacher at Delhi University. Fortunately, some authors believed that their works should focus on the beginning of the Kashmir discord and as a result, information towards Great Britain’s involvement was documented.

Authors with non-historical backgrounds have written important material in relation to the Kashmir conflict. One such case is Chandrasekhar Dasgupta’s *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947-1948*. Dasgupta worked in the Indian Foreign Service and was the Indian Ambassador to China (1993-1996) and the European Union (1996-2000). The focus of his work is on India at the beginning of the Kashmir problem and in particular, why it was carried out the way it was in the first year. This book focuses more on India but one of the main arguments of Dasgupta was that Great Britain had a significant effect that first year. *War and Diplomacy* concentrates on the fact that Great

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<sup>9</sup> ... *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, pg 6.

<sup>10</sup> ... *Demystifying Kashmir*, pg 208-217.

Britain had ulterior motives before and during the incident from 1947-1948. He believes that these motives led the issue to last all these years.

The focal point of his arguments was that the Kashmir conflict could have ended within the first year, in India's favor, if Great Britain had not interfered. Dasgupta's point is that Great Britain remained in charge of both India and Pakistan's armies. From there, he speaks about Great Britain's economic interest of keeping Pakistan a nation because it allowed good relations with the rest of the Muslim world. As Admiral Cunningham, a prominent leader in Britain's navy, explains: "if Pakistan's application were rejected it would shatter Britain's relations with the 'whole Moslem world' to the detriment of her strategic position in the Middle East and North Africa."<sup>11</sup> This theory of British Imperial interests was present in India too as Dasgupta reveals: "For two centuries, the Indian Empire was both the object and the instrument of British strategy in the Indian Ocean."<sup>12</sup> Facts such as these allow Dasgupta's argument of British interfering in the conflict to draw it out in order to keep both its interests intact to be quite convincing. While Dasgupta sees the involvement of the United Nations as a delaying tactic used by the British, Mark Mazower maintains that Britain was in fact supporting the ideals of the United Nations alongside their interests in his book, *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*.

Mazower does not concentrate on the British in this piece, but on the origins of the United Nations. It was not meant to be a utopian answer to the problems of the world, but a tool to maintain the interests of the world's superpowers. In this book, Mazower tries to confront the two most common ideas about the origins of the United Nations:

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<sup>11</sup> Dasgupta, C., *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947-1948*. Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2002, pg. 16.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, pg 11.

“one is that the United Nations rose—like Aphrodite—from the Second World War, pure and uncontaminated by any significant association with that prewar failure, the League of Nations. And second, that it was, above all, an American affair, the product of public debate and private discussion in which other countries played little part.”<sup>13</sup> Though he does digress, Britain was in fact a major player in the creation of the United Nation and this was because it was a part of the Big Three: Great Britain, the USSR, and the USA.<sup>14</sup> With this information, Mazower tries to show that the UN was not created originally to solve all of the problems in the world but in fact to help the more powerful nations, such as Great Britain, to maintain their interests in the world. Then there are authors like D.N. Panagrahi who look at the influences of the Cold War on the Kashmir conflict.

D.N. Panagrahi’s *Jammu and Kashmir: The Cold War and the West*, is a unique and recent work because it concentrates on the influences of Great Britain and the United States on the Kashmir conflict. In addition, Panagrahi focuses on the beginning years to see how Great Britain orchestrated India’s failure in obtaining Kashmir. Unfortunately, this work is completely in favor of India, so information about the issue makes India look like the victim of Great Britain and the United States’ indirect interventions: “The western powers looked at the Kashmir problem as an Indian creation and wished to see that it was either amalgamated with Pakistan or made an independent state.”<sup>15</sup> This bias towards India is understandable because D.N. Panagrahi is a modern India specialist and works for the University of Delhi; nevertheless, his work is still valuable toward understanding the Kashmir dispute.

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<sup>13</sup> Mazower, Mark. *No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the Ideological Origins of the United Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, pg. 14.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, pg 16.

<sup>15</sup> Panagrahi, D.N., *Jammu and Kashmir: The Cold War and the West*, Routledge, New Delhi 2009, pg 10.

Dasgupta and Panagrahi share the common ideal that Great Britain was more deeply involved in the politics of India, Pakistan, and, subsequently, Kashmir. Their focuses are different in that Dasgupta believes Great Britain allowed the Kashmir issue to escalate out of fear of either India or Pakistan losing, but he still supported the idea of India being the victor in the issue. Panagrahi believed that Great Britain and America were trying to subvert India and support Pakistan. Mazower focuses on how the United Nations was created in order to serve the interests of more powerful nations. Then there were authors like Behera, Bose, and Swami, representatives of how most historians and scholars write about the Kashmir discord. Their topics of terrorism, the threat to peace, and the political difficulties between India and Pakistan have become popular studies involving the Kashmir conflict. Out of all these arguments and topics, Dasgupta's is the most sound, and the bias in his work is not as apparent as Panagrahi's. However, I contend that this is not about whether Great Britain supported India or Pakistan, but rather that no victory suited British interests better, and that is what they set out to accomplish with great success.

The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir between its Hindu and Muslim population began with the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846.<sup>16</sup> The British sold Kashmir to a Hindu chieftain who took control from the rulers of the region, members of the Sikh religion. The chieftain's name was Gulab Singh, he was the grandfather of Maharaja Hari Singh, and he received an amazing deal from Great Britain. As the representative of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan explains about this acquisition of Kashmir by Gulab Singh: "He was sold the entire Kashmir Valley for a paltry sum of 7.5 million Rupees

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<sup>16</sup> ... *Demystifying Kashmir*, pg 14.



(about \$2,250,000).”<sup>17</sup> With this purchase, the Dogra dynasty became the rulers of Jammu and Kashmir. Atrocities against the Muslims of Kashmir sanctioned by their new Hindu masters soon followed.

In 1846, the majority of the population of Kashmir was Muslim and their Hindu maharajas treated them poorly. According to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan’s account, titled the *Story of Kashmir*, the Dogra maharajas burdened their Muslim citizens with heavy taxes. Anything and everything was taxable in order to finance the ambitions and desires of the maharajas: “No product was too insignificant, no person too poor, to be taxed to defray the ever-increasing expenses of the spendthrift Maharajah and his court.”<sup>18</sup> In addition, we can find in the words of Sheik Abdullah, the hero of the common folk in Kashmir, a true picture of the horrors for the Muslim people: “What is not fully known is the depths of misery to which they have been reduced by a century of unmitigated tyranny and oppression under Dogra rule... Death often provides release from the unbroken chain of suffering, misery and privation, which begins in the cradle and ends only in the grave.”<sup>19</sup> This malpractice towards the Muslims by Hindus did not emanate from the Dogra dynasty itself but from deeper religious and social differences.

Hinduism and Islam are religions with distinct societal practices. British India has always had a small Muslim population compared to its number of Hindus. In addition, British India did not comprise the entire subcontinent; they only controlled 75% of the total population directly while 25% of it remained under the rule of local princes in what

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<sup>17</sup> United Nations Security Council Commission for India and Pakistan, *The Story of Kashmir*. New York, February 1, 1951, pg 2.

<sup>18</sup> ...*Story of Kashmir* pg 2.

<sup>19</sup> Khan, Muhammad Zafrullah, Sir, *The Kashmir Dispute*, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs Karachi, November 1950, pg 5.

were known as the Indian States.<sup>20</sup> A rough estimate for British India's population was that there was about a three to one ratio of non-Muslims to Muslims. According to Sir Zafrullah Khan's speech before the Security Council on January 16 and 17 1948: "The two main blocs-the Moslems and the non Moslems-have, in most spheres of life, kept apart all through. The one outstanding cause is that the bulk of Hindu society is based upon the principles of caste and touchability."<sup>21</sup> Muslims did not approve of Hinduism because it was a polytheistic religion. Islam is monotheistic. Hinduism believes in a trinity of gods that represent the creation, middle, and the destruction of the universe; Islam believes that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet. This difference in culture leads Hindus to treat Muslims like second-class citizens. This became a problem when determining the independence of British India.

To understand the Kashmir conflict, it is necessary to explain how British India gained its independence. India, Pakistan (Bangladesh later gains independence from Pakistan) used to be part of the British colonial province known as British India. British officials were in charge of important economic and government positions in British India by rule of a Viceroy. Pakistan was not an official state of British India and its creation is a result of the discord among the prominent indigenous figures of British India and their inability to come to a compromise.<sup>22</sup> Prominent Hindu figures included Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister; Sardar Patel, Nehru's right-hand man; and Mahatma Gandhi, the Indian philosopher of peace.<sup>23</sup> For the Muslims, such prominent figures were

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<sup>20</sup> ... *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, pg 14.

<sup>21</sup> Khan, Muhammad Zafrullah, Sir, *India-Pakistan Dispute on Kashmir: Extracts from the speech delivered by Sir Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, K.C.S.I., Kt., Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, Before The Security Council of the United Nations Organization On January 16 and 17, 1948*, pg 1.

<sup>22</sup> ... *Demystifying Kashmir*, pg 5.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid*, pg 8.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League; and Liaquat Ali Khan, Jinnah's right hand man and Pakistan's first Prime Minister.<sup>24</sup> Equal representation was the issue that eventually split British India apart. Jinnah and Ali Khan wanted to have equal representation in both the government and society of British India between the Hindus and Muslims of India; Nehru and his followers, members of the India National Congress, did not allow this.<sup>25</sup> These political debates and issues were prominent throughout the early 20th century and it did not approach a conclusion until Lord Louis Mountbatten, Earl of Burma and the last Viceroy of India, arrived.

Lord Mountbatten was the last Viceroy of India and his rule began in March 1947. He was charged with managing a smooth transition of British India towards independence. He concluded it was necessary to partition British India into two states, India and Pakistan, and allowed the 600 or so scattered princely states to decide which nation they wanted to join; Kashmir was no exception. Mountbatten helped India and Pakistan to gain their independence on August 14 (Pakistan) and August 15 (India) 1947. He had only been viceroy for five months.<sup>26</sup> India allowed Mountbatten to serve as Governor-General of India to help them create order amid the chaos of partition.<sup>27</sup> Maharaja Hari Singh asked Mountbatten for help in order to have Kashmir not fall into chaos and to protect him from whichever nation he did not join: "He also assured him on behalf of the government of India that if the Maharaja decided to accede to Pakistan, India would not regard it as an unfriendly act."<sup>28</sup> By allowing this, Mountbatten tried to

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<sup>24</sup> Wolpert, Stanley A. *Shameful flight: the Last Years of the British Empire in India*. Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

<sup>25</sup> ...*Demystifying Kashmir*, pg 6.

<sup>26</sup> ... *War and Diplomacy*, pg 15.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, pg 21.

<sup>28</sup> Lord Birdwood, *Kashmir*. *International Affairs* Vol. 28, No. 3 (Jul. 1952), pp 301.

create order in the chaos of partition.

Partition effected both India and Pakistan greatly, leading to approximately one million deaths and the largest mass migration in human history.<sup>29</sup> Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs had to flee across the newly created borders to avoid being in the wrong country. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, a British barrister, created the Boundary Commission that determined where, exactly, Pakistan would be. The boundaries split in half the Punjab region and the Bengal region (modern day Bangladesh), a fact which was not known to the public until a day after independence.<sup>30</sup> The UK Cabinet knew that chaos would ensue over these boundaries no matter where they drew the line and realized that the Radcliffe Boundary commission was the fastest way to secure independence for India and Pakistan.<sup>31</sup> This caused people who had lived in their homes for generations to make a mad scramble to avoid communal violence. There was on-going violence in the months before in fear and ignorance of where the boundary line would be. Millions of Muslims had to flee into East and West Pakistan while millions of Hindus from these areas fled into India.<sup>32</sup> As they fled, gangs of the opposite religion attacked both Hindus and Muslims; no one was safe. Hindus were killing Muslims, Muslims were killing Hindus, and riots and communal violence were occurring all over India and Pakistan. This violence was widespread and created chaos for the new governments, that were trying to unite their countries and maintain order in the first years of independence. After each country became independent, they still only consisted up to half of what comprises India and Pakistan today. They had to deal with the princely states that remained.

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<sup>29</sup> Collins, Larry and Dominique Lapierre: *Freedom at Midnight*. London: Collins, 1975.

<sup>30</sup> Radcliffe, Cyril, Sir, *The Awards of the Boundary Commissions*. British Library Archives, Pol. 10934; 1947.

<sup>31</sup> ... *Shameful Flight*.

<sup>32</sup> ... *Freedom at Midnight*.

Many of the princely states were in the middle of India and each of them had their own maharaja and government. In order to try to maintain a peaceful transition of power, Britain allowed the governments and citizens of each princely state to vote on which nation they would join. Most of the princely states based these decisions on whether the population was Hindu or Muslim. Historian Alice Thorner, describes in her article, “The Issues in Kashmir,” how the princely states choose to join either India or Pakistan: “The Act of Parliament of July 1947, which partitioned the eleven provinces of British India into two nations, provided that each of the 600-odd feudatory princes (who together ruled over nearly one-half the country) might accede to one or the other or to neither.”<sup>33</sup> Each of the princely states also received advice from Lord Mountbatten in relation to joining India or Pakistan. He advised them to take into account the economic, geographical, and population statistics when deciding which country to join.<sup>34</sup>

Kashmir was one of the most glorious and important of the princely kingdoms in the British India area. It is located in the northernmost area of British India and shares borders with Afghanistan, China, India, and Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan desired to control this kingdom. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Prime Minister was especially fond of Kashmir, as he states here in one of his writings: “My love of the mountains and my kinship with Kashmir especially drew me to them, and I saw there not only the life and vigour and beauty of the present but also the memoried loveliness of ages past.”<sup>35</sup> In order for either India or Pakistan to obtain Kashmir, they would have to convince maharaja Hari Singh to join them.

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<sup>33</sup> Alice Thorner, “The Issues in Kashmir”, *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 15 (Aug. 11, 1948), pp. 173.

<sup>34</sup> ...*Story of Kashmir* pg 6.

<sup>35</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, writing in 1946. [Guha, Ramachandra, *India after Gandhi: The History of The World’s Largest Democracy*, HarperCollins Publishers 2007, pg 75.]

Hari Singh, like his Dogra ancestors, was Hindu and this led to problems in his kingdom of Kashmir where Islam was the dominant religion. The Muslims outnumbered the Hindus in Kashmir by a ratio of three to one. According to the 1941 census report in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the total population was 4,021,616 people. Of this population, 3,101,247 or 77.11% were Muslim and 920,369 people or 22.89% were non-Muslim.<sup>36</sup> Therefore, when Pakistan gained independence and became a home for the Muslims of British India, Kashmir's Muslims wanted to join as well. However, their maharaja was Hindu and because he was in control of Jammu and Kashmir, he did not follow the will of his people.

Hari Singh brought in gangs of Hindus and Sikhs from East Punjab and he launched a reign of terror against anyone who did not approve of his rule in August 1947. One account written by a special correspondent of *The Times* wrote that 237,000 Muslims were exterminated in the state of Jammu by troops headed by Hari Singh himself.<sup>37</sup> Because of this terror wrought upon them, some of the Muslim citizens of Jammu and Kashmir revolted and formed the *Azad* (Free) Kashmir Movement.<sup>38</sup> They tried to wrestle control from the maharaja in order to join Pakistan. Economic concerns were a priority of the Azad Kashmir movement because they knew that Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan were interdependent in economic matters. This is just one reason why Pakistan needed the Jammu and Kashmir state to join them.

Jammu and Kashmir, especially in the Kashmir valley, is a fertile land with good forests, fields, and other useful exports. The wools and clothing are a valuable

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<sup>36</sup> ...*Story of Kashmir* pg 30.

<sup>37</sup> Khan, Muhammad Zafrullah, Sir, *Kashmir Question: Extracts from sir Zafrullah Khan's speech before the Security Council, February 1950*, pg 15.

<sup>38</sup> ... *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace*, pg 2.

commodity for the Kashmiri to sell; timber is also an important export between Kashmir and Pakistan. As Sir Zafrullah Khan stated: “The timber is cut down in the mountains. It is dragged down to the rivers and streams and floated down the streams and rivers into Pakistan... There was no other means; there is no other means of conveying that timber out of Kashmir.”<sup>39</sup> Western Pakistan [modern day Pakistan] was the top consumer of Kashmiri exports. Karachi, Pakistan’s main port city, was the natural and closest outlet for Kashmir to access the international market.<sup>40</sup> Pakistan has relied on having access to Kashmiri timber, fruit, and wool to help fuel their economy, especially when they were part of British India. Trade with other parts of India existed as well but the people from the area that became Pakistan were historical trade partners.

Further, Pakistan’s geography and people relied on the safety and well-being of the Jammu and Kashmir state. According to the UNCIP (United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan): “West Pakistan’s three main rivers, the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab, flow from Kashmir into Pakistan. If Kashmir continued to be occupied by India, nineteen million acres of land irrigated by these rivers would be in danger of having their water supply cut off.”<sup>41</sup> Violence and animosity were common between India and Pakistan, so this fear had validity. Militarily, if India gained control of Kashmir, they would be able to have two strategic fronts against Pakistan.<sup>42</sup> Refugees that fled the terror of partition into Pakistan were also a problem and if three million more people had to come into their nation, Pakistan would not be able to support them all. Meanwhile, India, harbored hopes that internal domestic and economic problems would cause Pakistan to

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<sup>39</sup> ...*Kashmir Question*, pg 11.

<sup>40</sup> ...*Story of Kashmir* pg 5.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> ... *Demystifying Kashmir*, pg 22.

want to rejoin India.

India controlled more land and more technological advances, such as railways and roads that the British had left behind; this lessened Kashmir's economic need for India. It seems that the Indian government desired to control Jammu and Kashmir to be able control valuable economic and strategic asset of Pakistan.<sup>43</sup> Because of the chaotic transition to independence, India was being flooded with Hindu and Sikh refugees, but they had more land and a better economy to aid them with this. Their main goal was to stop the destruction and violence that partition created for the entire subcontinent. Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan presents Pakistan's point of view on why India wanted Kashmir: "India is under no necessity or compulsion to require or to need the accession of Kashmir to itself. India has merely entered upon a gamble. If it succeeds in that gamble, it can crush and break Pakistan—and that is the object of that gamble."<sup>44</sup> Thus, while both countries desired Kashmir, it was essential to Pakistan. Pakistan's hope was that the Azad Kashmir Movement would succeed and allow Kashmiris the right to vote over which nation they joined.

By allowing the princely states to choose which country to join, the majority of the states entered into India or Pakistan without bloodshed. Unfortunately, Kashmir would not have so much luck in this venture of politics because Hari Singh went against the will of his Muslim citizens and opted to join India: "the Premier of Pakistan denied all accusations and warned Kashmir against joining India. On the following day large armed bands crossed the Pakistan-Kashmir border and overpowered the state forces in the

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<sup>43</sup> ... *Demystifying Kashmir*, pg 23.

<sup>44</sup> ... *Kashmir Question*, pg 13.



frontier town of Muzaffarabad.”<sup>45</sup> India technically has Jammu and Kashmir as its northwest state. In retaliation to the rebels, India invaded Jammu and Kashmir to deal with the problem.

Raiders and tribesman coming from Pakistan and the Northwestern provinces invaded Kashmir in an attempt to change the maharaja’s mind by force. V. P. Menon, secretary for Sardar Patel, observed that Pakistan planned this from the beginning “to let loose a tribal invasion through the north-west. Srinagar today, Delhi tomorrow. A nation that forgets its history or geography does so at its peril.”<sup>46</sup> Hari Singh used the Indian troops and gangs to murder civilian Muslims. In response, Pakistan sent its army to counterattack and stop the slaughtering of Kashmiri Muslims. The facts are inconsistent here because India and Pakistan believe that the conflict started on different days. India claims the struggle started when the tribesmen invaded on October 22, 1947 while Pakistan, as stated by Sir Zafrullah Khan, “Pakistan, on the other hand, maintains that a vigorous freedom movement had already started within the State and had made considerable progress before the tribal incursion took place.”<sup>47</sup> This is how the controversy and strife would become one of the first prominent international issues for the new United Nations.

Both India and Pakistan sought the help of the United Nations to settle the conflict in Kashmir and to act as a mediator in the ensuing events. Lord Mountbatten was able to convince Prime Minister Nehru to send this issue to the UN and on November 2, 1947, Nehru announced this intention in a radio broadcast to India:

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<sup>45</sup> ... “Issues in Kashmir”, pp. 176.

<sup>46</sup> Menon, *The Story of the Integration of the Indian States*, p. 394.

<sup>47</sup> ...*Kashmir Question*, pg 14.

We on our part have no intention of using our troops in Kashmir when the danger of invasion has passed. We have declared that the fate of the people is ultimately to be decided by the people.... We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations<sup>48</sup>

The issue was first discussed in 1948, following complaints that tribesmen and others, with Pakistan's support, were invading Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan denied the charges and declared Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India, which had occurred in 1947, illegal.<sup>49</sup> This is how the Security Council first learned of the issue, which became an opportunity for them to show how peaceful negotiation and mediation can solve a violent issue. No major international event had yet occurred to give the recently established Security Council opportunity to demonstrate its *raison d'être*.

The Security Council first held hearings on the issues in January 1948 when they allowed India and Pakistan to send their representatives to speak their case.<sup>50</sup> Throughout the coming year, the Security Council met and decided on what to do about the Kashmir struggle. The council established a UN Commission for India and Pakistan. This commission proposed a ceasefire, troop withdrawals, and a plebiscite to decide the issue.<sup>51</sup> India and Pakistan accepted but they were not able to agree on how the plebiscite should take place. This all occurred during 1948, either through meetings in Paris, the headquarters of the Security Council at the time; New Delhi, the capital of India; or Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. All of these events help set the stage to understand the beginning of the conflict and provides a good backdrop to Great Britain's motives in

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<sup>48</sup> *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 1, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1958, pp. 160-61.

<sup>49</sup> Department of Public Information, *The United Nations Today*. United Nations, New York, 2008.

<sup>50</sup> ... *Demystifying Kashmir*, pg 210.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, pg 211.

Kashmir.

From October 23 through October 26, 1947, India refused to save Kashmir from the tribesmen. Before the tribal invasion, Maharaja Hari Singh did not want to join either India or Pakistan because he held a naïve idea of an independent Kashmir, which he controlled. As Sheikh Abdullah explains in his autobiography, *Flames of the Chinar*: “If he [the Maharaja] did not accede to Pakistan, he would have to agree to joining India.... The Maharaja in a bid to escape a decision, avoided Mountbatten, since he still nourished hope of an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir.”<sup>52</sup> Of course, once the tribesman invaded, he begged India for help. These three days were vital because the British government caused the situation in Kashmir to turn from a skirmish into a full-blown conflict by convincing India to respond to the invasion.

Great Britain had leaders in both the militaries of India and Pakistan. Even though India and Pakistan had gained their independence from Great Britain earlier that year, Britain was able to keep their upper military personnel in each country. According to Sir Francis Tucker, Lieutenant General to all officers and men of the Indian Army in Eastern Command, the British were to remain in command of India and Pakistan’s armies until a certain date: “The 1<sup>st</sup> April 1948, the date originally laid down in the Joint Defence Council order of 11<sup>th</sup> August 1947, under which the Supreme Commander’s H.Q. was constituted.”<sup>53</sup> This meant that the British were walking a delicate tight rope because they did not want to lose the support of countries who happened to desire the defeat of each

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<sup>52</sup> Abdullah, Sheikh, *Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography*, 1993, pg 89 [...*The Cold War and the West* pg 53.]

<sup>53</sup> Tucker, Sir Francis, *India’s Partition and Human Debasement*, Vol. II, Akashdeep Publishing House Delhi 1988, pg 500.

other. At the same time, they also wanted to have each nation join their Commonwealth for economic reasons.

Great Britain hoped to have India join their Commonwealth in order to maintain some military presence and trade. Britain was able to get Pakistan to join their Commonwealth and India seemed likely to join. To be on the safe side, Lord Mountbatten was advised by Prime Minister Atlee to make sure India became a member: “You will point out the need for continued collaboration in the security of the Indian Ocean for which provision might be made in an agreement between the two countries. At a suitable date, His Majesty’s Government would be ready to send military and other experts to India to assist in discussing the terms of such an agreement.”<sup>54</sup> Because of this, India and Pakistan were poised to be significant trade partners with Great Britain while they would also be good locations for the British military; there was a problem though. Britain wanted India as a member of the Commonwealth and wanted to keep a military presence there. The problem was that India wanted to get rid of the British officers from their military and they would not join the Commonwealth if this did not occur.

India’s National Congress wanted their country completely independent from Great Britain, while Pakistan desired to have British officers. This reason for complete independence was viable for India because even with the chaos of partition; India had enough economic and military resources to survive on their own. This had the United Kingdom Cabinet at Whitehall worried because it would wreak havoc with Great Britain’s military strategies:

If the [Indian] demand for withdrawal were extended to include all British personal including those in the service of the Indian government, the

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<sup>54</sup> ...*Transfer of Power Vol. VIII*, Atlee to Mountbatten, 18 March 1947, item 543[...*War and Diplomacy*, pg 14.]

fulfillment of any of our strategic requirements would be improbable. It is in our view essential that the Indian Government should be persuaded to accept the assistance of the necessary number of British personnel.<sup>55</sup>

India did allow Britain to keep their officers in command of India's army. Pakistan on the other hand needed the help of Great Britain because they had little economic or military resources. Because of this, both India and Pakistan were concerned about who Britain would support in the escalating discord over Kashmir. Thankfully, the British government had created a contingency plan in case a situation like the Kashmir conflict occurred.

The United Kingdom Cabinet had understood that in order to keep India and Pakistan happy and allow British interests to remain in effect that neither side could receive total support. On paper, it would be easy to maintain this facade of alliance with nations that hate each other, so long as neither went to war against the other. In case a war happened between India and Pakistan, the supreme leader of all the British officers in India, Field Marshall Auchinleck, sent a secret message to all Senior British Commanders in the Indian and Pakistani armed forces on September 28, 1947:

On receipt of the Code Word 'STAND DOWN' the following order will be immediately put into force: Owing to the immediate risk/outbreak of open-conflict between the armed forces of India and Pakistan, all British officers and other ranks HOWEVER employed and of WHATEVER rank shall cease forthwith to take any further part in the command or administration of the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan. You will take immediate actions to this effect, and nothing is to be allowed to impede it.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Wavell to Pethick, 13 July 1946, forwarding paper No. C-in-C. Sectt./37/82 prepared by the Chiefs of Staff (India) Committee. Mansergh, N., Lumby, E.W.R. and Moon, E.P. (eds), *The Transfer of Power, 1942-47, 1970-1983*, Vol. VIII, item 254, London: HMSO.

<sup>56</sup> Cited in Noel-Baker's minute to Attlee, 20 August 1948. File PREM 8/800, Public Records Office, London. [...*War and Diplomacy* pg 26.]

Because of this, Britain did not openly help either India or Pakistan but likewise, they could not let one defeat the other either.

When other historians like Bose and Panagrahi write about the Kashmir conflict, Great Britain's secret manipulations and motives in 1947-48 are usually just a side note in the greater picture. This is because this has been an issue for India and Pakistan for the past sixty-three years and has become an integral part of their society. Historians who write on the topic of Kashmir usually are either Indian or Pakistani and thus create a bias in constructing an argument to support one nation over the other. They mention Great Britain in relation to their nations gaining independence and their motives are mentioned briefly at best. By focusing on the secret motives of the UK Cabinet in 1947-48, people can begin to understand how this problem in Kashmir grew into the stalemate it is today. To understand how Prime Minister Atlee and the UK Cabinet tried to achieve their motives, one must understand the complicated military, diplomatic, and economic situations that faced Great Britain in both the Indian subcontinent and the international stage.

The Partition of India was at its height at the beginning of the Kashmir strife. This meant that Great Britain had to deal with the legacy of them leaving India and Pakistan in a state of chaos and terror. Religious hatred was raging across the countryside as the extermination of Indian and Pakistani citizens occurred. Even the members of the military wanted the extermination of citizens opposed to their religion. Sir Francis Tucker explained in his memoirs that Hindu officers in Eastern India wanted to exterminate the Muslim population: "Some pointed to the United Provinces and insisted that such large pockets of Muslims as Aligarh could not be allowed to exist right inside a Hindu

population. They argued that they must be eliminated in order that they should not, when war came, rise in rebellion in aid of the Muslim power to the north.”<sup>57</sup> Hindu officers in Kashmir felt the same. Opinions of Hindu officers towards Muslims led Sir Francis Tucker to write this statement in his memoirs: “With the extermination and eviction of Muslims, killing far and wide over the countryside decreased.”<sup>58</sup> Partition, though, was not a black and white affair, Hindus were dying too and Great Britain knew that these issues would cause problems in Kashmir.

Kashmir’s invasion by the northwestern tribes was the catalyst for the conflict and the basis for how Great Britain’s true motives were revealed. Prime Minister Atlee was afraid of the whole situation blowing out of proportion and in this response to Nehru; Atlee explains how he hoped for peace and not hostility in Kashmir: “The immediate and grave problem... [is] to prevent Kashmir becoming the cause of a break between the dominions themselves. This cannot be a matter of concern to me and my Government.”<sup>59</sup> British officers did not condone the use of tribesmen against Kashmir but they allowed Pakistan to try to acquire that region because it was so close to West Pakistan. Most of the other princely states had joined the nation that was geographically close to them. Kashmir was the only instance in which this did not occur. The barbarous actions of the tribesman without intervention reveals that Great Britain was willing to allow anything to maintain the status quo, even actions like those described in this lucid narration from Mir Qasim, the future Prime Minister of Kashmir in 1971:

Blood-thirsty invaders swarmed the state killing and raping without discrimination between Hindus and Muslims.... The invasion and the humiliation his army suffered at the hands of the invaders unnerved him

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<sup>57</sup> ... Tucker, pg 497.

<sup>58</sup> ... Tucker, pg 496.

<sup>59</sup> Atlee to Nehru, 29/30 October 1947, File L/P&S/1845b, India Office Records, London.

[the Maharaja]... To confound this holocaust, communal riots started in Jammu even as Pakistan imposed a total blockade on Kashmir starving it of essential commodities... luxuries like salt.<sup>60</sup>

Violence such as this was occurring everywhere but this was Pakistan's first attempt at using force to try to take a princely state. Kashmir's dissent was not an original situation for India and Pakistan in acquiring a princely state; there was the problem in the state of Junagadh.

The princely state of Junagadh would be the first major crisis for Great Britain in trying to keep India and Pakistan from fighting. It would also be the first test of the Stand Down orders. In Junagadh, the situation mirrored Kashmir in the sense that the Maharaja was of a different religion than his subjects; in this case, the ruler was Muslim and the subjects were Hindu.<sup>61</sup> What makes Junagadh's case different from Kashmir is that the princely state was inside India's territory, in what is today the Gujarat district. Pakistan was comprised of territory that had populations with Muslims as the religious majority. Other princely states allowed a vote amongst their citizens on either to join India or Pakistan, Junagadh was not allowed one initially. India, like Pakistan with Kashmir, was worried that if Junagadh ceded to Pakistan, chaos would grow within their country. This fear was justified because the ruler of Junagadh would try to join Pakistan.

The prince of Junagadh, just like Hari Singh in Kashmir, hoped that the religious views of the elites, including himself, in his principality would determine which nation they joined. He personally wanted to join Pakistan but this would encroach on the Boundary Commission, which had created India and Pakistan's current borders. Negotiations would begin between India and Pakistan over who had the right to acquire

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<sup>60</sup> Qasim, Mir, *My Life and Times*, 25 February 1975, pg 37. [...*The Cold War and the West* pg 54.]

<sup>61</sup> ... *War and Diplomacy*.



Junagadh. These negotiations were almost a sham because India already had Junagadh surrounded geographically. India's appointed Director of the Provisional Government of Junagadh, Mr. Samaldas Gandhi, explains about the citizen's choice of which nation to join: "If the Muslims vote for Pakistan, we will know who are not loyal to the Union. We cannot keep the serpents and scorpions alive moving under our own pillows. We must put them to death. We will see who votes for Pakistan."<sup>62</sup> India grew tired of the negotiations and decided to invade;<sup>63</sup> Lord Mountbatten and the UK Cabinet feared this.

Lord Mountbatten remained in India as Governor-General to help the new government get on its feet and had to maintain India's interests to the best of his abilities. The Junagadh crisis would test Mountbatten's responsibilities because India wanted to provoke an armed conflict. Britain could not allow this to happen because they did not want a war between India and Pakistan. As a result, of this conflict, Lord Mountbatten asked the Cabinet what to do; he explained what he did in detail to his cousin, King George VI of England:

My chief concern was to prevent the Government of India from committing itself on the Junagadh issue to an act of war against what was now Pakistan territory. My own position was singularly difficult.... For the Governor-General of a Dominion to have acquiesced in action which might lead to a war with another Dominion would have been completely unprecedented.

But at the same time I was aware that my own physical presence as Governor-General of India was the best insurance against an actual war with Pakistan. To have compromised my position too far over the preliminary threat of war would have undermined my final position.<sup>64</sup>

Lord Mountbatten could not stop India from sending in its troops, which were described as a "police force," but he was able to avert a war between India and Pakistan. This was

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<sup>62</sup> ...*Story of Kashmir*, Mr. Samaldas Gandhi, pg 9.

<sup>63</sup> ... *War and Diplomacy*.

<sup>64</sup> Hodson, H.V. *The Great Divide*, Hutchinson of London, 1969, pg 436. [...*War and Diplomacy* pg. 22.]

because Pakistan was not geographically connected with the Junagadh province. Because of the way Junagadh was resolved, the British hoped Kashmir might unfold the same way, but this was not meant to be. Kashmir did share borders with India and Pakistan and was right next to Afghanistan, which was neighbor to the world superpower, the Soviet Union.

A new approach on the Kashmir discord is focusing on the years 1947-48 when the Cold War was beginning and understanding how this could affect Britain to create a stalemate in the Indian Subcontinent. By introducing the diplomatic fears that the UK Cabinet held toward the influence of the Soviet Union spreading in India and Pakistan in 1947-48, people can further understand just how delicate the Kashmir situation was in the international scheme of things. In 1947-48, Britain realized that neither India nor Pakistan could be the victor because the loser could succumb to the influences of the Soviet Union. When the Kashmir topic is chronicled in the annals of history, historians will mention that this problem was affected by the Cold War, but except for Dasgupta and Panagrahi, they do not cover it extensively. Both are trying to prove that Britain wanted to hinder India because of diplomatic issues. In addition, Panagrahi concentrates on the alliance of Great Britain and the United States and examines the entire conflict, while Dasgupta examines the conflict in 1947-48 and focuses on proving India's claim to Kashmir. Fear of the specter, the Soviet Union, in 1947-48 heavily influenced Britain's actions involving Kashmir.

Great Britain, like other major Western Powers in 1947, was afraid of the Soviet Union spreading its influence to other countries in the world. This fear was viable because the USSR was one of the superpowers at the time and other nations in political turmoil were seeking ways to improve themselves; communism was one such proposition.

India and Pakistan were in turmoil because of their recent independence and partition and if war was to occur, their citizens and governments might start viewing communism as an option. The other fear, specifically for India, was if the Soviet Union got control of that region of the world. As the service chief of Britain's military informed the government: "If India was dominated by Russia with powerful air forces it is likely that we should have to abandon our command of the Persian Gulf and the Northern Indian Ocean routes."<sup>65</sup> India was a valuable military and naval location for Great Britain. Pakistan was also important because they were next to Afghanistan and that left Pakistan vulnerable to invasion. However, what worried the British the most concerning the Soviet Union's view towards India was Nehru's non-aligned policy towards all foreign nations.

India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, held a political philosophy of being non-aligned and this philosophy alarmed Great Britain in regards to the Cold War.<sup>66</sup> Nehru's political goal was to have India become a great independent nation and was willing to accept any help to accomplish this goal, so long as India was in control of all its institutions. He hoped for complete independence from Western foreigners, whom he considered imperialists. This political philosophy towards the USSR and China as Nehru described to John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's Secretary of State in 1953, would give Great Britain reason to think India may fall to communists: "Our minds were largely taken up by this building up of a new India and we were reluctant to get entangled in external matters. Hence our basic desire for peace, which of course arose from our whole outlook. Hence also our wish not to be tied with any other country and to retain

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<sup>65</sup> ...*Transfer to Power*, item 26. [...*War and Diplomacy*, pg 13.]

<sup>66</sup> ... *The Cold War and the West*.

our independence of action.”<sup>67</sup> Even though Nehru stated India had no wish to become a communist nation, their non-aligned policy greatly agitated Great Britain and the other Western powers. This fear of the Soviet Union would continue to cause problems for Kashmir when both India and Pakistan tried to settle the conflict peacefully and asked the United Nations for help.

Great Britain’s fear of India succumbing to the influence of communism caused the Kashmir dispute to continue for many more years. Great Britain could not afford India to lose Kashmir in fear that they might create an alliance with the Soviet Union. This fear consumed the politicians of Great Britain so much that they ruined the best chance of a peaceful solution to the problem during the United Nations meeting in January 1948. Pakistan’s representative to the United Nations, Zafrullah Khan, explained his suspicions that Great Britain was involved in undermining peaceful means to end the hostilities in Kashmir:

Thus the failure of the Security Council to secure an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute is attributed largely to the unfortunate intervention of Mr. Atlee from London. That took place probably at the instance of Lord Mountbatten, who must have been moved by Mr. Nehru to intercede with the Prime Minister. The argument used might have been that the Security Council’s persistence in laying down the conditions given in the draft resolution in order to secure a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir might push India into the arms of the USSR; this argument has been used not only over this problem but over others also.<sup>68</sup>

These actions of Mr. Atlee and Lord Mountbatten were done in the name of securing peace; they just wanted to be able to have both India and Pakistan be happy with the results. Mountbatten convinced Nehru to back out because he was afraid that India might

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<sup>67</sup> Minutes of talks with John Foster Dulles, *SWJN*, second series, vol. 22, pg 510, paragraphs 12 and 13. [...*The Cold War and the West*, pg 125.]

<sup>68</sup> Khan, Muhammad Zafrulla, Sir, *The Forgotten Years: Memoirs of Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan*, edited by A.H. Batalvi, Sang-E-Meel Publications, Lahore-Pakistan, 1991, pg 169.

form an alliance with the Soviet Union in order to secure victory in the Security Council decision: “Mountbatten warned that if the Soviet Union were to come to India’s rescue by exercising a veto in the Security Council, she would appear throughout the country as the saviour of India against the machinations of the United States and the United Kingdom.”<sup>69</sup> Just as Britain’s Kashmir policy towards India concentrated on the fear of the Soviet Union, economic interests and military interests governed Britain’s views toward Pakistan in the conflict.

Historians, particularly those that are in support of India, like Panagrahi and Behara, will explain that as the Kashmir situation began and continued, Great Britain was more partial towards Pakistan. One of these reasons was because Pakistan was a Muslim nation and the UK Cabinet wanted to maintain good trade relations with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Oil was the main trade resource from the area and still is today. It remains the lifeblood of Great Britain’s economic and military power. Instead of proving that Britain was more partial to Pakistan, this information will explain how complicated the economic and diplomatic matters were. This would lead Prime Minister Atlee and the UK Cabinet to desire neither India nor Pakistan to gain victory in this conflict.

Pakistan was built to be a haven for the Muslims who were in British India and hence a nation with Islam as their main religion. A country’s religion usually does not constitute how Great Britain views a nation but because the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region were Islamic, this changed. The Middle East and the Persian Gulf, like today, had access to oil and oil was the lifeblood of Great Britain. Because of this, Great Britain wanted to keep friendly relations with the Islamic world in order to have access to oil. As Admiral Cunningham explains when Pakistan was appealing to Great Britain for their

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<sup>69</sup> Mountbatten to Atlee, 8 February 1948. File L/WS/1/1140, India Office Records, London.

independence: “If Pakistan’s application were rejected, it would shatter Britain’s relations with the ‘whole Moslem world’ to the detriment of her strategic position in the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Indian subcontinent.”<sup>70</sup> This was one reason Pakistan gained its independence and would continue to be a reason why Pakistan did not fall into ruin. Problems in Palestine complicated Great Britain’s position on the Kashmir conflict.

In 1947, the Palestine issue in which the Jewish community was granted Israel was causing a stirring of emotions amongst the Islamic world. Great Britain had been, reluctantly, at the forefront to help Israel become a nation and was now on thin ice with the Muslim community. Because of this, Britain would be more inclined to make sure Pakistan did not lose during the Kashmir conflict. In a letter to Mr. Atlee, Prime Minister of England, Britain’s Foreign Office explains how the Middle East should not conclude that Great Britain is opposing an Islamic nation in an international dispute:

The Foreign Secretary has expressed anxiety lest we should appear to be siding with India in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir which is now before the United Nations Security Council. With the situation as critical as it is in Palestine, Mr. Bevin feels that we must be very careful to guard against the danger of aligning the whole of Islam against us, which might be the case were Pakistan to obtain a false impression of our attitude in the Security Council.<sup>71</sup>

Therefore, Britain had to make sure Pakistan had support from them in order to maintain good relations with the Muslim world. Britain also realized that Pakistan would be a valuable military ally compared to India.

Pakistan was willing to ally with the Western Powers and allow Great Britain to leave their officers in charge of their armies. This was useful for Britain’s military

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<sup>70</sup> ...*Transfer of Power*, Viceroy’s Staff Meeting, 1 May 1947, item 272.

<sup>71</sup> Sargent’s minute to PM dated 6 January 1948. File FO 800/470, Public Records Office, London. [...*War and Diplomacy* pg. 111.]

presence in the Indian subcontinent because Pakistan was closer to the Suez Canal for their navy and closer to the Soviet Union for their Royal Air Force. It is because of these reasons that the United Kingdom Cabinet at Whitehall decided on this view of Pakistan:

From the strategic point of view there were overwhelming arguments in favor of West Pakistan remaining within the Commonwealth, namely, that we should obtain important strategic facilities, the port of Karachi, air bases, and the support of Moslem manpower in the future: be able to ensure the continued integrity of Afghanistan; and be able to increase our prestige and impose our position throughout the Moslem world. Whilst the acceptance of Pakistan only into the Commonwealth would involve a commitment for its support against Hindustan, the danger would be small, and it was doubtful if Pakistan... would ask for more than the support of British Officers in executive and advisory positions.<sup>72</sup>

This decision seemed the most logical to take because it helped Great Britain maintain good relations with the Muslim community and it provided them a great military position against the Soviet Union. Therefore, Great Britain could not allow a full-blown conflict to occur in Kashmir to jeopardize its military, diplomatic, and economic interests, while also not allowing British motives toward either India or Pakistan to be known to the other nation.

On October 27, India acquired Kashmir from Maharaja Hari Singh. This was because the will of the UK Cabinet was manifested through India's Governor-General. Lord Mountbatten was able to convince India that sending troops immediately in response to the tribal invasion constituted an invasion of a neutral territory, an action that would seem barbarous to the international world.<sup>73</sup> Things looked good for India because the Maharaja was afraid for his life from the invading tribesman. Therefore, Maharaja Hari Singh wrote a letter to Lord Mountbatten, which showed he decided to have

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<sup>72</sup> Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting on 12 May 1947. Mansergh et al., *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X, item 416. [...*War and Diplomacy*, pg 17.]

<sup>73</sup> ... *Roots of Conflict, Path to Peace*, pg.35-36.

Kashmir become part of India: “Naturally, they [Government of India] can’t send the help asked for by me without my state acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government.”<sup>74</sup> Lord Mountbatten was quite partial to India and by making it seem like he was helping them, he was maintaining the façade of Britain’s total support. Everything looked like India would settle this conflict before it began, unfortunately it was not that simple.

Because Maharaja Hari Singh did not have a vote amongst his citizens on which nation they wanted to join, India’s acquisition of Kashmir went against the Radcliffe Boundary Commission. This meant that Pakistan contested that they should have right to Kashmir. Like other cases, involving the merging of princely states into either India or Pakistan, Pakistan should have obtained Kashmir, primarily for two reasons. First, the population of Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir was much higher than the Hindu population. A census taken in 1941 showed that about 77.11% of Jammu and Kashmir’s population was Muslim.<sup>75</sup> Second, Kashmir is right next to Pakistan. The partitioning of India and Pakistan was based upon the geographic areas where Muslims were most prominent in British India and Kashmir is right next to Pakistan. With that argument, India was able to acquire the Junagadh principality. Great Britain understood all this and in the end, they tried desperately to find a peaceful solution but also one that suited their needs more than those of India or Pakistan.

When the Kashmir conflict was beginning, Great Britain realized that in order to maintain their motives of containing the Soviet Union, appeasing the Islamic community

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<sup>74</sup> Lakhanpal 1965: 55-57 [*The Cold War and The West*, pg 63.]

<sup>75</sup> ...*Story of Kashmir*, Appendix I.



in the Middle East, and keeping a military presence in the Indian subcontinent, neither India nor Pakistan could be the victor in this conflict. Britain had officers in the leading roles in both India and Pakistan's militaries. They were hoping to have both India and Pakistan become part of their Commonwealth and in this regard, India was more difficult to handle than Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India, was allowed to stay on as the Governor-General of India and was able to help keep India and Pakistan from going to war. Great Britain had already experienced the acquisition of Junagadh into India in which the Muslim ruler was going against the will of his Hindu citizens. With the Stand Down orders given to all the British officers, Britain made sure that none of their troops became involved with only India or Pakistan.

Their fear of the Soviet Union's influence spreading into the India subcontinent was justified in their eyes because Nehru's non-aligned policy made Britain suspicious of India's political motives. In addition, they were afraid that if the chaos of partition caused India or Pakistan to fall into ruins that their citizens or government might consider communism to fix their problems. British military strategy relied on having their forces in the India subcontinent in order to maintain control of the Indian Ocean and to monitor the Soviet threat; hence, India could not lose in the Kashmir conflict. Oil was the lifeblood of Great Britain and their most ready supplier like today was the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Because of their support in the creation of Israel in the Palestine conflict, Britain was afraid of further angering the Muslim world and they thought if they did not support Pakistan that this would occur. Geographically, Pakistan was in the northwest of the India subcontinent and they were fine with accepting British military officers to

command their armies. Therefore, Pakistan had to be supported because the loss of economic wealth and military strategy would be a monumental blow to Great Britain.

To maintain this façade of no complete support for either India or Pakistan, Britain allowed the partition to rage across the two nations. They were desperately trying to find peace to the dispute but they wanted a peace on their own terms. Britain even convinced India and Pakistan to send the matter to the United Nations for peaceful negotiations while Britain worked behind the scenes to achieve political gridlock. The Kashmir discord, which is a festering wound of the political policies of India and Pakistan, has lasted for sixty-three years in part because Great Britain was not willing to accept the defeat of either India or Pakistan. This struggle could have ended in a few months if India had been allowed to repel the tribal invaders or if India had left them alone and Pakistan took Kashmir. Either way, the Kashmir conflict remains a muddled affair in large part to the double-dealing of Great Britain in 1947-48.


# Appendices



Map 1: Jammu & Kashmir Present Day.  
[http://thecandideye.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/kashmir\\_map.jpg](http://thecandideye.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/kashmir_map.jpg)




Map 2: Gujarat District Location Map. [Red region is the Gujarat District. The black region was where the Princely State of Junagadh was.]  
[http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cc/Gujarat\\_district\\_location\\_map\\_Junagadh.svg/530px-Gujarat\\_district\\_location\\_map\\_Junagadh.svg.png](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/cc/Gujarat_district_location_map_Junagadh.svg/530px-Gujarat_district_location_map_Junagadh.svg.png)



Map 3: India Before Partition 1940.

<http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelpregion/asia/india/indianindependence/map1/indiabeforepartition.jpg>



Map 4: India and Pakistan 2007-08.

<http://viviansalama.files.wordpress.com/2007/08/map-india-pakistan.jpg>

**APPENDIX I**  
**Population Statistics of Jammu and Kashmir State According to the**  
**Census Report of 1941**

| District or Province                  | Area<br>(Square<br>miles) | Total<br>population | Muslims   | Non-<br>Muslims |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| 1. JAMMU &                            |                           |                     |           |                 |
| KASHMIR STATE . . . . .               | 84,471                    | 4,021,616           | 3,101,247 | 920,369         |
| 2. <i>Jammu Province</i> . . . .      | 12,378                    | 1,981,433           | 1,215,676 | 765,757         |
| (a) Jammu District . . .              | 1,147                     | 431,362             | 170,789   | 260,573         |
| (b) Kathua District . . . .           | 1,023                     | 177,672             | 45,214    | 132,458         |
| (c) Udampur District . .              | 5,070                     | 294,217             | 128,327   | 165,890         |
| (d) Reasi District . . . . .          | 1,789                     | 257,903             | 175,539   | 82,364          |
| (e) Mirpur District . . . .           | 1,627                     | 386,655             | 310,880   | 75,775          |
| (f) Chenani Jagir . . . . .           | 95                        | 11,796              | 2,205     | 9,591           |
| (g) Poonch Jagir . . . . .            | 1,627                     | 421,828             | 382,722   | 39,106          |
| 3. <i>Kashmir Province</i> . . . .    | 8,539                     | 1,728,705           | 1,615,478 | 113,227         |
| (a) Baramulla District . .            | 3,317                     | 612,428             | 590,936   | 21,492          |
| (b) Anantnag District . .             | 2,814                     | 851,606             | 778,684   | 72,922          |
| (c) Muzaffarabad District             | 2,408                     | 264,671             | 245,858   | 18,813          |
| 4. <i>Frontier District</i> . . . . . | 63,554                    | 311,478             | 270,093   | 41,385          |
| (a) Laddakh District . .              | 45,762                    | 195,431             | 154,492   | 40,939          |
| (b) Astore District . . . .           | 1,632                     | 17,026              | 16,878    | 148             |
| (c) Gilgit (Leased Area)              | 1,480                     | 22,495              | 22,296    | 199             |
| (d) Gilgit Agency . . . . .           | 14,680                    | 76,526              | 76,427    | 99              |

**NOTE**

In 1941 Muslims constituted 77.11% of the total population of Jammu and Kashmir. The Hindus were 20.12%, and Sikhs 1.64% of the population. The increase in population since 1941 has been estimated at 1% per annum.

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